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 Peacebuilding in Colombia and Peru following their late-20
th
 and early 21
st
 century 
civil wars is a challenging proposition. In this study, it becomes necessary as indigenous 
peoples and peasants resist domination by extractive industries and governments in their 
thrall. Whether they protest nonviolently or rebel in arms, they are targeted for human-
rights violations, especially murder, disappearance and displacement. The armed actors, 
state, insurgency, paramilitaries or drug traffickers, destroy civic institutions (local or 
regional government) and the civil (nonprofit) sector and replace them with their own 
authoritarian versions. Therefore, peacebuilding has emphasized rebuilding civic 
institutions, civil society and local initiatives, also personal relationships across scales 
and sectors. What has been called “the third side” has become an important resource for 
the parties materially affected by the conflict, a role well suited to civil society.   
I examine peacebuilding across levels of authority, complexity and interaction, as 
well as across scales such as international, national and local. I also look at peacebuilding 
  
across a hierarchy of human needs and the full complement of human rights. In the 
centerpiece of the thesis, I focus on case studies from two postmodern ethnographies.  
One looks at highland villagers in Peru undergoing Western-style evaluations and 
treatment for their trauma in the wake of the civil violence and rituals of reconciliation 
allowing former rebels who abused human rights back into the community.  The 
professionalization of human rights, along with a Western bias in official discourse, has 
blunted the full affect (emotions) and hidden the full effect of the mass violence from the 
broader audience. With human-rights professionals in Colombia, this professionalization 
also came at a price. The costs there were the fissures in the human-rights community 
across the local-to-national and reconciliation-to-liberation perspectives. Both groups 
required spiritual and psychological resources to anchor them in the midst of horrific 
violence. A new ethic and cultural paradigm of “interculturality” could greatly assist 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding in these situations.   
Peacebuilding for the long term depends on sustainable-equitable development; 
respect for rule of law and transitional justice; retraining state and rogue armed actors;  
effective land reform; and resettling the displaced.  
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When they resisted Shining Path directives, the peasants were warned that the 
communal ranch would be burned down just like the [agrarian society] cooperative. The 
threat obliged the comuneros [the members of the collective] to divide all of the animals 
among themselves and divide the remaining equipment among the neighborhoods of the 
community. It was a painful decision, executed only out of fear of the reprisals that 
would result from disobedience. The objective was not only to liquidate all productive 
projects that might divert the peasants from the path of the people’s war, but also, in the 
words of senderista cadres, “that every type of organization disappear.” 
 Nelson Manrique, “The War for the Central Sierra,” Shining and Other Paths, 1998 
[emphasis added] 
 
This impact [of FARC] can be assessed not only in terms of its role as a state with an 
almost undisputed territorial control and its monopoly expansion of commerce, 
providing means of transportation (such as speed boats [mostly for the drug trade]), 
constructing landing strips, and adjudicating and arbitrating social and personal 
conflicts. This is in addition to providing health and education services. In many 
municipalities [similar to counties] of these areas, the only authority, beyond the 
symbolic state police station in the capital centers of the municipalities, is that of the 
FARC, and it is the sole provider of essential public services.  
Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in 
Colombia, 2002 
[emphasis added] 
 
What is at stake in postwar contexts is the reconstruction of social relationships, 
moral communities, cultural forms, and economic networks, and the reinvention of 
ritual life that allows people to make sense of suffering endured and suffering 
inflicted.  
Kimberly Theidon, Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru. 2013 
[emphasis added] 
 
For the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] that focused on state-sponsored and 
paramilitary violence against community activists, simply ending the guerilla 
violence was not enough. They argued that without ameliorating the root causes of 
the conflict – poverty, inequality, and political corruption – the dissolution of the 
guerillas’ military machine would not lead to a reduction in violence. Many human 
rights defenders viewed the peace activists’ slogans, such as blanket rejections of 
violence and generic statements in support of peace, as a competing discourse that 
undermined efforts to ensure justice and accountability. In fact, many of the early 
peace initiatives, such as mass demonstrations against guerilla violence and the 
symbolic votes [non-binding referendums] for peace, did not address the issues of 
social reform that NGO activists viewed as the foundation for a lasting peace.  
Winifred Tate, Counting the Dead:  
The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia, 2007 
[emphasis added] 
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Chapter I 
 
The Terms of the Discussion 
and the Difficulties We Face 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The social and moral chaos that engulfs any community during times of civil war is the 
result of an exceeding complex phenomenon, a zone of multi-lateral contention that that 
can become exponentially unstable. Taming this beast with various programs designed to 
foster peace is an equally complex process. Therefore, isolating a single thesis in this 
study to explore in any deterministic way, among a multitude of conflicts and interests, is 
difficult and probably misleading. Still, we cannot explore every facet of a society either, 
so we have to pare our concerns down to a small handful at most. We will be doing that 
here by focusing on fundamental issues of social justice, aggression, ritualized and 
therapeutic healing, social and individual, and the social construction of human rights.  
 More specifically, as there have been a number of calls lately within peace, equity 
and development circles to better support civil society, we will be examining those issues 
closely in our case studies. This is in keeping with a recent call from the UN for the 
world’s nations to better protect members of civil society. The UN News Centre 
highlights this issue in a March 3, 2014, article that is headlined: “UN Human Rights 
Council opens with calls to protect, support civil society activism.” This emphasis 
marked the 25th meeting of the council. Produced by the UN News Service, the article 
leads with:  
 
Noting that more and more people around the world are taking to the streets to lay 
claim to their rights, United Nations officials opened the latest session of the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva today with calls for the protection of members of civil 
society who pursue justice in their countries. 
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 Streets, airwaves, entire countries are buzzing with demands for economic, 
social and political justice,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay 
said, as she opened the high-level segment of the 25th session of the Council, the 
Organization’s major human rights organ. 
[UN News Centre 2014; emphasis added] 
 
In the spirit of this emphasis, we will be taking a close look at civil-society workers in 
need of better protection and support. In two case studies, we will examine how the 
professionalization of human rights changes the professionals who do the work, the 
nature of the work they do and the way the moral knowledge of a given population is 
socially constructed and interpreted.  
 Among human-rights professionals in Colombia, we will look at how always being in 
close contact with death and constantly risking one’s life affects these people. We will do 
this in Colombia by examining the physical security and mental health of human-rights 
(advocacy) professionals. In the highlands of Peru, among the people who suffered the 
most, we will explore the professionalization of state human-rights (trauma-treatment) 
workers dealing with the severe emotional and spiritual crises afflicting the survivors of 
the violence as an initiative of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(PTRC). There, the civil-sector workers needing protection, that is, validation and 
support so that they do not become extinct as a social role, are the Native healers called 
curanderos. They needed to be better integrated into the trauma-treatment process 
through an intercultural hermeneutical approach. While the trauma counseling was less 
than wholly successful, another PTRC-supported project was. The National Repentance 
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Law was effective in encouraging and enabling a public repentance process – an 
intercultural mix of Native and Christian belief systems – with which to integrate former 
human-rights abusers back into village life.  
 Regarding methodology, on the macro-scale, emphasizing etics, we will try to make 
good use of human ecology, political economy and social anthropology, and on the 
micro-scale, exploring emics, we will be working mostly in cultural, psychological and 
belief-systems anthropology, particularly in two case studies. (Etics, how a population 
actually lives, and emics, ideas about how they wish to live, are ways of looking at 
behavior and ideas about behavior, respectively. They have been derived from linguistic 
terminology, for the spoken language, phonetics, and the idealized language, phonemics). 
We will restrain such an extensive investigation by looking at victims of human-
rights violations and their advocates in various social locations within the broader social 
organization. We will then explore a few of what might be called moral epistemologies, 
ways of understanding the relationship of human rights to peacebuilding during and after 
the violence. We will do this in close quarters through two ethnographies but also ground 
it in other social-science data. Aside from our two moral analytics, critical theory and a 
Ricoeur-like “hermeneutics of consciousness,” our main social analytic will be 
examining peacebuilding at various levels, or scales, from the international level, or 
macro-scale, to the national level, the meso-scale, and finally, to the historically less 
explored but increasingly discussed local level, or micro-scale.  
 Regarding political economy and asymmetries of scale, we should note that each 
country has been in many ways, and still is in some, a frontier economy in most of the 
countryside. Frontier justice and semi-feudal (patron-client) relations have long held 
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sway there. A weak state presence has meant a weak local government and civic 
structure as well. Civil society and traditional judicial and cooperative institutions have 
filled this gap in the countryside, but they can be easily overwhelmed, as occurs during 
mass, pluralistic or civil violence. The introductions of cheap, reliable small arms, 
training in dirty war, international collusion in the art and science of terror, along with a 
rush for figurative, and sometimes literal, gold in the form of extractive industries such as 
mining, oil and gas, timber and plantation agriculture (palm oil, bananas, coffee, cacao 
and cattle raising, and of course, coca for cocaine), have produced extreme levels of 
violence and a variety of armed actors, all of whom vie for control and are of dubious 
legitimacy.  
 It is a cultural geography and political ecology that is still being “tamed,” that is, 
bureaucratized, routinized and thereby flattened out socially, ethically and emotionally. 
This process brings rationality and manageability but it also can diminish the individual 
or the small group and their suffering. 
 In particular, we will take a close look at:  
 
 Restoring nonviolent and cooperative relationships among civic leaders and 
citizens at the village level in the wake of the civil war and its atrocities in the 
highlands of Peru. These were some of the most abused of the highland peasantry 
in the poorest parts the country. This face-to-face interaction of the abused and 
their abusers represents some of the most socially torturous, morally complex and 
spiritual redemptive aspects of peace building, and among the least-investigated.  
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 The professionalization of human-rights workers in Colombia, which, besides 
the NGOs, includes increasing numbers of human-rights staff in government and 
the military. This development provides increasing credibility for human-rights 
work but causes tension within and among groups and across levels (scales). 
Regardless, because of this emphasis on professionalism, in both countries, there 
is now a much better-educated public and a better-trained human-rights 
workforce.   
  
 Precisely because peacebuilding is so extensive and multi-laterall, we will also 
explore a number of its other aspects, meso- and macro-scale activities, social, political, 
economic and ecological. We will do that with more abstract, less narrative data. Those 
discussions will come later and be broader. Within this latter part of the study (part IV), 
one focus will be the work of faith-based and indigenous-rights organizations in human 
rights and peacebuilding. Of great importance in building sustainable peace in Latin 
America is a maturing Native-identity movement becoming increasingly well established 
and geopolitically savvy. It has found it can work around unresponsive national 
governments and gain a hearing with key international groups. From there they can 
sometimes create enough leverage to stop the violence and build a fledgling peace.  
 Also of great consequence, especially with a new pope championing the poor and 
powerless, is a theological movement of liberation, a discourse about rich and poor, 
powerful and powerless. It has gripped and divided the church, especially in Latin 
America. Liberation theology represents a deep and searching inventory of the tradition 
for its support of liberation, for the “least of these,” as Jesus once said of the poor. Its 
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demise has been celebrated a few times, but chances are good we will be a long time 
totaling up the number of serious discussions, about politics, religion, economics, even 
ecology, that liberation theology has transformed, especially in Latin America. So both 
the indigenous-rights and liberation movements have produced people and institutions 
that can function in what we are going to call a third-side capacity, actively as mediators, 
activists and peace communities, or reflectively, as writers, scholars and social critics or 
analysts. In addition, a number of national and international, NGO and intergovernmental 
groups have supplied third-side human capital (or capacity) at various times. Any of these 
might constitute this critical aspect of peacebuilding. It has theoretical and practical 
implications we will explore. 
 
Introducing the third side 
Third-side interests are a concept articulated by anthropologist William Ury to 
characterize an evolving approach to mitigating and ending conflict. Ury has helped 
popularize conflict resolution in the United States but he has done extensive work 
elsewhere as well. Particularly relevant for our purposes is that he has made a specific 
commitment to the resolution of civil wars. With former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, he 
even founded the International Negotiation Network, dedicated to stopping civil wars, the 
most common kind worldwide. These sorts of conflicts provide the social context for the 
analysis of peacebuilding we will pursue.  
In The Third Side, Ury (2000) argues that a critical factor in resolving intractable 
conflicts is to bring in the “third side,” those physically, organizationally or systemically 
near the conflict, those with a critical stake in it. When they get involved, the issues are no 
 8 
longer bilateral. They become multi-lateral. This is generally to be distinguished from 
any independent third party chosen to facilitate negotiations appointed by the state or an 
NGO. At its best, the fully flexing third side becomes a kind of coalition, formal or 
informal, of the interests of the community – physical, political or economic. They are 
weighing in and saying they have every right to do so:  
 
The third side is the surrounding community, which serves as a container for any 
escalating conflict. In the absence of that container, serious conflict between two 
parties all too easily turns into destructive strife.…  
 The third side is not a transcendent individual or institution who dominates all, 
but rather the emergent will of the community. It is an impulse that arises from the 
vital relationships linking each member and every other member of the community. 
[Ury 2000:7,14; emphasis added] 
 
He calls it “a mobilized community acting systematically motivated by a new story” (Ury 
2000). Ury offers a social explanation of how the third side works, below. There is also a 
psychological aspect we should touch upon. We will do that briefly below and in more 
depth in our case studies.    
 
How does the third side work psychologically? 
 Another explanation is more psychological but augments Ury’s nicely. It has to do 
with a notion psychologists and psychological anthropologists refer to as “theory of 
mind.” It explains how we imagine what others are thinking as a way to anticipate their 
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behavior. The hypothesis is that we are able to construct parallel selves as tools and 
heuristics for modeling the behavior of others. These are probabilistic scenarios we run in 
a psychic virtuality, our imaginations. We use these scenarios to explain and anticipate 
behavior, and thereby, better meet our needs in various groups, each of which is different, 
each individual of which is different (Bownds 1999; Bor 2012; Whitehead 2008).  
Theory of mind and a related concept, theater of mind – stemming from play rather 
than work – emerge early in childhood and early in our evolution as well, binding groups 
before language, in coordination of hunting and gathering, in ritualized song and dance, 
in trade and other areas (Whitehead 2008). The hypothesis is they paved the way for 
symbolic and linguistic communication.  
Both theories depend on a recent discovery called “mirror neurons.” Initially believed 
to be activated by the observation of concrete activities such as tool use, they are now 
thought to also mirror more abstract or social behavior. When we observe an activity that 
commands our attention and strikes us as useful, our neurons fire in concert with those of 
the person performing the activity, in the same place in the brain and body, and in 
virtually the same way as that person, whether the behavior is interpersonal or solitary, 
social or technical (Whitehead 2008).  
This has important implications for social-learning theory, the notion that we can’t 
learn everything by trial and error, as in classical behaviorism. Instead we internalize and 
try out various scenarios virtually, imaginatively, as we observe the behavior of others. It 
also places the birth of consciousness in a matrix of social interaction.  
 For our purposes, it helps explain how belligerents consumed almost entirely with 
their pursuit of conflict might be given pause to think about consequences outside their 
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bipolar world. A capacity to imagine what others are thinking and feeling, and so are 
likely to do, has helped us achieve our social goals as we mix with a complex variety of 
people. This may represent a Chomsky-like predisposition to understand the thought and 
behavior of others not unlike or related to our acquisition of language. The effects of any 
“theory/theater of mind” on conflict resolution and the efficacy of the third side should be 
investigated further, particularly as they relate to our understanding of empathy.  
 
How does the third side work socially? 
 Socially, the third side succeeds by using the power of peers, the community of 
interested parties materially affected by the conflict, the more the merrier. Ury (2000) 
explains: 
 
The third side possesses the power of peer pressure and the force of public opinion. It 
is people power…. It influences the parties primarily through an appeal to their 
interests and to community norms. In every conflict, there usually exists not just one 
possible third party but a multitude. Individually, we may not be able to intervene 
effectively, but collectively we are potentially more powerful than any two conflicting 
parties. Organizing ourselves into a coalition, we can balance the power between the 
parties and protect the weaker one.  
[2000:online; emphasis added] 
 
The emphasis on protecting weaker parties as a key to peace is not always explored, but it 
should be considered integral to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. If weaker parties 
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and their interests are not protected in conflict resolution, it is largely coercion by other 
means.  
 It also succeeds by proceeding from a viewpoint focused on common ground, on 
shared interests, perhaps using some outgrowth of theory of mind. It operates on the 
assumption that most issues have more than two sides. They have many. The moral and 
pragmatic appeal is to the community as an extended family, perhaps engaging instincts 
for community encoded in our pre-settlement past. 
 Another pillar is its support for dialog and nonviolence. The focus is on process, on 
how we deal with our differences as well as what they are about and what the resolution 
is. It means looking for the limit concept of a “win-win-win” scenario, what Ury calls a 
“triple win,” satisfying the bi-polar interests and those of the surrounding community. 
The third side uses multiple roles in various ways, so it will be a good fit with our multi-
dimensional, multi-sectoral approach to peacebuilding.  
 Regarding their contributions to conflict resolution, Ury lists these roles that third 
siders can play. The following detail various social and psychological services they can 
provide. (Emphasis added to examples in this study; see appendix 1 for a full explanation 
from The Third Side web site.) 
 
(1) The provider. Conflict stems from the frustration of basic human needs. 
Providers share resources and knowledge. They help others feel secure, respected and 
empowered. This would include humanitarian and human-rights workers, any that 
provide physical security, food, water, development or land reform. 
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 (2) The teacher. Teachers offer lessons in conflict transformation. These may 
involve an alternative worldview. They teach tolerance and problem-solving. Various 
education-for-peace efforts in Colombia and Peru fit this category well. 
 (3) The bridge-builder. Anyone can build bridges across social, economic or 
cultural divides by facilitating good relationships. Bridge-builders create cross-cutting 
ties, develop joint projects and foster dialog. This category includes church and 
native leaders reaching out to rebels and the state in hopes of mediation, or state or 
rebel officials doing something similar.  
 (4) The mediator. Mediators try to reconcile competing interests. They listen, ask 
people what they really want and suggest alternatives. They bring parties to 
negotiations, facilitate communication and help them find solutions. This role in 
particular has been performed by various tribes and inter-tribal organizations and by 
progressives of the Catholic and Protestant churches. 
 (5) The arbiter. An arbiter is usually appointed by the court and can determine a 
settlement. Arbiters replace destructive conflict with nonviolence, promote justice 
and encourage negotiation. This role is appointed by the court and is generally 
outside the scope of this study.  
(6) The equalizer. Equalizers exercise their influence in particular on the more 
powerful. They help bring them  to negotiations, build a more collaborative 
democracy and support nonviolence. Human-rights workers especially provide this 
service. 
(7) The healer. A healer sees the conflict will not be resolved until people and 
relationships have healed. Healers create the right climate, listen, acknowledge 
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feelings and encourage an apology. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s mental-health workers and curanderos fit here, but with different 
methods and results. The absence of such efforts at healing are evident among 
human-rights professionals in Colombia.  
 (8) The witness. These track conflict to keep it from escalating. They speak out 
and seek help. Witness for Peace (an NGO explored later) is an example of this role.  
(9) The referee. Referees limit the size and terms of the conflict. They establish 
rules for fair fighting, remove offensive weapons and build nonviolent defenses. 
Peace communities, commissions and committees fit here. Roles stemming from 
customary law provided by the Nasa in Colombia, examined in part IV, are another 
good example of this activity. So are the citizen watch and law-enforcement services 
provided by the so-called rondas campesinas in highland Peru.  
 
All or part of each are represented in this study. Of great significance in particular, 
Indian and church leaders have served in any number of these capacities in the pursuit of 
conflict resolution and transformation. (Conflict transformation is the  process of 
managing social and environmental change to minimize conflict, but one that has no 
definite resolution.) They have also helped to create zones of peace and facilitated 
negotiations with the state behind the scenes, other third-side roles. For both the 
peasantry and the remote tribes, critical concerns have been battling transnational 
corporations for hundreds of years regarding access to natural resources. They most want 
to protect their lives and lands from exploitive development by petroleum, mining, timber 
or agricultural interests. For the rural and urban poor, their issues involve the most basic 
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aspects of development: health care; sanitary water; agricultural and credit 
cooperatives; literacy and educational projects; and a range of movements for civil and 
political rights, often focused on land rights and reform or greater autonomy in the local 
economy. 
Land reform has been a contentious issue for centuries. For the indigenous peoples, 
fueled by a galloping cultural pride, self-determination regarding land and natural 
resources is an overriding concern. Facing the same kind of threats from extractive 
industries, but not in the same ways as the peasants, indigenous peoples in the mountains, 
jungle and savanna frequently fight transnational corporations and national governments 
for control of their most precious resource, their land, so precious it is not a resource to 
them. It is the source of all. Or the Source of All, depending. It is therefore not a 
commodity.  
Having tried to escape Western-style “development” for decades, even centuries, 
many of these remote peoples, having nearly lost that fight, face extinction. They want 
development on their own terms, but failing that, they increasingly want to be left alone, 
and their land left alone. But oil and gas, mining and agricultural interests with large 
budgets, advanced technology and political influence have little intention of doing so.  
 
Ury and his critics 
 Ury and other “popularizers” of conflict resolution have been criticized by a few 
scholars and practitioners as being simplistic, naïve or otherwise too optimistic. Ury’s 
breakthrough came with Roger Fisher and Bruce Paton in Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving In (Fisher, Ury and Paton 1991). It was of great value in 
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businesses and boardrooms, in labor negotiations, in family matters and even in 
environmental disputes. But it was primarily a popular treatment.  
 The Third Side was published before one such critic, Alan Tidwell (1998), published 
Conflict Resolved? – his examination of conflict-resolution theory – so he could not 
address it. But he did offer a relevant opinion on Getting to Yes. His most pointed 
comments are: “These popular texts tend to suffer from the same three criticisms: they 
trivialize conflict, routinize methods of handling conflict, and undervalue the role that 
situation and context play in handling conflict” (Tidwell 1998:25). Still, this surely must 
be true of almost any attempt to help large numbers of people process violent social 
conflict, then reconcile and at least partially heal after it. The sad fact is it probably has to 
be abstracted and routinized if we are to help hundreds of thousands, millions if you 
include the displaced. The question becomes how much flattening of affect and 
trivializing of effects there is, how much abstraction and routinization, trivialization by 
bureaucracy, we can afford, before it becomes inhumane itself.  We will explore this in 
our case studies. These popular conflict-resolution books, Tidwell says, underestimate the 
power of emotions. Individual anger can fester. Social anger can develop over very long 
periods and can take a long time to resolve (1998; Gerlach 2010).  
 Yet, by the same token, he apparently is willing to trivialize Fisher, Ury and Paton 
(1991) when they advise acknowledging your opponent’s emotions. He knocks down a 
straw man when he proposes we imagine conflict-resolution facilitators telling Nazi 
perpetrators in a tribunal that a Holocaust survivor needs to ventilate her emotions. He is 
misunderstanding the more utilitarian reach of the publication and criticizing the content 
for being targeted at such an audience.  
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 More to the point, however, he criticizes the use of language and in this particular 
case, he’s probably right. We will be looking at the language of conflict and trauma and 
its effects on victims a little later. However, there’s a hermeneutical issue as well – a 
broader issue of matching message to audience across popular, scholarly and practical 
levels. In general, he criticizes Getting to Yes for being a simplified application of a very 
complex art and science, points well taken in a more philosophical argument. That was its 
purpose, and it is probably better these ideas are in broader circulation because of it. In 
his defense, Tidwell is mostly criticizing any naiveté about imbalances of power in 
negotiations. Just changing language and perceptions may never be all that is required. 
This is his main concern, and it should be taken seriously.  
 
Catholic social witness as an emergent property  
The region’s most dominant religious force by far, is the Catholic Church. It applies 
its own leverage on human rights and peacebuilding, from within and without these two 
very Catholic countries. But for most of the last 500 years, the church has served as one 
of the overlords, an agent of colonialism, herding large numbers of Indians into missions 
and indoctrinating them while exploiting their labor under conditions of bondage or 
tenancy. There is no way to paint a prettier picture here.  
Still, some of these missions saved indigenous peoples (or Native peoples, or 
Indians), from starvation and massacre. A few notable priests spoke out and began to 
articulate an ethic of human rights. This history of advocacy for the first peoples of this 
continent from within the church continues to be melted down and recast. It is a Euro-
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American institution, but it is a source of cultural and subcultural pride for 
disadvantaged peoples facing a large, rights-abusive state. 
Eventually, Catholic missionary strategy accepted an overlay of Christian 
iconography on Native spirituality. This approach to evangelization, and colonization, 
was eventually acceptable to the Catholic hierarchy and ultimately more appealing to the 
indigenous peoples. It was also easier, and more humane, than eradicating it. It focused 
on cultural parallels where possible. This Christianity-dominated mix is sometimes called 
the popular (or people’s) church. It is a classic example of religious syncretism but not 
without imbalances in power. Christianity is still the spiritual container and paradigm.  
 
In the spirit of de las Casas, a prominent example of postmodern social action in Latin 
America comes from Chiapas in Mexico. After a long history of deprivation and violation 
of human rights, an indigenous rebellion riveted the world, briefly, in 1994. It had a 
romantic idealism, a moral edginess and a scathing critique of globalization upon the 
birth of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It also made use of the latest 
technology, the Internet, to tell a compelling story about poverty and pride.  
Chiapas is interesting for our purposes because this eruption of indigenous ire took 
place where the bishop who showed the most concern for indigenous Meso-America 
during the earliest, most brutal stages of colonization, Bartolomé de las Casas, lived and 
worked during the mid-1500s. He is the prophet and paradigm for this kind of social 
witness. Long before anyone ever uttered liberation theology or international human 
rights, he was a pioneer in both. He challenged church and state over the abuse of the 
indigenous peoples and was moved around and marginalized because of it. In recent 
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memory, Samuel Ruiz, bishop of San Cristobál de las Casas (named for Bartolomé), 
functioned as a third sider in negotiations with the Zapatistas, as the rebels were called. 
He has served the Native community there and has often taken up the same kind of 
advocacy as de las Casas.  
Closer to home, related to our case studies, that is, Gustavo Gutierrez (1973), a 
Peruvian from an indigenous background, is considered the father of liberation theology. 
He wrote the founding volume, A Theology of Liberation. It gave this theology a 
theoretical footing it has not really relinquished. Noteworthy as well is another exemplar 
and founder, Colombian theologian, activist and guerrilla Camilo Torres, a Jesuit 
sociologist from an aristocratic family in Bogotá who felt driven from the academy for 
his views. He then founded a major group of guerillas and was killed in his first battle. 
But he left behind an important legacy of action and reflection – the twin methodological 
poles of liberation theology. His Revolutionary Priest offers action to Gutierrez’s 
reflection (which itself was instigated by many social actions for and by the poor). 
Torres’ theory and practice was a precursor to some of the more philosophical 
approaches to liberation theology. 
In addition, especially germane to our purposes, we should note that there have 
always been rebellions against this colonial-neocolonial form of social organization, and 
there have always been symbol systems adopted by the state, the wealthy and the military 
with which to put them down. However, within any insurgency also flows a well of 
symbolic resources, a tapping of the collective unconscious perhaps, and understanding 
the dialectic between them we might call a hermeneutics of consciousness. It explains 
how, as with liberation theology, the traditional symbol system can be adapted for the 
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rebels as well as for the elite, for the (relatively) innocent villagers, as well as for 
(relatively) guilty armed actors. We will examine this later in more detail.  
These rebellions were almost always brutally suppressed and innocent people 
inevitably died. But in their wake, a clear mission was born regarding human rights. 
Alongside the physical assault on the state’s monopoly on violence, which often failed, 
came an intellectual and moral assault on the state’s – and the elite’s – monopoly on 
mind and morality, which, at least in part, succeeded.  
Assisting this process, against the grain of the cultural and political dominance of a 
conservative church managed largely for the elite, in the second half of the 20
th
 century, a 
theology of liberation began championing the poor and downtrodden, especially peasants, 
Indians and the urban poor. This movement, largely European early on, saw those 
descended from Native peoples as members of an oppressed class and assumed the goal 
was assimilation. Since the 1980s, however, strongly influenced by indigenous activism 
and idioms, it has become increasingly supportive of Native spirituality and lifeways, on 
their own terms and in dialog with Catholicism.  
In general across Latin America, indigenous traditions and specialists are increasingly 
allowed and expected to flourish on their own. Emblematically, among other syncretistic 
events, religious specialists from different traditions have performed public rituals 
together. This is in addition to formal and informal education regarding other traditions. 
It represents the beginning of an intercultural approach within the Catholic Church.  
One of the developments with potentially widespread consequences has been the 
emergence of a number of centers for research and practice in what is known as 
indigenous theology. These have flourished throughout Latin America but especially in 
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the Andes. They have less to do with public demonstrations of belief and more with a 
mix of deep research into the native traditions and the development of an appropriate 
hermeneutics, on one hand, and the theory and practice of social engagement, on the 
other. Where collaborations of these two primary third-side actors (progressive Catholics 
and Native activists) has probably had the most public impact has been in the sponsorship 
and coordination of a variety conferences, workshops and social action emphasizing 
interculturality and peasant and indigenous rights. In pursuit of this, an increasing number 
of theorists and practitioners are pioneering a still-Catholic project that seeks to become 
embedded in native cultures and use a given spiritual iconography in ways that do no 
violence to the culture it is seeking to bond with. 
 This is surely a challenge, but, if not performed as cultural imperialism, it should 
represent intercultural inroads. Some of the main movers behind this project are 
indigenous Catholics who have been trained as catechists, seminarians and novitiates. 
Indigenous religious specialists are also involved. Among its primary projects are to 
compile the written and oral traditions and organize the fables, myths and wisdom 
literature. They then look for ethical parallels between/among traditions and any 
expression of them in a corresponding set of symbols, stories, rituals or myths. Outreach 
from these centers has been a galvanizing experience for those of native descent in part 
because, as some have put it, Indians in Latin America have had 500 years to get used to 
some form of syncretism, often of their own making.  
 The implications here cannot be fully anticipated. They will play out over the long 
term (half to full centuries) and will produce excellent material for future research. 
However, they are outside the scope of this study. It is safe to say the mixing and 
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remixing of religious traditions are more thoroughgoing and far-reaching than most 
North Americans can easily grasp. The main lesson is that the native identity and 
liberation movements have put spirituality into intellectual, ritual and social practice and 
increasingly are learning to do it together. Klaiber 1998; Cleary 1997).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
MODELS AND DEFINITIONS 
Before we look at our cases in Colombia and Peru, we should examine some of the 
major models of peacebuilding and various ways to institutionalize conflict resolution
1
. 
As for the significance of this kind of modeling, we also want to emphasize that 
peacebuilding has become especially critical following the world’s most widespread form 
of violent conflict, civil war. Such efforts become increasingly critical when considering 
that virtually half the countries that get help restoring their societies to nonviolence do 
not achieve that goal. Moreover, nearly three-quarters of peacebuilding initiatives take 
place with authoritarian governments still in power, with at best a sketchy plan for 
transition (both facts from Barnett et al. 2007).  
Nevertheless, a major success has come from this effort. The concept and its activities 
have become institutionalized. This process of putting down bureaucratic and political 
roots can only grow with the realization that failed states represent a serious threat to 
global peace and stability. 
  
As such, the notion of peacebuilding emerged distinctively in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, particularly as a Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung (1969), using social-
conflict theory, began to talk about the need to deal with the factors behind violent 
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conflict. He advocated transforming social and political structures to create more 
equitable social, cultural and economic systems. Models, definitions, explanations and 
justifications have proliferated since. This has complicated the issue but has produced a 
theoretical richness as well. Some key models and their main factors follow.   
 
The UN on peacebuilding 
The concept of peacebuilding has become increasingly important over the last few 
decades, particularly in the wake of the Cold War – in which a tense but largely stable 
status quo maintained by two superpowers fractured into many small violent conflicts, 
most of them within national borders. In 2000, the UN’s Brahimi Report on 
Peacekeeping Reform reworked a definition from the Boutros-Ghali administration and 
said: “Activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than 
just the absence of war” (UN 2000). At the World Summit in 2005, then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan supported this definition when he established the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission.  
 
Governmental and intergovernmental models 
 Along the peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding continuum, UN agencies have lined up 
behind various but related core concepts, as have the developed nations.
1
 Barnett et al. 
(2007) note variations on a theme with key international and developed-world players. 
For example, the World Bank refers to postconflict reconstruction and recovery. The 
IMF uses the same phrase. The European Union uses crisis management, as well as 
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conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Is definition emphasizes 
prevention, based on a viable economy and functional social, political and judicial 
institutions. 
 
Alongside these descriptions, the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has 
advised that peacebuilding emphasize “building relationships as well as institutions and 
structures; civil society participation and local ownership; and coordination and 
integration of multiple actors, sectors and disciplinary approaches” (Lambourne and 
Herro 2008:277; emphasis added). In 2001, the UN’s Security Council said both short- 
and long-term activities should focus on “fostering…institutions in areas such as 
sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and 
accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence” (Lambourne and 
Herro 2008:277). Summing up this part of the discussion, we can use an inventory done 
by the UN in 2006. It classified the components of peacebuilding as: (1) security and 
public order; (2) justice and reconciliation; (3) governance and participation; and (4) 
socio-economic well-being (Lambourne and Herro 2008). Upon examination, virtually all 
have implications that are broader and longer term than one might think at first.  
 
Scholarly models 
Regarding the evolution in scholarly thinking about peacebuilding, Oliver Richmond 
(2010) outlines four generations of theory and practice:  
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 The first came from political science and emphasized conflict management and 
the rule of law by nation-states within their own territory, a largely Westphalian, 
sovereignty model. 
 The second highlighted conflict resolution and was founded on the work of 
international-relations scholar John Burton (1990). Its pluralist approach to 
conflict resolution says that conflict is rooted in critical human needs and is 
generated by preventing their fulfillment.  
 The third derives from sociologist Johann Galtung (1969). Its focus is on the 
transformation of a society through peacebuilding and statebuilding. As a 
fundamental cause of conflict, it seeks to redress social conflict between haves 
and have-nots, especially that leading to state failure and the collapse of rule of 
law. 
 The fourth is conditioned by critical theory and poststructuralism. It is drawn 
from the critical thinkers of the Frankfurt School, from the postmodernists and 
from progressive literary and cultural studies. It looks at responses to conflict that 
emphasize liberation from domination and focuses on grassroots or hybrid efforts 
that avoid the cultural dominance of the “liberal peace” agenda and its top-down 
assumptions. 
 
We will use some or all of these models as we investigate the prospects for peace in 
Colombia and Peru.  
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HOLISTIC MODELS, CRITICAL FACTORS AND DYNAMICS OF SCALE 
Summarizing a number of studies, Lambourne and Herro (2008) offer an overview of 
the following critical factors in successful peacebuilding. They help us look at a range of 
constituencies, sectors and activities that need to be built into a lasting peace. We will 
select some of these for a closer look later, especially the meso- and micro-scale 
phenomena (emphasis added to those involving such activities).  
 
A holistic model 
 an effective system of communication, consultation and negotiation;  
 peace-enhancing political, economic and security structures and institutions;  
 an integrative political–psychological climate, the software of peacebuilding;  
 a critical mass of peacebuilding leadership; and  
 a supportive regional and international environment (Reychler 1999). 
 
A multi-dimensional model 
 absence of physical violence;  
 elimination of political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination;  
 self-sustainability;  
 high level of internal legitimacy and external approval; and 
 propensity to transform conflicts constructively (Reychler 2004). 
 
A comprehensive plan  
 national security;  
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 regional security;  
 “quick wins” [negotiating “low-hanging fruit”];  
 rule of law and constitutional consent;  
 right to property;  
 democracy or wider participation; and  
 genuine moral and psychological reconciliation (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  
 
The keynote is that, as with the mass violence it follows, peacebuilding involves a 
complex and varied set of actors, sectors and interests. The relevant factors in each 
situation are specific to context. Because that statement opens up many questions, we 
have chosen the satisfaction of basic human needs as a key analytic with which to 
discover patterns and relationships basic to a multi-dimensional, contextual approach to 
peacebuilding. Another will be to organize these systems according to scale and 
complexity and explore relationships across levels of social and political organization.  
 
An emphasis on local and interpersonal processes 
In keeping with our emphasis on micro-scale analysis, Lambourne and Herro feature 
John Paul Lederach (1997, 2000). He has focused a great deal how war, especially civil 
war, destroys the social and cultural fabric and how this creates mistrust and division in 
formerly productive or supportive relationships. In addition to a focus on resolving the 
social and political issues driving violent conflict, he has emphasized that conflict can be 
transformed by the bridge-building involved in interpersonal relationships. This could 
involve face-to-face encounters of both leadership and rank-and-file, and something 
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similar with the public. They should be designed primarily as cultural-exchange 
experiences – with a given agenda and structure – but also have time for private, even 
confessional, moments. Something similar along vocational or disciplinary lines could be 
arranged.  
Lederach notes that peacebuilding takes place within a time- and place-specific social 
context, a matrix of many variables. Peacebuilding should not be general and top down, 
in other words. As much as possible, it should be specific and bottom up. This means, for 
one, that sensitizing any program to the hopes, fears and needs of the local population has 
to be a basic part of preparing for any role or mission. In keeping with this local 
emphasis, it also needs to examine the role of another critical player: civil society 
(Lederach 1997). This sector may be especially effective as a conduit between levels and 
across scales.  
This process of “devolving” the accountability for peacebuilding to the lower levels 
of the social structure mirrors a move within Latin American nations to do the same with 
judicial and political power. It has been called a democratization of peacebuilding and 
cannot be viewed as any linear throughput system. As with the mass violence it seeks to 
treat, it conforms as much to chaos theory as to any basic functionalism, simplified 
conflict theory or rudimentary systems approach.  
In “The Political Economy of Peace Building: A Critical Theory Perspective,” 
Michael Pugh also says that “the ownership [control] of peacebuilding needs to be 
embedded in local communities.” In creating a “context of regeneration and 
peacebuilding,” he says “[reconstructing] civil society can be understood as building 
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trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion and pluralism through non-state 
associations of all kinds” (2005:121; emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the relationship between the international community, the 
intergovernmental community and the local and national users of peacebuilding resources 
has become an important area of concern. In light of this, the international donor and 
investment community, including the World Bank, has increasingly promoted ways for 
donor organizations and NGOs to get together to discuss local and civil-society 
objectives in peacebuilding, not always one with policy at the local or national levels, 
according to consultant Catherine Barnes (2006).  
Barnes (2006:25) works with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (GPPAC), civil-society organizations helping stakeholders develop conflict-
prevention strategies. She too says that if peacebuilding is to be well accepted and lasting, 
“local ownership…is likely to result in more legitimate processes and sustainable 
outcomes [than national or international efforts].” GPPAC subsequently supplied critical 
background for an International Peace Academy initiative with civil-society 
organizations on the challenges of democratizing peacebuilding and ways to involve 
them as a more equal partner with states and intergovernmental agencies (Issaka and 
Bushoki 2005). They said that states generally cooperated with NGOs as long as their 
needs were met first. When civil society asked for practical and moral considerations in 
return, they were not always there. A classic example is President Alvaro Uribe of 
Colombia and his closed-door approach to its peace and justice law, in which 
paramilitaries were pardoned if they laid down arms and from which human-rights NGOs 
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were shut out. The report urged that central governments see civil-society 
organizations as partners, not rivals (Eide et al. 2005). 
In “Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial 
Rationality?” Vivienne Jabri (2013) looks into the complex issues of agency, scale and 
social location in peace and justice work. She outlines a few important ways to 
understand the gap between the local and the international levels and models for bridging 
it. These are: 
 
 A critical-inquiry approach that highlights local peacebuilding as a more 
authentic representation of the majority of the people. This is a reaction to the 
failure of the so-called “liberal peace project,” which Mac Ginty (2008) says has 
privileged the efforts of international organizations.  
 A post-liberal approach that proposes a hybrid of international and local 
approaches (Richmond 2010);  
 A capacity-building approach that reframes the local-international dichotomy and 
wants to reinvent the discussion with dialog and reciprocity on the ground. In this 
view, capacity building is a function of interactions and relationships, not entities, 
so it cannot be located in one sphere or the other (Chandler 2012); and 
 Jabri (2013) proposes a transitional “postcolonial international” approach, in 
which she highlights the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial mentalit. 
Pressure from the local and national levels has produced a new sensitivity at the 
international level to local needs and prerogatives. 
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What most can agree on is that it revolves around creating institutions that are, in the 
terms of Barnett et al. (2007:49), “democratic, transparent, accountable, and responsive to 
local needs.”  
 In pursuit of a systematic approach to peacebuilding, having looked at spatial 
relations, Barnett et al. (2007) also offer a basic temporal analysis. They outline three 
phases of peacebuilding: stability creation, restoration of state institutions and the 
socioeconomic dimensions of conflict. 
 
Creation of stability 
These activities, the “first dimension” of Barnett et al., entail the need to “reinforce 
stability and discourage the combatants from returning to war” (2007:49). Here, 
peacebuilding picks up before peacekeeping leaves off. The first task is to maintain a 
peace accord, ensuring combatants do not re-engage in political violence. It then involves 
returning combatants to a viable civilian life, without which they may have any number 
of reasons to resume the violence. Underlying causes have to be addressed and powerful 
players abusing such power reined in or at least restricted. Our exploration of the 
dynamics and activities of human-rights workers in Colombia especially belongs in this 
phase, but so does the treatment of trauma and the reintegration of former combatants in 
Peru, without which, stability is much less assured.  
The professionalization of human-rights work, then, is peacebuilding. But it entails 
many interpersonal or systemic complications within and across scales. The nature of the 
victims highlighted and the perception of human-rights violations as individual or 
collective can set the tone for the social construction of human rights and peacebuilding. 
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We will therefore be looking at the nature of these relationships and their implications 
for models of peacebuilding going forward.  
With this in mind, in our first case, we will examine face-to-face reconciliation in the 
highlands of Peru, a process involving an expiation and public repentance by former 
genocidal insurgents before the community can take them back, a process supported by a 
national “repentance” law. As this involves a re-establishment of faith in local judicial 
norms and authorities, it belongs in the next phase as well, rebuilding faith in institutions.  
In Colombia we will take a close look at how the extraordinary interpersonal, political 
and ethical tensions inescapable in human-rights work serve as a bonding, even spiritual, 
experience, but also how they can drive people apart into smaller, more contentious 
groups via splintering and fissioning. Because these events take place early in the process 
of peacebuilding, they have critical social, political and psychological implications for 
the subsequent rebuilding of social and political institutions that Barnett et al. (2007) 
outline. The basic premise for the long-term relevance of the two case studies is that 
peace needs to be built by whole (or healing) people working within holistically rebuilt 
(or healed) relationships and institutions.  
In this long-term socioeconomic phase we will investigate sustainable-equitable 
development driven from the grassroots as a fundamental factor in lasting peacebuilding. 
This has been morally, emotionally and pragmatically supported of late by advocacy 
from both the Native-identity and progressive-Christianity movements and, increasingly, 
as an intercultural mix. In this part of the study, we will look at a number of cases and 
examples, but in the interests of space, mostly in overview.  
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Restoration of institutions 
This phase is focused on re-establishing the legitimacy of public institutions (both 
state and, importantly, local). It entails building or rebuilding institutional capacity in 
public goods and services such as communication, transportation and utility networks, 
also health, legal and educational services (Barnett et al. 2007). It also often entails 
rebuilding the management skills, vision and ethics of the major economic players and 
institutions.  
In our in-depth analysis, we will look at this in Peru among highland villagers as they 
reclaim traditional judicial and conciliation roles. In Colombia, we will examine human-
rights professionals risking their lives and reputations as they confess their faith in their 
work, suffer, bicker and splinter on the local and national levels, building and rebuilding 
a human-rights infrastructure, then come together at the international level over the best 
way to engage the international community. In the study of human-rights workers, we 
will highlight the fact that the professionalization of human-rights work means that new 
institutions are being created within old ones as civil-society and governmental groups 
develop norms for mitigating and ending the violence. In both cases, intensely held 
differences stemmed from a reconciliation versus a liberation approach, complicated by 
the visceral tension and emotional drain of the political and cultural complexity of 
building peace amid civil chaos. 
In both situations, many of the crucial decisions took place at the national and 
international levels using Euro-American ideas, ethics and symbols. In looking at the 
chances for first-class citizenship for indigenous peoples and their descendents, in one 
look at local needs, for example, within this discourse we still find, after participating in 
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talks in Geneva that produced an innovation in human-rights institutions, a very 
unhappy indigenous activist and an equally disgruntled union leader. Though hailed by 
the national and international NGOs as a consensus-building breakthrough, both activists 
felt the process was a waste. The lobbying was intended to bring a special rapporteur 
(reporter) and subsequent international attention to address human rights in Colombia. It 
failed but a partial solution, an in-country office of the human-rights commissioner, was 
found (see page 91). 
 
The socioeconomic phase  
This phase involves making peacebuilding as long-term as possible. Building and 
rebuilding institutions of conflict resolution, rule of law and sustainable development are 
the main issues here. Peacebuilding at this stage can involve anything from transitional 
justice to social or interpersonal reconciliation to various kinds of counseling (personal, 
job, work, group, etc.). It also includes inter- and intra-community negotiations, a 
rebuilding of civil society, respect for human rights, better ecological awareness and 
women’s empowerment (Barnett et al. 2007).  
A crucial part of peacebuilding for our purposes is the empowerment of indigenous 
and peasant communities (Mac Ginty 2008, 2012). These efforts often rely on local or 
traditional spiritual leaders and highlight community and interpersonal relationships. Mac 
Ginty (2012) characterizes the prevailing international approach as privileging elites in 
exclusive, boardroom-style deals that ignore historical and social context and rely on 
values from the corporate sector. These tend to use people, ideas and resources from the 
outside.  
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PEACEBUILDING AS A COMPREHENSIVE, MULTI-LEVEL MODEL 
A well-regarded scholar and practitioner of peacebuilding has laid out a conceptual 
framework for scalar analysis along the lines we just discussed. As noted above, John 
Paul Lederach, professor of international peacebuilding at Notre Dame, examines 
peacebuilding leadership at three levels. He calls these “top,” “middle-range” and 
“grassroots” leadership (Lederach 1997). The difference from those outlined above is the 
inclusion of international and national actors in both top and middle levels. He then 
separates each into official or highly visible leaders and those that are less official or 
dominant, more persuasive (media) or educational (higher education). He acknowledges 
the crucial role of international leadership, but his focus is the national level because he 
believes it holds the key to tapping the resources of the local level, which he views as the 
foundation of sustainable peace.  
He says the top level consists of a few important political and military leaders. It may 
also include prominent religious leaders. The middle level is made up of a larger number 
of well-respected leaders in fields with more pedagogical, voluntary or private-sector 
roles, such as health, education, business or agriculture. These also may come from the 
academic, humanitarian or religious sectors.  
The bottom, or grassroots, level consists of the masses and common folk, those most 
affected by the civil violence, in this case, peasants, Indians and the urban poor, the latter 
often former peasants. Lives at this level are often governed by a struggle for survival and 
a focus on primary needs such as good food, clean water, adequate shelter and physical 
safety. The key players here are frequently leaders of indigenous, peasant, worker or 
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neighborhood organizations. They may also be managers of relief or refugee agencies. 
Most important, leadership at this level is in close touch with most of the survivors. 
These kinds of connections should be of interest to anthropologists, as they cross many 
social scales, human needs and human ecologies – a cross-cultural sweep. These often are 
matters that can be understood in terms of community and face-to-face relationships. 
The significant issue for our purposes is Lederach’s premise that the middle-range 
leadership is in a crucial position. Of the three groups, it can best coordinate with the 
other levels. In other words, it can prioritize information and activities across scales. On 
the other hand, it does not have the numbers and nominal moral authority of the 
grassroots, nor the administrative authority or political clout of the top. But in many 
ways, while squeezed by the demands of the other two, this level sees social problems in 
the most multi-dimensional detail (Lederach 1997). It also absorbs a great deal of the 
tensions associated with spanning these three levels of reality, power and access, as we 
will see among health workers in “the trauma industry” in Peru and among human-rights 
workers in Colombia.  
In a critique of the top level, Lederach (1997) notes that actions at this level are 
generally top-down. National military and political leaders agree to stop the fighting, then 
disarmament begins. Given the relatively superficial nature of these deals, most of the 
details have to be determined. Lederach explains:  
 
As we shall see, this scenario contrasts sharply with the kind of peace process 
envisioned under a more comprehensive framework, which assumes an 
interdependence of levels that involve multiple tiers of leadership and [multiple tiers 
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of] participation within the affected population and that integrate 
simultaneous…activities. 
[1997:46; emphasis added] 
 
The challenges facing leaders of the grassroots level are the large numbers of people 
needing help, the all-too limited budgets available to help them and the unrelenting 
pressures of everyday existence on these people keeping them from more effective 
mobilization. 
Top-level processes are well documented by news media and history books. These 
have been effective in stopping the worst of the violence in selected cases (Lederach 
1997). But the bulk of the work on the cultural, political and economic infrastructure 
remains. This is especially true for the peasants, indigenous peoples and urban poor, for 
any near the bottom of the social ladder.  
A key activity at the middle range involves problem-solving workshops, one of the 
most consulted and evaluated of means. They often make use of third-party facilitators. 
Participants are generally considered “opinion leaders” but do not include top-level 
leadership. These discussions are generally informal and off the record. They facilitate 
direct interaction with adversaries and provide flexibility by offering alternatives out of 
the public eye. We will look again at their value in the summary.  
These sorts of efforts led to the agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993, a 
move toward peace in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s and a peace accord in 1996 in a 
brutal conflict in Guatemala involving indigenous genocide. Mid-level actors are 
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especially appropriate for facilitating such workshops because they know the local 
situation in detail, yet have access to top-level decision makers.  
Another defining characteristic of middle-range activity would be conflict-resolution 
training. It generally involves two main goals: raising awareness about multi-dimensional 
conflict and teaching concrete skills in analysis, communication, negotiation or 
mediation. In contrast to problem-solving, conflict-resolution can be taught across levels, 
classes, groups and sectors, Lederach (1997) says. He cites models from South Africa, 
the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and the Nairobi Peace Initiative of the Africa 
conference of churches in central Africa. These sorts of education for peace efforts have 
been strong and varied in both Colombia and Peru.  
A third important activity at the mid-range is setting up peace commissions. Lederach 
(1997) cites examples of the value of these groups from Nicaragua of the mid-1980s, 
Central American of the late 1980s and South Africa of the late 1990s. The first two 
involved a settlement regarding government, autonomy and land use on the Nicaraguan 
coast and a ground-breaking Central American peace accord that marked the end of the 
region’s civil wars. In South Africa, following apartheid, an outgrowth of the national 
peace committee was the formation of several regional and local committees. These 
involved monitoring and communication systems that could detect mass violence in its 
early stages.  
In Colombia, the Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CIJP), composed of 
representatives from Catholic, Presbyterian and humanist organizations, has advocated 
for respect for human rights for more than 20 years. CIJP has worked for truth and 
reconciliation, transitional justice and reparations. It has concretely promoted a 
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negotiated solution and a truth and reconciliation commission (Peace Brigades 
International 2014). While these efforts may have, at long last, produced results in 
Colombia in the long term, Peru offers an exemplary version of such a commission from 
the stage of peacebuilding entailing a restoration of institutions. 
Lederach (1997) then outlines key activities of the grassroots level. The bottom-up 
approach should hold the most potential for sustainable peace, he says, but it is much 
harder to organize. Still, he argues that the most effective peacebuilding efforts in civil 
conflicts of the past two decades have come from grassroots movements. This is 
especially true in Latin America. He also notes that these efforts often finally pay off 
once the conflict has exhausted the nation and its leadership, also largely true in both 
countries we examine. An especially interesting development from an anthropological 
perspective is the increasing use of traditional community leaders such as tribal elders to 
facilitate conflict resolution.  
Lederach documents these in Somalia. While not leading right to a viable 
government, these and similar efforts brought a transitional national government by the 
early 2000s and a provisional constitution in 2012. He notes:  
 
These conferences not only dealt with issues of immediate concern at local levels, but 
also served to place responsibility for interclan fighting on the shoulders of local 
leaders and helped to identify the persons who were considered…rightful 
representatives of those clans’ concerns. Having achieved this initial agreement, it 
was then possible to repeat the same process at a higher level with a broader set of 
clans. Characteristic of these processes were the reliance on elders; lengthy oral 
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deliberations (often lasting months); the creation of a forum or assembly of 
elders…careful negotiation over access to resources and payments for deaths 
[reparations] that would reestablish a balance among the clans.  
[1997:53; emphasis added] 
 
 Colombia provides a close approximation of these councils of elders in the exercise 
of community justice in many villages. Zapata (2006) believes it provides an important 
cultural resource for conflict transformation. She cites Edgar Ardila of the National 
University in Bogotá, who says that community justice involves customary (traditional) 
law and other judicial traditions rooted in Andean village culture. He classifies these as 
equity conciliation (conciliacion en equidad), peace from justice (justicia de paz) and 
indigenous jurisdiction (jurisdiccion indigena). Decisions by these groups have legal 
standing, and their customs and judgments come from traditional norms and means of 
justice. Most are volunteers, they do not have to have legal training and their rulings are 
equivalent to those of a judge. Many Colombian scholars and activists believe 
community justice can bring cultural sensitivity to the judicial system, that it represents a 
democratization of justice, an empowerment of civil society and the building of a 
sustainable peace (Zapata 2006). Similar activities are longstanding in Peru, especially in 
conjunction with peasant organizations called rondas campesinas. We will explore these 
below. 
As we are emphasizing in our case studies, grassroots activity can precede or follow a 
peace agreement, often representing clear resistance to the dominance of the armed actors 
and so placing its operatives in danger, as we will see with rights workers in Colombia. In 
 40 
Mozambique, programs such as “Preparing People for Peace,” sponsored by the 
Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), and the “Circus of Peace,” run by UNICEF, 
took root before the formal peace. The CCM initiative started with a national conference 
of church leaders from all provinces. These then conducted seminars at the local level. 
Discussion focused on religious views of war and peace; church and family efforts for 
peace; helping the displaced (refugees) and securing their return; land access and reform; 
health and environment; human rights; and the effect of mass violence on children.  
The Circus for Peace was a traveling show, followed by a forum, with an emphasis on 
youth. Using theater and art, it dramatized key features of violent conflict and modeled 
conflict-resolution skills. Among its benefits, likely owing to the emotional resources of 
both drama and art, was helping the audience to grieve. It documented the people’s 
concerns and prepared them mentally and emotionally for peace, including allowing 
those who had suffered terrible losses to process their grief into constructive activity 
rather than revenge.  
A third model involved the Christian Health Association of Liberia. It addressed 
conflict resolution within the health-education efforts it had historically pursued 
regarding trauma. These focused on limiting prejudice and enhancing community 
decision making. Staff included health officials, conflict-resolution trainers and 
psychological professionals. We will look at a similar efforts in Peru. These programs 
make use of existing networks and associations in religion and health and focus on 
processing trauma, particularly among young people, to build a long-term peace. To be 
effective, they focus on the behaviors and attitudes of those who lived closest to the 
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violence and those who were their adversaries. About these dynamics and programs 
designed to treat them, Lederach believes:  
 
War at this level is experienced with great immediacy, both in terms of violence and 
trauma endured and insofar as people live in close proximity and continued 
interdependency with those who were, and may still be, perceived as enemies. This is 
not a matter of political accommodation at the highest levels; rather it involves 
interdependent relationships in the everyday lives of considerable numbers of 
people… The process of advancing political negotiation at polished tables in elite 
hotels, while very difficult and complex in its own right, is both a more formal and 
more superficial process than the experience of reconciliation in which former 
enemies are brought together at the village level. 
[1997:55; emphasis added]  
 
Lederach’s last important lesson for this study involves moving from an 
understanding of issues to an analysis of systems. This involves moving outward 
concentrically from issues to relationships and to subsystems, then to whole systems. 
These often must be examined on a case-by-case basis, but the general pedagogical 
principle is the nested paradigm that includes all the levels and can relate one to another 
up and down the scale.  
 
 42 
PARADIGMS BASED ON BASIC NEEDS 
 
Human needs are a powerful source of explanation of human behavior and social 
interaction. All individuals have needs that they strive to satisfy, either by using the 
system…or acting as a reformist or revolutionary. Given this condition, social 
systems must be responsive to individual needs, or be subject to instability and forced 
change (possibly through violence or conflict). 
– Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati, Preface to The Power of Human Needs in World 
Society, 1988  
 
If one of the most critical issues regarding peacebuilding is its complexity and the 
holistic demands of that complexity, it makes sense to approach it in terms of fulfillment 
of human needs. A human-needs analysis allows us to be somewhat reductive – 
“fundamental” would probably be a better term – focusing on a manageable number of 
variables, and holistic at the same time, looking at issues across an array of needs, 
capacities, rights and scales.  
A number of scholars have addressed human needs as a system, including one 
prominent in peace studies, John Burton. Another, perhaps best known for popularizing a 
hierarchy of needs, is psychologist Abraham Maslow. However, both owe a great deal to 
British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who pioneered the concept as the so-called 
father of functionalism, the notion that societies, or cultures, exist to allow humans to 
better meet their needs than they could as individuals.  
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The premise here is that real peacebuilding requires fulfilling each of these needs, 
not merely the physical and economic or just the social, psychological and spiritual. In 
this way, it dovetails well with the full range of human rights in the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Helpful for our purposes, most of these needs not covered 
by the civil-political rights are covered by the social, economic and cultural rights, those 
not ratified in the United States. Sustainable peacebuilding, I will argue, entails honoring 
these rights along with the civil-political rights better supported in the West.  
Malinowski (1944) believed that individuals first need to meet physiological needs, 
such as those for food, shelter and reproduction. For Malinowski, social institutions help 
people meet these needs, but also cultural and instrumental needs. The latter include a 
desire for systems of economics, social control, education and political life (Porth, 
Neutzling and Edwards 2009). In linking physiological needs to an organic, unified 
theory of behavior, he tied these closely to cultural needs, including spiritual needs, and 
focused on the functions such behaviors served in relation to the socio-cultural whole.  
Malinowski (1944) summarizes this model of culture well here: 
 
It [culture] obviously is the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' 
goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and 
crafts, beliefs and customs. Whether we consider a very simple or primitive culture or 
an extremely complex and developed one, we are confronted by a vast apparatus, 
partly material, partly human and partly spiritual by which man is able to cope with 
the concrete specific problems that face him.  
[Porth, Neutzling and Edwards 2009:online]  
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Later, Maslow, a humanistic psychologist popular in the 1960s and 1970s, outlined a 
hierarchy of needs. These included physiological needs – air, food, water, sex, sleep, 
homeostasis and excretion; and needs for safety – security of body, employment 
[income], resources, morality, the family, health and property; for love and belonging – 
friendship, family and intimacy; for esteem – self-esteem, confidence, achievement, 
respect of others and respect by others; and for self-actualization – morality, creativity, 
spontaneity, problem solving and freedom from prejudice. 
 Maslow is also considered the father of transpersonal psychology. In general, this 
specialty seeks to integrate peak, mountaintop or other spiritual or anomalous experiences 
into the conceptual framework of humanistic psychology. In the studies of high-achieving 
people that led to his theory of psychic development, Maslow found the vast majority of 
such people had fundamental spiritual values that guided and motivated them. In other 
words, in this hierarchy, spiritual needs matter too (Abraham Maslow.com 2009? 
Danison 1998).  However, given our analysis of community relations as integral to 
peacebuilding, we need to point out that Maslow is more psychological, and so more 
atomized and individualized than Malinowski. Human needs, as Malinowski intended, 
lead to a better understanding of the community, not just the individual. 
Burton, the conflict-theory scholar, made good use of this system to lay out a critique 
of previous peacebuilding theory and his ideas for lasting peace. His set of needs is a 
little different than Maslow’s or Malinowski’s. He combines most of the physical needs 
under distributive justice and safety and security, then moves on to social and 
psychological needs. These are needs for belonging and love; self-esteem; personal 
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fulfillment; identity; cultural security; freedom; and participation.  Helpful for our 
purposes, these needs could be grouped under a general need for dignity, an issue we will 
explore later as a framing tool for peasant and Indian social movements.  
 
The alternative "Human Needs Theory" has evolved only in the last few decades, and 
largely as a reaction against these limited separate [disciplinary] explanations of 
social problems…. If conflict resolution is to be taken seriously, if it is to be more 
than just introducing altered perceptions and good will into some specific situations, 
it has to be assumed that societies must adjust to the needs of people, and not the 
other way around. Workers must be given recognition as persons if social and 
domestic violence is to be contained, young people must be given a role in society if 
street gangs are to vanish and teenage pregnancies are to decrease, ethnic minorities 
must be given an autonomous status if violence is to be avoided, [and] decision-
making systems must be non-adversarial if leadership roles are to be collaborative.  
[1998:online] 
 
Burton, as we can see, was highly critical of any analysis that limited the social context of 
conflict and divided it into the nominally value-neutral paradigms of psychology, 
sociology, political science or economics. He believed that hidden ideologies and belief 
systems were involved in all such systems of knowledge. For any effective policy making 
regarding peace, he championed a holistic perspective (Burton 1998; Sandole 2001), but 
one rooted in an analysis of the difference in fulfillment of needs across levels of social, 
economic and political power.  
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We will examine these ideas in more detail when we get into our case studies. They 
come after the next section. But before we get to them, we need to review the history of 
the civil conflicts, their complicated interweaving of social, political and economic 
issues.  
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Chapter II 
 
The History of the Conflict, the Depth of the Violence 
and the Nature of the Armed Actors 
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THE HISTORY OF THE MASS VIOLENCE 
In what follows, we will be exploring the challenges of peacebuilding in the wake of 
two of the most noteworthy but brutal revolutionary movements in South America of the 
last 50 years. They involve the major revolutionary group in Colombia, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) 
and the Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Peru–Sendero 
Luminoso, PCP-SL, known as Shining Path, Sendero or SL). 
FARC is the longest and bloodiest rebellion in Latin American history. Peru also lays 
claim to one of the bloodiest revolutions in Latin American history. While Colombia’s is 
the longest-running and most lethal in absolute terms, Peru’s is the most intensive 
genocides in the continent’s history. Shining Path dominated the Peruvian left from 1980-
1992 and dispensed its terror liberally during that period, killing about 35,000 people. It 
was largely contained by the early 1990s, but it contributed to a new period of 
oppression, fear and repression that lasted until 2000 and beyond. (Throughout, 
oppression will be defined as social and economic disadvantages that become 
institutionalized; repression will be defined as the ideological and physical destruction of 
dissent and dissenters.)  
At one time, Shining Path nearly rivaled the state for control and was one of the most 
ruthless Latin American guerrilla groups of the 20th century, defined, for example, in 
terms of civilians killed out of total dead – about half, in contrast to most insurgencies, 
which kill civilians but many fewer than the security forces and generally the well to 
moderately well off. Perversely, though championing the peasants, poor and Indians, 
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while Shining Path killed liberally across all socio-economic categories, it had a 
pathological commitment to spilling a specific quota of peasant blood.  
 
Regarding the political economy of each country and the connections between them, 
we should note they are similar enough socially, ecologically and economically to be 
compared usefully. They also contain key differences, which allows us to make some 
critical distinctions and fine discriminations.  
In overview, a handful of industries are dominant in each, and they have most of 
these in common. They include coffee, chocolate, cotton, sugar and rubber, with timber 
increasing steadily, also gold, silver and copper. Peru also exports much fish and fish 
meal, Colombia emeralds, diamonds, bananas and ornamental flowers. Oil and gas 
pumping has become a major industry for both. Both have large populations of Indian-
descended peasants in the highlands – though this was long denied in Colombia – and 
smaller populations of remote tribes in the lowlands, about 2 percent each. These are 
increasingly endangered by transnational development – private, governmental and 
intergovernmental. Protests regarding this abuse of their lifeways and lives is often met 
with government incompetence, corruption or indifference, if not murder, torture and 
displacement.  
In the highlands, Peru has a acculturated peasantry considered fundamentally 
indigenous that is increasingly self-affirming. In Colombia, a similar population with a 
little more European makeup constitutes the majority of Colombia’s peasants, but its true 
ethnicity was explained away for years. It has only lately become more honest about its 
indigenous heritage. Colombia has a sizable Afro-Colombian population as well, near 
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both coasts. Peru has one too, also near the coast, but it is smaller and less heard from. 
Overall – highland and lowland, acculturated and isolated – Native groups make up about 
45 percent of the Peruvian people. Interestingly, genetic testing recently revealed that 
Colombia’s indigenous demographic is much more statistically significant than had been 
assumed. It indicated that up to 85 percent of its people have some indigenous blood 
(Kearns 2006). According to the Library of Congress research division, at the end of 
Colombia’s colonial period, Native peoples likely numbered about half of the population 
(Bushnell and Hudson 2010).  
In Colombia, in the late 1960s, after emerging from a 20-year period of social strife 
between liberals and conservatives called La Violencia (The Violence, 1946-1966), a few 
guerrilla groups began operations. FARC was formed in 1966 with 350 recruits, mostly 
in the south. It has had up to 20,000 soldiers at one time but probably hovers around 
10,000 now. Overall, it has given up territory to the paramilitaries and the state in the last 
decade, but from 1999 to 2008, FARC and the National Liberation Army (Exerjito 
Liberacion National, ELN), the other major rebel group, were the de facto government in 
about 30 to 40 percent of the country, most of it dominated by FARC. For about 30 years, 
it has occupied a great deal of territory in the southern part of the country.  
In Peru, after centuries of traditional values and rigid social hierarchies, following a 
short period of growth after World War II, which fostered some social and political 
liberalization, the rural economy either stagnated. During this period, however, the 
fortunes of the educated residents of the coast improved. This signaled a growing gap in 
well being between the darker skinned people of the mountains and high plains and the 
largely Euro-American or mestizo residents of the coastal plains, called the Sierra and 
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coast, respectively. By the time Sendero arose, the quality of life in the Sierra had 
diminished or had not improved for about 20 years.  
At 482,122 square miles, about as big as Alaska, Peru has about 30 million people (as 
of 2012, according to Buckman 2012b). Cusco, in the southern mountains, was the 
capital of the extensive Inca empire, which ran up and down most of the Andes. At 
439,405 square miles, Colombia is about as big as Texas and New Mexico combined and 
has about 45 million people, second in Latin America (as of 2012, according to Buckman 
2012a).  
Including Colombia, the Chibcha Indians dominated almost everything south of 
Guatemala and were spread across much of northern South America, just north and east 
of the Inca. They were a politically and culturally sophisticated civilization of about half 
a million. After the Incas, they were the most centralized society prior to Spanish 
conquest. But by the 1700s, no one spoke the language and they had mostly become 
acculturated Indians of the highlands, not unlike highland dwellers in Peru. Both 
countries were colonized by those who modeled themselves on the European aristocracy. 
Elites in both were very proud of their cultured and moneyed heritage and disdainful of 
the original peoples. The latter were often threatened with beatings, torture or death if 
they did not submit to slavery, debt bondage and virtual serfdom or tenancy.  
Both countries have extremely varied geographies and ecologies. These include very 
high mountain ecosystems, high valley and mountainside ecosystems and lower, hotter 
valley ecosystems between the mountain ranges. Lowlands, plains and jungles dominate 
the landscape east of the mountains, all the way to Brazil or Venezuela. Both countries sit 
very near the equator and have very hot lowlands, generally savanna and rainforests. The 
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climate becomes more moderate the farther one goes up the mountains. The mountains, 
valleys and forests have a rainy season, late fall and winter, and a dry season, spring, 
summer and early fall. The eastern savanna (plains) is generally drier than the rest.  
Last and probably most important, a dramatically inequitable distribution of land and 
income in rural areas characterizes both countries. In Colombia, where 38 percent is 
agricultural land, less than 1 percent of the population owns more than 50 percent of the 
most arable land. Land reform has been a chronic issue but has generally been stymied by 
corruption in the very institutions that are supposed to administer it. A lack of human and 
financial resources has also hampered these efforts.  
In the early 2000s, under the Alvaro Uribe administration, Colombia moved away 
from land reform (or redistribution) and toward development by agribusiness (USAID 
2010a). A disparity in land tenure has been accentuated by subsidies that included tax 
write-offs for large landowners and fostered inefficient or absence of land use. Drug 
traffickers also purchase agricultural land to launder money. These factors create higher 
land values than are justified by the land’s productivity. They limit the production of food 
and put additional stress on forested and indigenous lands. Once-indigenous lands are 
increasingly colonized and cleared by peasant and landless settlers (USAID 2010a). In 
addition, since the 1980s, the armed actors have purchased or commandeered about 4.5 
million hectares, accounting for about half of the nation’s best land. Much of it is used to 
grow coca or launder drug money through cattle, timber or palm-oil operations.  
In Peru, in response to longstanding social unrest, the Juan Velasco regime initiated 
an ambitious land-reform project in 1968. From 1969 to 1991, about 38 percent of the 
nation’s agricultural land was designated for the landless or disadvantaged small farmers 
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(USAID 2010b). However, the most effective part of this campaign ended in 1975, 
when a conservative military regime staged a coup and largely put a stop to it. Land was 
reassigned, but the allotments generally went to the larger landowners and mestizo 
middle class. Before this attempt to make land tenure more equitable, 1 percent of the 
people owned 80 percent of the private land, and 83 percent held about 5 hectares or less. 
This group owned only 6 percent of the country’s farmland (USAID 2010b).  
Recent data compiled by the Peruvian Center for Social Studies (Centro Peruano de 
Estudios Sociales, CEPES), a research group for rural development, shows that 
agribusiness has expanded rapidly since the early 1990s. It had been guided by the 
aggressively neo-liberal policies of then-President Alberto Fujimori (Burneo 2011). A 
report by CEPES and the International Land Coalition, “The Process of Land 
Concentration in Peru,” notes that as of 2010, 34 owners controlled 250,000 hectares of 
land, in a country where less than 3 percent of the land is arable, and this excludes land 
devoted to mining, petroleum or timber (Burneo 2011). 
Colombia currently has the second highest unemployment rate in Latin America, a 
poverty rate of 48 percent and an extreme poverty rate, meaning a lack of basic 
necessities such as food, of 17 percent (Buckman 2012a). In another statistic on land 
concentration, an estimated 62 percent of the country’s best land is owned by 0.4 percent 
of the population (USAID 2010a). As of 2005, more than half of Peru‘s population lived 
in poverty, and 18 percent lived in extreme poverty, and the rate in rural regions was 
twice that of urban areas. By 2006, poverty had risen to 44.5 percent. It then dropped to 
35 percent by 2009 and 31.3 percent by 2011 (Buckman 2012b). Indigenous peoples in 
remote areas experience the most extreme poverty (USAID 2010b). 
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Other armed actors  
Just as scrutinized here will be the extralegal means of social control used by the 
defense and law-enforcement organizations, mostly the army and national police. These 
are usually called the security forces or the forces of order. To subdue the guerrillas, 
state-sanctioned armed actors have been all too willing to illegally detain, disappear, 
torture, rape, kill or displace unarmed civilians. The conflict then spreads as the 
insurgencies redouble their efforts. The social chaos produces a cascade of armed actors.  
In each situation, over the last 30-40 years, rampant civil strife has produced cracks in 
the political economy wide enough to open opportunities for the paramilitary sector, or 
paras, as well as for drug traffickers serving a large international market for marijuana, 
cocaine and heroin. Battling with the paras at first, the drug mafias have by now achieved 
an accommodation with them. Both the guerrillas and paras “taxed” or “regulated” the 
drug gangs early on but have mostly turned to running their own systems of production 
and distribution.  
The paras emerged from the citizen militia and, properly speaking, in some cases, still 
are. But in Colombia, in contrast to the ronderos, they are largely vigilantes and 
mercenaries often called, accurately, death squads. By the early 2000s, the United States 
had finally put the largest Colombian paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), on its terrorist list. Some of 
these vigilantes are agrarian working class or small-business people, but most have come 
from the military, the national police or the labor force on the large estates, usually 
looking for a way to move up. They also increasingly come from organized crime. They 
have often been managed by the military, and for centuries, leased or owned by large 
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landowners. They are sometimes also managed or paid, under the table or above it, by 
the upper echelons of government. Along the way, they have started their own lucrative 
drug operations, leaving them increasingly unaccountable to the state. After the dramatic 
increase in violence in the 1990s, crucial developments in the 2000s began to limit 
guerrilla and military violence. It then shifted to the paras and the criminal gangs. 
Longstanding thornier issues have to do with how much the military will continue to 
collaborate with the paras and let them do its lethal bidding. While many paras have 
demobilized, nearly as many have formed criminal enterprises or security firms. These 
are called neo-paramilitaries. Others have joined the military. Oddly enough, some have 
joined the rebels, and guerrillas have joined the paras, isolated cases, but it has happened.  
This complex of factors and players points to a new way of understanding genocide. 
If civil wars are the most common kind worldwide, and they produce what is variously 
called mass violence, civil violence or violent pluralism (pluralistic violence), we should 
understand them as a specific form of a generic concept, genocide. I am going to call this 
manifestation of it civil genocide, civicide for short, or in its longest construction, civil-
war genocide. It means destroying a people by destroying their civil and civic 
institutions, their physical, social and cultural capital (capacity), the hard-won benefits of 
a centuries-long practice of reciprocal altruism. It involves a total assault on the civic 
(public or governmental) and civil (voluntary or communitarian) sectors. In both regions, 
but especially in the lowlands, civil and civic arrangements have always been more 
communal, predate the state and stretch social resources in areas poorly served by 
government. Once its civil and communal resources are destroyed, the population is 
brought to its knees socially and psychologically.  
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Such an assault becomes the motive, means and opportunity for authoritarian social 
control. In other words, this form of genocide works by destroying the third side, 
especially civil society. It destroys the cultural immune system. It levels the institutions 
that create and enforce standards of individual and group behavior: law enforcement, 
public-works, school and court systems, local and regional assemblies and local and 
regional (civic or civil service) government. It also seeks in particular to eliminate 
voluntary or nongovernmental (civil) organizations. These would include husbandry and 
crop associations, co-ops for agricultural and industrial inputs and trade and religious 
groups, especially the religious schools, which generally have a better academic 
reputation than the public schools. We should also include cooperative lending and 
crime-prevention groups. Without these institutions, there are many fewer checks and 
balances, legally, politically or economically. There are few institutions left that 
traditionally mitigate predatory activity by overbearing political or economic forces.  
This form of mass violence can involve direct mass killing or various sub-lethal 
persecutory actions by the state, the paras or the often-authoritarian rebels. It includes in 
particular the following sub-lethal processes, especially as they lead to lethal 
consequences: forced displacement (creating refugees), disappearance, beatings, famine, 
rape, overwork and disease. 
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Peru: The charismatic sociopath in history and the rise of Sendero  
Regarding the depth and breadth of civil violence in Peru since independence, the 
worst occurred during a deadly reign of repression in the 1930s. Supporters of the major 
leftist political party were the main targets, as they were engaged in both armed rebellion 
and political activism. Many tens of thousands were killed or jailed (PBS 2002). The 
economy continued to be governed by a racial gradient, although modernization and 
urbanization created some opportunities for the mestizos, the mixed-race middle class, 
and acculturated Indians, for the former via higher education, for the latter through the 
lower pay of the informal sector, often in cities. While not always so accepted, mestizos 
have tended to identify with whites socially and demographically, and highland and 
lowland Indians were often excluded from the gains of a slowly industrializing economy. 
In the last census that used racial categories, mestizos were counted with whites, and 
together they comprised about 53 percent of the population. With a small Euro-American 
population, this meant mestizos outnumbered whites and Indians (Galindo 2010), though 
Indians comprised a strong minority at about 45 percent  
 
A quota of blood: Shining Path and the sanctification of violence  
While deep divisions between rich and poor are long-standing in Peru and revolts 
have been common, Shining Path was largely the vision of one man. Born in 1934, 
Abimael Guzmán was the illegitimate son of an upper middle-class importer. He grew up 
in a two-room house in a different neighborhood than his half-siblings and resented it. He 
studied leftist philosophy at the National University of San Augustín in Arequipa and, by 
1963 was teaching at the Universidad Nacional de (National University of) San Cristóbal 
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of Huamanga, in the department of Ayacucho (similar to a state), the poorest in the 
country with a large concentration of the Indian-descended rural poor.  
The south-central part of the country is largely mountains and high plains settled by a 
mostly illiterate and impoverished peasantry and presided over by a landed class that 
exercised semi-feudal domination over Native productive resources long after most of the 
continent had experienced some land reform (Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). At the 
university, the disaffected sons and daughters of peasants got an education they thought a 
ticket to social mobility, only to find that jobs were few. In the late 1950s and 1960s, 
Ayacucho became an enclave of leftist thought for students and professors alike. By the 
1960s, in the highlands, peasants were marching, protesting and taking over haciendas.  
 
The highlands rise more than 9,000 feet above sea level in Ayacucho. There, three-
quarters of a population of about a half million makes a subsidence living from potatoes, 
maize, barley, wheat and alfalfa. Where only grazing is feasible, the other quarter raise 
alpaca, llamas, sheep, goats and cattle. In Ayacucho and nearby departments, the eastern 
lowlands grade into the Amazon basin and produce coffee, fruit and in the last few 
decades, much coca, most of which is made into cocaine, often in Colombia, and 
exported to the United States, Europe and Brazil. National and multi-national companies 
also mine gold, silver and copper and cut timber, especially high-value mahogany. Where 
more roads are built, exploitation is more common (Gorriti 1999; Strong 1992). 
Starting in Ayacucho, Guzmán began to reinvent the Communist Party. He branded 
his new organization with the legacy of Jose Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the 
Communist Party of Peru–Red Flag in the 1920s and champion of the indigenismo 
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movement. Mariátegui had called the Inca empire a prefiguration of communism, so 
the full name of Guzmán’s cadres became the Communist Party of Peru in the Shining 
Path of Jose Carlos Mariátegui. To propel the party into action, he tapped decades of 
Indian despair. In addition, Peru’s population had doubled between 1920 and 1960, 
putting great stress on limited arable land, about 3 percent of the country, and a school 
crisis meant that less than half its children were educated. Also, half the country, the 
Quechua-speaking Indians, had been newly disenfranchised by a Spanish literacy test 
(Strong 1992).  
In addition, the coup of Gen. Juan Velasco in 1968 promised progressive reforms, but 
these goals were sinking by 1975, when, to stop social unrest, a conservative military 
government took over. While 9.75 million of 23 million hectares of land were 
reallocated, these were often top-down reorganizations that left the mestizos and larger 
landowners in control. In the highly Quechua Ayacucho, only about 11 percent benefited, 
compared to about half elsewhere, and per capita income in the region fell 20-30 percent 
during the 1970s (Goritti 1999; Strong 1992). As the goals of the Velasco regime were 
reversed, Guzmán prepared peasants, students, professors and many public-school 
teachers – most of whom were leftists – for a people’s war. In May 1980, Sendero 
inauspiciously launched its armed assault on Peru’s political sector by storming the polls 
in Chuschi, a small town in Ayacucho. It rifled files, burned ballots and urged a boycott 
of the elections. When most of the left was ready to focus on electoral politics, it barely 
made news.  
In the next two years, however, SL would engage in about 1,100 violent actions. 
Maoist ideology determined that it raise armies in the countryside before surrounding the 
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cities, but in allegiance to the urban poor, Guzmán ensured that SL did not spare Lima, 
Arequipa or Cusco. Targeted for violence were banks, courthouses, government 
buildings, police stations, jails, political party headquarters, embassies, union offices, 
factories, hotels and shops. It also blew up infrastructure such as electrical towers, phone 
lines, water tanks, dams and railroads (Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). Blackouts, 
transportation blockages and communication breakdowns were common. In addition, 
Sendero assassinated police and political officials, judges, wealthy landowners and 
church, peasant, NGO, human-rights and union leaders, as well as officials of political 
groups. Leftist leaders were even considered the enemy, reformists who would only delay 
the revolution. Shining Path also attacked the haciendas (estates) and, early on, shared the 
livestock, fodder and grain with the peasants. By 1982, according to state sources, only 
180 people had died in SL-related violence, about half civilians (Strong 1992). 
With the nation fresh from military rule, President Fernando Belaúnde was reluctant 
to use force, as few took Shining Path seriously. But soon enough he saw he had to 
mobilize the security forces. He declared a state of emergency in five provinces in 
Ayacucho and one in Aperumic (a province is part of a department). With this began the 
next phase of the human-rights disaster. Following the tradition of dirty war in Latin 
America, as promoted by U.S., British and Israeli trainers and applied by governments in 
Argentina and Brazil that Peru had consulted, wholesale arrest (including disappearance), 
torture and murder of anyone with leftist sympathies was believed the best way to quell 
the rebellion. By the mid-1980s, the dead numbered more than 7,000, of which about 200 
were due to the security forces, 2,500 to civilians and 4,400 to guerrillas (Strong 1992).  
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Counting on indiscriminate state violence to catalyze the revolution, SL was not 
cowed. Instead, it was inspired by it (Strong 1992). By 1984, Shining Path’s attacks in 
Ayacucho were double those in 1982. By 1985-86, SL had backed off its core of 
operations and was working in the coca-growing Huallaga Valley and the six departments 
adjoining Ayacucho. In 1985, total SL attacks were twice those of 1984. By early 1986, 
its violence was relentless, and the response of officialdom just as brutal. A prison riot 
left 210 dead, 1,286 people had died in the civil war and four departments were in 
emergency status. As of May 1986, increasingly funded by coca money, SL had engaged 
in 98,365 actions since 1980 and nine departments were in states of emergency (Strong 
1992; Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999).  
The army’s initial reaction was essentially an uncontrolled racist repression. 
Degregori explains: “In 1983, the armed forces entered an unknown territory in which 
they dealt out indiscriminate repression; anything that moved was a potential enemy” 
(1992:78). Eventually, it realized it was harming its cause more than helping and began 
what he calls selective repression. It began assisting with infrastructure projects and 
shifted the composition of its troops from raw mestizo recruits from the coast, to whom 
the Indians were alien, to peasants from the region who had some experience as cultural 
intermediaries (Degregori 1992). In what he calls its “reconquest,” the army did not try to 
tightly control everything as it had done at first. The troops began weekly visits to 
peasant communities and ronderos (short for rondas campesinas, citizen watches and 
militia), took part in their parades and fiestas and helped meet the needs of the militias, 
distributing shotguns, for instance. However, from 1983-1988, the years before this turn, 
Peru led the world in disappearances. 
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Shining Path, then, increasingly decided to take no quarter. In the early 1980s, 
while controlling virtually all public activities in the regions they commanded, they had 
been more selective in their killings, executing mostly corrupt officials and thieves, 
enough to inspire peasant respect as the new patron, the one who favored the powerless. 
However, this began to change as the revolution expanded beyond Ayacucho, where it 
had some peasant-Indian sympathy, to regions where it had to maintain constant 
vigilance and totalitarian control.  
Regarding Sendero’s commitment to violence, Degregori says,  
 
Shining Path decided to compete with the army on an equal footing as regards the 
meting out of violence against the rural population, to defeat it on that ground too. 
Following this logic…Guzmán himself began to proclaim that “the triumph of the 
revolution will cost a million lives. 
 Thus…the region was devastated, from 1983 onwards, by two objectively external 
armies…. One of the main senderista slogans was, “the party has a thousand eyes and 
a thousand ears.” To put it more brutally, in those days, Shining Path generally knew 
who to kill…and if the peasantry submitted to its demands, it could survive. But 
while the party had a thousand eyes and a thousand ears, the armed forces were blind, 
or, rather, blind to everything but colour. Having recently arrived in the region, and 
trying to reproduce in the Andes strategies that had been effective in the countries of 
the southern cone, they had no means of distinguishing the enemy from anyone else in 
the area and wherever they saw dark skin, they fired.  
[1992:76; emphasis added]  
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A little later, as SL could rely much less on volunteers, it began conscripting. To 
support this and other modes of authority, it decided to ramp up the repression as a means 
of symbolic and actual intimidation. Again, Degregori illuminates: 
 
In this process Shining Path lost its peasant masses but won young cadres. Once 
again, it converted a social defeat [the defection of the highland peasantry] into 
political victory [in the other areas it controlled]. But nowhere else in Peru was the 
Ayacucho scenario of the early 1980s – Shining Path’s most social and consensual 
period – to be repeated. In later years, as the organization expanded into other zones, 
its tendency to resort to terror and its “anti-social” nature tended to increase.  
[1992:77; emphasis added] 
 
Out of these developments grew the establishment of the rondas as true militias, not 
just community watches. They finally drove off Sendero, leading it to parasitize the drug 
trade, as it had done with the peasantry. (Rondas campesinas means literally, peasant 
rounds, because they made rounds of the villages every night.) 
 
Sendero’s deals with drug lords and other devils 
Shining Path’s exact relationship to the cocaine trade is complex, but it was closely 
tied to it and like every other resource it dominated, it found a way to benefit from it. 
Early on, it tapped decades of anger over political, economic or physical abuse of 
peasants by agents of the state and by vigilante or criminal organizations. SL would take 
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over a village, town and eventually a region, proclaim itself the arbiter of the people’s 
rights and implement vigilante justice. Initially, offenders, often corrupt or abusive 
officials, were put through mock public trials, humiliated and beaten, even hanged, shot 
or hacked apart. These usually were much-hated thieves of livestock, corrupt officials, 
spouse abusers or cheating merchants. Later, the SL faithful would dispense with 
homilies, shout a few slogans and summarily execute. But in that time and place, any 
champion of those who were destined to be lifelong servants and beasts of burden was 
greeted with enthusiasm, even devotion. Where frontier justice and semi-feudal relations 
often applied, this meant that much of politics, civil rights and criminal justice was 
extrajudicial, corrupt or genocidal. Sendero promised a new national state in five years 
and asked peasant youth if they wouldn’t like to be a minister in the new government. 
With such bravado, it was received as a valorization of peasant vengeance and a dream of 
Indian justice.  
In this social-political environment, on the eastern slopes of the Andes, where coca 
grows readily without much tending, any champion of the growers, otherwise at the 
mercy of amoral coca processors, was welcome (Strong 1992; Gorriti 1999). This 
situation was especially rewarding for the once-poor peasants who grew it because it 
could be harvested many times a year and conveniently brought middlemen to the bush to 
buy it instead of having to be hauled over mountains to market, as with coffee or cacao 
(cocoa). 
According to Sendero operatives and peasants, SL regulated prices for the growers, 
established systems of justice where drug traffickers previously had ruled capriciously 
and asked for about 10 percent. Doing so, it established a fairly stable tax base, an 
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estimated $20-100 million a year (Gonzales 1992). The official line was they believed 
the cocaine habit to be capitalist decadence, the growers driven to it by poverty and the 
Indian reverence for the plant, their use of it for currency, ceremony and social events, 
the beliefs of a primitive culture. They didn’t encourage it, they said. They merely 
brought rationality and reasonable prices, as well as protection for the growers.  
Into this unstable political ecology were added a government highly corrupted by 
cocaine profits and a growing paramilitary sector, at times warring with rebels and drug 
traders, at others, making agreements with them. Paras have a long tradition, not only in 
Latin America but worldwide through history. An alternative to standing armies, private 
militias are cheaper but are less well trained, less well equipped and more willing to 
violate human rights. And in Peru and Colombia at this time, both groups were paid 
better than most peasants.  
As noted earlier, in Peru, the paras should be separated from the self-defense militias 
(the rondas). Overseen by the military but mostly peasant-based, the latter were initially 
organized to defend against rustlers and thieves, were tied to towns or villages and used 
force fairly discriminately. They repelled Shining Path without excessive violence and 
maintained an independence from the drug dealers and paras. The paras, on the other 
hand, were regional killers, vigilantes riding on horseback or in SUVs. They were usually 
paid by wealthy landowners and business people and had the hidden support of the 
military. In addition, the situation with citizen militias was different in Colombia. With 
one ethnic exception, there was no real counterpart to the ronderos. There citizen militia 
largely refers to paramilitary groups. The largest there is known by its acronym, the 
AUC. These have been mostly latifundia-based, or were first trained by the military and 
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evolved into paras. In contrast to Peru, they have been badly implicated in torture, 
disappearance and the killing of civilians, including women and children. 
The social, political and human-rights meaning of cocaine profits many times greater 
than small countries and large businesses is that, failing a well-developed state, these 
extraordinary fortunes only attract more extra-legal players hoping to exploit not only a 
specific landscape for its cheap natural resources but its peasants and indigenous peoples 
as equally cheap human resources. This often occurs in economically challenged areas. In 
them, changes in consumption elsewhere, often in the developed world, make a 
previously undervalued landscape rich with high-value resources – such as gold, silver, 
emeralds, diamonds or petroleum, some of Colombia’s leading exports, and cocaine.  
This undisciplined approach to development has been well documented in Violent 
Environments, a volume co-edited by Nancy Paluso and Michael Watts (2001). It 
examines the lucrative trade in diamonds in west Africa, oil in Nigeria and shrimp in 
south Asia and central America for the damage the resulting social chaos and mass 
violence inflicts on the vulnerable, human and non-human.  
Regarding the drug trade, while the highlanders have suffered, the most vulnerable 
have been the lowland Indians and the generally poor Afro-Peruvians. In the coca-
producing regions of Peru and areas benefiting from them, this competition for social and 
civil control has produced a reverberation of violence and multiplication of armed actors 
that destabilized natural, social and political landscapes and made life on the ground a 
waking nightmare at times. 
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The fall of Sendero  
Though terrorizing Peruvian society for about 12 years, Shining Path’s dominance 
was relatively short-lived. Better use of intelligence, severe restrictions of civil rights 
under a new national-security regime and the success of peasant defense groups brought 
Sendero down. Its key leaders were rounded up in the early 1990s. Guzmán was arrested 
in 1992 in his safe house in Lima (Strong 1992; Stern 1998; Gorriti 1999). When it most 
needed peasant backing and a decentralized structure to survive, it had little or none.  
Due to a ruthlessness regarding dissent, a leadership dismissive of peasant autonomy 
in theory and racist and elitist in practice, and a top-down absolutism borne of a mix of 
egomania and modernism and foreign to indigenous ways, SL finally had little support, 
even where it had the most early on. Its authoritarian ideology forbade religious festivals, 
separated children from parents for indoctrination, blocked commerce with expanding 
markets in the cities and destroyed peasant livelihoods. Children and adults lived in fear, 
were sick and hungry much of the time, starving at others, in SL enclaves cut off from the 
rest of the world. This destruction of those it was designed to help meant that once its 
leader was captured, it had little support from within and largely collapsed. 
James Rochlin looks at rebel movements in Peru, Colombia and Mexico in terms of 
their pre-modern, modern and post-modern worldviews and their ability to build 
relationships and social capital (capacity) inside and outside of their boundaries.  
 
While Sendero had much in its favor with respect to both ideology and support base, 
it also possessed crucial weaknesses. Perhaps chief among these was [its] attempt to 
smother... indigenous epistemology. Sendero’s prohibition of indigenous holidays; its 
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suppression of indigenous spirituality; its contradictions of indigenous conceptions 
of time, space, family, and the nature of truth and political change spawned 
considerable resentment.  
[2003:48–49; emphasis added] 
 
Amid a devastation of local institutions, this means that Shining Path was dedicated to 
eradicating not only institutions of political and economic control but the major modes of 
Native thought, experience and metaphysics, the stuff of truth itself.  
 
Colombia: Rural poverty and the systems of coercion surrounding it 
As of July 2013, according to a thoroughly researched report by the National Centre 
of Historical Memory, since it began in the early 1960s, this most recent war in Colombia 
has claimed the lives of about 220,000 Colombians, 80 percent of them civilians. Nearly 
41,000 of the armed actors, security forces, paramilitaries and guerillas, have died as 
well.  
Colombia features fragmented geographical, economic and political sectors, a poorly 
developed civil-political apparatus in rural areas and a two-tiered society historically 
based largely on landholdings, extractive wealth and semi-feudal relations. After 
independence, the nation suffered through nine civil wars between 1830 and 1895, 
capped by The War of a Thousand Days, from 1899-1902, which devastated the 
economy. These all involved Conservatives fighting Liberals. The former represented 
landed aristocracy in control of an encomienda system that was essentially feudal and 
their political proxies in government. Later, this system was replaced by latifundias as 
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virtual serfs became peasants. The Liberals favored a secular state, free trade and an 
economically liberal (free) merchant class (Rochlin 2003). They believed that Native 
peoples, tenants and small farmers should be integrated into a market economy at decent 
wages. 
These polities were not well developed beyond their patronal bases and featured a 
tradition of private justice. Each department had its own army but was augmented or 
rivaled by militias from the encomiendas. In the aftermath of this war, the country formed 
its first national army. After about 1850, following a mining-based economy, agricultural 
production for export became more dominant, and, as in much of Latin America, one of 
the most vexing problems was finding a labor source for the large landowners who grew 
cotton, tobacco, quinine, small grains, cacao, indigo and later, dominating all exports, 
coffee and bananas (Buckman 2012a).  
In the early days of the republic, with a large amount of public land apparently going 
begging (regardless of the land needs of the indigenous peoples), peasant settlers, called 
colonos, occupied these lands, legally or illegally. They often could not make it as 
freeholders and ended up as tenant farmers or laborers on the much larger holdings 
resembling plantations. Cash crops for export grew in the middle altitudes and lowlands, 
but the Indian population had occupied the highlands, so landowners had to recruit 
migrants to work on the large farms, which, as they were used to cheap labor, aggravated 
them. With unclaimed land nearby, laborers would strike out on their own, again causing 
labor shortages. In response, entrepreneurs would “enclose” peasant lands and assert 
rights to property and labor, driving the smallholders off or making them indentured. 
Judges in the thrall of the landowners accepted forged bills of sale, and the small farmers, 
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most of them illiterate, were not equipped to stop them. Not surprisingly, this enclosure 
movement produced armed resistance. Along with this resistance came a call for reform.  
Still, from about 1900 to the early 1940s, it was relatively quiet. But when labor and 
land reforms halted under a Conservative president, La Violencia began (1946-1966). 
Liberal revolutionary groups controlled large areas of the coffee-growing central regions. 
Paras tied to the Conservatives fought the rebels to defeat secularism and communism, or 
so they believed. Its legacy was 200,000-300,000 dead – at least two-thirds rural folk – 
and a mass migration to the cities to escape poverty and violence. 
This migration produced squalor in shanty towns thrown up by rural refugees on 
vacant land in the cities and a civil and political vacuum that fostered uprisings. While 
the recent violence has roots in these conflicts, it also has much in common with earlier 
civil wars, all of which have similar themes. Another paradox was that out of this period, 
Liberals and Conservatives agreed to share power by alternating presidents and dividing 
elective offices equally between the two parties. Called the National Front, it was 
approved by plebiscite but excluded all other political parties. It only lasted until 1974 
but helped cause the violence that followed.  
 
The political economy of the mass violence 
FARC is rooted in the Liberal factions of La Violencia. The second era of this 
movement began when a military government banned the Communist Party in 1954. By 
the mid-1950s, frustrated with Liberal inaction on land reform, increasing numbers of 
peasants responded to the communist appeal of the guerrillas. In a longstanding conflict, 
they supplied a support base for the rebels or joined them.  
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One of FARC’s enduring issues, land reform, failed miserably between 1966 and 
1980. In the late 1960s, President Carlos Lleras Restrepo gave land to sharecroppers and 
tenants, but landlords pushed them off with violence. By the 1970s and 1980s, drug 
barons and plantation bosses accelerated this consolidation. By then, estimates put the 
urban poverty rate at nearly 60 percent and the rural rate at nearly 90 percent (Sanchez 
2001). By the late 1970s, FARC operated along eight fronts in the southern, eastern and 
central parts of the country. It was not powerful but happened to be well positioned to 
take advantage of the boom in cocaine traffic by controlling key growing regions. By 
1985, it had 3,200 members on 32 fronts, by 1994, about 10,000 (Rochlin 2003). By the 
late 1990s, it may have comprised up to 30,000 members on about 100 fronts. It 
numbered about 20,000-25,000 in the 2000s but is probably half that now. 
FARC is one of a half-dozen guerrilla groups. Chief in size and impact, having the 
largest peasant base, it is rooted in the peasant self-defense groups of the 1950s. It was 
initially formed to fend off military and landowner violence and has traditionally focused 
on agrarian reform. By the 1990s, it was the government from Arauca to Caquenta – most 
of the eastern plains, much of the southern bush and some of the Amazonian jungle. It 
also controlled parts of Antioquia (where Medellin is the capital), Santander and Tolima. 
After repressive regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, by the mid-1980s, a social 
consensus emerged that the guerrilla groups merited negotiation. The state brokered 
truces, and this détente contributed to the 1985 formation of the Patriotic Union (Union 
Patriotica , UP), the political wing of the left. FARC was first among equals in this 
coalition.  
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FARC and the drug trade 
FARC’s history in drug trafficking is complicated, checkered and hard to appreciate 
without an understanding of all the systems of violence in Colombia. By the 1980s, as the 
drug trade began to expand into a multi-billion dollar industry, FARC, as with Shining 
Path and other insurgencies in the Andes, began to regulate the coca industry. Its original 
intent was to protect growers from abuses by processors and get 10 percent of the gross 
as a financial base, soon to become more important with the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Including protection for the processors, this worked fairly well at first, but deep 
political differences made the alliance unstable. The drug traffickers, like many mafias, 
see themselves as entrepreneurs and want market freedom, legitimacy and an extremely 
laissez-faire political order. The rebels seek total control in their territory, one they 
believe adjudicates peasant welfare. With more local support than with Shining Path, 
FARC apparently achieved this control early on. It set up schools, health-care networks, 
agricultural coops and other aspects of civic order. This commitment predated the drug 
trade and eventually put them in conflict with the drug barons and their projects, which 
also included schools, clinics and community centers (not unlike the state, the rebels and 
eventually the paras). Both sought to emulate the patron-client relationships characteristic 
of the broader Iberian-American society.  
Eventually a system of double or triple tribute would make life unbearable for the 
Native peoples and peasants. In it, rebels, military, paras and drug traffickers competed 
against or secured an accommodation with one another. In the 1990s, as FARC began to 
break away from the drug gangs, and as the military contracted with a burgeoning 
paramilitary sector to take over the dirty war, the situation was increasingly open to 
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violence. The drug traffickers also began to work with the paramilitaries but were 
taxed by them. To supplement its drug revenue, FARC turned increasingly to the 
extortion of transnational companies doing resource-extractive work, and to kidnapping, 
first of corporate heads, political leaders and the very rich, and then, of anyone who could 
pay. FARC and other guerrillas have historically generated revenue through such 
kidnappings (in which Colombia has led the world) and the extortion of oil, mining, 
agricultural and other transnational operations.  
The period leading up to the late 1980s was a time of catastrophic violence that 
devastated the political wing of the rebellions, in which thousands of members of the UP 
were murdered. FARC’s lethality increased dramatically after that. Before it, from 1982-
1985, it was believed responsible for about 500 of some 2,000 extrajudicial deaths, not a 
huge amount, though not morally inconsiderable. Soon after, through the 1990s, its 
contributions to mass violence increased exponentially, as did those by all other armed 
sectors except the army (Sanchez 2001; Tate 2007). 
So if the UP stood to make electoral gains by the late 1980s and early 1990s, then 
why did FARC renew its assault on the civil and civic sectors during the 1990s? The most 
important explanation is that prior to and following the constitution of 1991, the military, 
the paras and some drug gangs summarily executed or blew up more than 3,000 of its 
leaders and rank and file. This massacre embittered a whole generation and re-committed 
it to violence. 
Then, funded by drug traffickers and the state, the paras began an assault on the 
guerrillas, and as a result, FARC’s killings began to rise. Human Rights Watch (2001) 
noted: “For the year 2000, human rights groups reported that the FARC-EP killed 496 
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civilians nationwide, many accused of being paramilitary or government 
sympathizers.” But unlike Shining Path, while using political and corporate assassination 
at times, outside of the collateral damage of bombings, FARC generally has been more 
discriminating in its use of lethal force, at least among peasants on its own turf. 
Indiscriminate killings have been more the result of para and military violence, but since 
the early 2000s, all the armed groups combined have killed about a thousand a year in a 
civil war with a body count that now rivals La Violencia (HRW 2001, 2012).  
These hostilities reached a chaotic peak in the 1990s, during which human-rights 
violations and extralegal deaths by all sectors rose rapidly. The military and paras were 
responsible for about two deaths for each of the guerillas. Ironically, between 1992 and 
1996, as the government sought international respectability, rights violations by the state 
went from 54 percent of the total to 10.5 percent, while those of the paras, not 
coincidentally, rose from 18 to 63 percent. For the guerrillas, they were between 38 and 
27 percent (Sanchez 2001).  
Massacres attributed to paramilitary groups from October 1995 to September 1996 
were 32; by guerrillas 13; and by unknowns, likely drug traffickers or the military, 10. By 
1998, this was 103 by guerrillas and 91 by the paras (Sanchez 2001). Total deaths by 
FARC cannot be determined, but it clearly has its own extralegal code.  
 
Outside their own zones of control...the Colombian guerillas [FARC first among 
them] increasingly resort to practices that contradict their discourse. This is most 
evident in their terrorist operations and in the massacres...against the social bases of 
their real or presumed adversaries....Once their initial penetration of peasant 
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communities is complete, the police are dislodged, and the population is 
subordinated to their designs; the next phase is that of political consolidation.  
[Sanchez 2001:30; emphasis added]  
 
Finally, another intractable variable is that, while the drug trade pumps untold billions 
of dollars into the economy and was responsible for steady economic growth during the 
1980s and 1990s, it generates no taxable income. So it is that much harder for the 
resource-poor state to fund the training and equipping of the military, police and other 
response teams needed to supplant the criminal groups and ensure the survival of a civic 
apparatus and civil society.  
Instead, the criminalization of the major military and political powers increases as 
they both tax and collude with the drug trade and become increasingly invested in 
trafficking. This alliance led to the assassination of three left-of-center presidential 
candidates in 1989-1990 and the many UP killings. The drug lords, paras and a corrupt 
state could ill afford a legitimate left and a state opposed to their activities. So it had to 
reignite guerilla violence after the truces.  
 
When revolutions burn out: FARC’s epilogue 
FARC’s violence has been winding down since the government, flush with U.S. 
military aid, abandoned its containment approach and shifted the dirty war to the paras. It 
then attacked the guerrillas head-on in a conventional war. In addition, FARC and ELN 
have both come under widespread domestic and international criticism for their 
kidnappings and sabotage of infrastructure. The rebellions also have waned as prospects 
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for peace develop. This has wavered but seems to have taken flight lately, as talks with 
FARC began again in mid-2013. These have featured President Santos agreeing to 
political participation for FARC and to land reform for small farmers. The latter, 
however, has been tried many times and generally gets blocked by the managerial and 
landowning classes. It seems very difficult to enact in a meaningful way. Tate explains 
that a recent study demonstrated: 
 
During twenty-five years of state-sponsored agrarian reform, approximately 900,000 
hectares were redistributed; [however] by 1988 Colombia had one of the worst ratios 
of land inequality in the world. As measured by the World Bank, the Gini Coefficient 
for land in Colombia was 0.86, with 0.0 being perfect and 1.0 representing complete 
inequality of land distribution. For comparison, selected others were: Brazil (0.85), 
Peru (0.91), Korea (0.35), Taiwan (0.45).  
[2007:315–316, n. 22; emphasis added] 
 
In addition, Santos, the leader of the campaign against them under Uribe, has 
continued to pursue an armed assault against the guerillas, a point of contention for them 
regarding peace talks. It remains to be seen whether negotiations with FARC will yield 
peace or whether political participation will be done in by violence and land reform by 
political monkey-wrenching. Land-reform efforts may yet succumb to intimidation by 
enforcers for wealthy land owners and local politicians under their influence. It has 
happened before, here and across Latin America.  
Other crucial issues related to mass violence and human rights in Colombia are: 
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 The National Centre of Historical Memory said most of the more than 200,000 
killings from the civil war occurred as large ranchers and latifundia owners began 
to fund and organize right-wing militias to combat FARC and other armed groups 
(Al Jazeerra Americas 2013). This assault became especially acute during the 
1990s and early 2000s.  
 A study by Amnesty International and the Fellowship of Reconciliation showed 
47 percent of the murder cases reported in 2007 involved security forces 
bankrolled by the United States. The Ministry of Defense has since directed its 
troops to capture, not kill, guerrillas (Romero and González 2008). 
 According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), in the decade ending at 2011, more than 3,000 people were killed 
extra-legally by the state. The army committed most of these between 2004 and 
2008. Since then, there has been a dramatic reduction in military cases, to around 
15 percent, but a corresponding rise in paramilitary cases (HRW 2012). Total 
numbers have barely changed.  
 In a realm of multi-sector violence, where pressure on one factor can produce an 
increase in another, a sobering statistic involves assassination of Colombian 
human-rights professionals. They generally work for an NGO or the state and 
have been eliminated at a rate not seen since the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 
2012, 42 percent more human-rights workers were killed than in 2011. In the first 
six months of 2013, 37 human-rights workers were murdered, one every 5 days, a 
27 percent increase for the same period of the previous year (Isacson 2013).  
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 Homicides of human-rights workers stabilized at about 30 per year for 2008 
through 2011. However, in 2012 Colombia instituted restitution of land taken 
from the rural poor. It allowed the displaced to submit a claim for their lands, and 
the number of murders of human-rights workers jumped to 69 (Isacson 2013).  
 
Next, we will look closely at the social construction of human rights and the human 
resources required at the highland-village and civil-society levels for effective 
peacebuilding, as well as the damage civil war does to the social capital necessary to that 
task. To do that, we turn to two incisive ethnographies of the postmodern Andes.  
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Chapter III 
 
In Search of Peace:  
Religion, Ritual and Reconciliation  
in Postmodern Face-to-Face Communities  
amid Mass Violence in the Andes 
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ETHNOGRAPHIES OF MASS VIOLENCE:  
THE WINDING ROAD FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO PEACEBUILDING 
We have said that one of the most important aspects of peacebuilding is a holistic 
approach to human needs and an emphasis on local contexts, community initiatives and 
popular solidarity. This should be coupled with an emphasis on empowering civil society 
for similar aims. However, once one investigates these matters in detail, it becomes 
apparent that there are not only significant differences in the way human rights and 
peacebuilding are perceived across local, national and international levels, but also key 
differences in the way these matters are understood within a single level.  
These are some of the most difficult issues bedeviling the human race, so it is likely 
that reasonable people would differ regarding the ways and means of relevant solutions, 
not to mention the likelihood of, not just the unreason of individuals, but the 
incomprehension of social systems in conflict – of villagers poorly educated in Western 
ways, especially as they are supposed to help them find peace, and, more significant, of 
Western-educated experts poorly versed in village ways, especially as those are supposed 
to accomplish something similar and, being local, may better hold the key. This poses 
vexing problems for social scientists, activists, NGO leaders and policy makers alike. 
Such dynamics across cultures among various postmodern communities are also the 
essence of anthropology.  
 
Kimberly Theidon (2013) and Winifred Tate (2007) reflect on these matters of 
conflict within and between levels in riveting accounts of fieldwork with two different 
groups in Peru and Colombia. They do this in Intimate Enemies: Violence and 
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Reconciliation in Peru and in Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human 
Rights Activism in Colombia, respectively. To create the first, Theidon (2013), who 
researched the lethal swath Shining Path cut through Peruvian society in 1987, especially 
in the rural highlands, returned periodically to research the effects and aftershocks of the 
civil war on ordinary villagers. She looks in particular at Western and native 
interpretations of violence, trauma and healing as they struggled spiritually and 
psychologically to process their grief. In addition, she examines their social and political 
struggle to assimilate former rebels into civilian life to take their place among those they 
had once abused. There she focuses on how rituals of reconciliation helped the abused 
live with their former abusers, not without anxiety but in relative peace. In particular, she 
examines Ayachucho, the department that was birthplace of Shining Path and one of the 
areas of the worst violence. She takes a special look at how former enemies made peace 
or failed to – examining the effect the trauma of war had on those relationships, how this 
tore at the fabric of village life and, ultimately, how the villagers found a way to process 
their grief and accept former mass murderers back into the community.   
For the second ethnbography, Tate (2007) worked on human-rights issues in 
Colombia in different capacities at different times and levels, local, regional and national, 
from the late 1980s into the 1990s. She returned in 2001 to do an ethnography of human-
rights workers during the worst of the 50-year civil violence. She had a particular interest 
in the relationships among these workers across the scales we have been discussing and 
across various moral and political epistemologies. We will use each to shed light on our 
two main objects of inquiry: meeting a hierarchy of human needs, particularly different 
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views of such across cultures and scales (the various moral epistemologies mentioned 
above), and the building or rebuilding civil society, also across cultures and scales. 
In addition, in this study we will be looking at situations that may transcend 
conventional definitions of genocide and include what we earlier referred to mass or 
pluralistic violence. Related to these notions, as already noted, I want to introduce a novel 
paradigm called civil genocide or civicide (destroying a people by destroying their civic 
and civil institutions). It is closely related to models of multi-lateral, multi-vector civil 
conflict characterized as mass violence by Christian Gerlach (in Extremely Violent 
Societies, 2010), or violent pluralism in a essays edited by Enrique Arias and Daniel 
Goldstein (Violent Democracies in Latin America, 2010). 
All these models emphasize the participation of many parts of the society in this 
violence, in other words, a multi-class, multi-ethnic, multi-sector civil strife. It is a 
concatenation of armed conflict that transcends traditional definitions of genocide but 
kills just as many innocent people. It has traumatized the survivors via murder of friends 
and family, torture, rape, kidnap, starvation, displacement and manifold forms of post-
traumatic psychological disorders. This manuscript follows a previous study that featured 
a close examination of models of genocide and mass killing, including the models above. 
It was intended to be part of a larger work for which this study is part II. Concerning this 
variety of models of genocide and/or mass killing, the critical issue is how these 
understandings of genocide form a rough gradient tending toward greater complexity of 
perpetrators and victims, from one-sided through binary to multi-lateral and multi-sector. 
The latter situation characterizes most civil wars and requires an approach to 
peacebuilding tailored to its complex, cross-cutting needs and variables. I have added a 
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matrix of these scholars and their models of genocide, along with key characteristics, 
in appendix 2. These constitute the social precursors to the conditions we will examine 
here.  
Peacebuilding must be done in the midst of such trauma, in a social world in which 
most certainties are lost, even between people who have known each other for a long 
time. It must in one way or another deal with such trauma as a precondition to a lasting 
peace. As we will see, this is true not only for the villagers but for those who work 
closely with them to document their tragedy.   
The very ways of thinking about the processing of that trauma, therefore, are 
culturally contested. We confront a conundrum when we even think about the metaphors 
we might use to characterize this event: Are we purging it, as with a Freudian catharsis, 
or banishing it with a Native cleansing? Are we involved in pleasing or appeasing the 
spirits? Or just one another? Is it a reconciliation, as with feuding neighbors or members 
of a clan? Are we clearing the forest so we can sow crops and build anew, a more 
“masculine,” putatively northern European, that is, white male, metaphor and model? Are 
we flushing the shadow from the collective unconscious so that it can be identified and 
reintegrating via higher consciousness, a Jungian model, or perhaps embracing the 
dissolution of subject-object relations as befits an Eastern mystic tradition?  
And furthermore, how does an analysis of human-rights organizations relate to 
peacebuilding? We will pursue this as straightforwardly as possible by saying that peace 
must be built on both social and criminal justice, that stopping the violence comes first 
and preventing its immediate recurrence second, but examining its broader patterns must 
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come next. We will therefore also look into the longer term issues of land distribution, 
reconstruction of state capacity and sustainable, equitable modes of development.  
More important, what are the metaphors, symbols, fables and myths the people most 
affected by this violence use to invoke healing and peace? Are they a fit with the 
metaphors, symbols, fables and myths used by the Western-educated professionals who 
try to facilitate, engineer or “build” a peace? And finally, in keeping with a previous 
genocide-studies component of this examination, in which we propose the search for an 
indigenous – as opposed to a northern European – model of genocide, is there an 
indigenous model of peacebuilding? It is to these matters we will turn.  
 
PERU: 
A SADNESS UNTO DEATH, THE TRAUMA INDUSTRY  
AND A REPENTANCE BEFORE THE COMMUNITY 
 
(The following epigraphic passages come from Theidon and Tate. They were selected for 
their emblematic qualities and are intended as first-person ethnography or thick 
description, in excerpt. Except for non-English words, emphasis is added.) 
 
Too much memory  
 
I hesitated for a moment. “Hernan, tell me a bit more about the psychological 
treatment you want in Hualla.” 
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 He shifted in his chair and exhaled his frustration. “Life in Hualla is 
impossible! People argue all the time. Before we can even think about reconciliation, 
we need psychological treatment.” 
 “And what is it about psychological treatment in particular that would help?” I 
wondered.  
 “Well, everybody keeps remembering everything. They keep insulting each other, 
especially when they’re drunk. It’s one big fight. If we could have professional 
attention – therapy with a professional – we could forget everything that happened.” 
 “So therapy would be necessary so you could live together again?” 
 Hernan nodded. “That’s right. You know what the big problem in Hualla is? 
There’s too much memory – way too much memory,” repeating the line for emphasis. 
“With psychological treatment, we could forget everything. That way we could live 
together again – peacefully,” he said.  
 [Theidon 2013:34; emphasis added] 
 
Despite their omnipresent criticisms of the health posts, people are not rejecting 
medical care per se. Indeed, claiming trauma is in part a demand for services. 
Talking [about] trauma is one way of constructing the intervenable subject – 
individually and collectively. There will be no projects providing elixirs for daño [an 
affliction caused by angry mountain gods], no NGOs heading to the mountains with 
sacrifices for the apus. Interventions and their subjects must fit within a modernist 
paradigm… The modern subject of suffering is traumatized.   
 [Theidon 2013:35; emphasis added] 
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 Indigenous peoples have for 500 years adapted to Europeans idioms, ways and modes 
of thought as a kind of protective coloring or ideological cloaking device, as these are 
among the weapons of the weak, as James Scott (1985) would have it. This is not more 
calculated than scavenging. The poor and homeless always have to do both. Still, it is not 
purely opportunistic. It is a way to get the system and its managers to notice, to take them 
seriously. As they do this, we might ask, speaking clinically, and ethnically, are there 
positive and negative aspects of memory? Apparently.  
As part of her fieldwork, Theidon (2013) studied the work of the Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) and investigated cultural tensions regarding concepts 
and terminology in mental and physical health. She also did health-needs assessments for 
an NGO and was struck by the bureaucracy overseeing reconciliation, by the cultural 
barriers to various modes of healing. Conventional models of psychotherapy hold to a 
virtual doctrine of retrieved memory. This is to allow one to experience the past deeply 
enough, but safely enough with the aid of a facilitator, that one gains some perspective 
and begins to move beyond it.  
Hernan Periona, of the first quotation, was a former member of Shining Path, so his 
concerns with memory could be seen as convenient. But many other villagers complained 
of the oppression of memory. Women could not stop crying, asking for a pill that stops 
memories. Men could not control their drinking, or their fighting. The local term for the 
condition was llakis, which means both pain and sadness but transcends purely mental or 
emotional experience. It “fills the heart,” the indigenous seat of memory. It can 
overwhelm the individual and render him or her dysfunctional for short periods, less 
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functional than normal for long periods. Theidon (2013) describes it as a memory 
affliction. However, instead of the private associations developed during therapy, llakis is 
a social phenomenon that carries no stigma. It is a reaction to overwhelming social events 
and calls for, and expects, a social response. 
 
Llakis surge from the heart, overflowing its capacity to contain so many hurtful 
memories. As they fill the body, “you become pure pain or sadness.” This is a 
“hydraulic model” of the emotions; emotions rise, fall, bear down upon, and travel 
through the body. There was another powerful expression several women used: 
Yuyaynipas tapawan (“My memories suffocate me”). Beneath the weight of 
reminiscence, the person cannot breathe and their heart aches. Llakis can rob the 
person of their use of reason, leaving them sonso (senseless or mad). And as llakis 
mature in the body, they can be fatal.  
[Theidon 2013:41] 
 
Other afflictions were a form of severe weakness (iquyasqa) she describes as a 
“profound, bone-penetrating exhaustion” (Theidon 2013:48). Western experts might call 
this severe depression. Health workers also documented birth defects and slow 
development among children born to women pregnant during the violence and a form of 
psychic (from the root, soul) death called wanurqani. Contrary to Western cultural 
idioms, this “death” might happen many times and result in loss of consciousness, 
fainting in Western terms. 
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Another common condition was a more self-evident “hardening of the heart,” both 
symptom and treatment, depending on social position and cultural set. Healers, or 
curanderos, would work with villagers to help them desensitize themselves to the effects 
of the violence, in other words, to harden their hearts. Then at town meetings community 
leaders would plead with villagers to “soften” their hearts, to reconcile and make village 
life more functional, more possible.  
Regarding the second passage above, Theidon says that the human-rights 
professionals of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission were taught to 
routinely rework the testimony of the villagers, not out of deceit but in an attempt at 
cultural translation. As with Tate to follow, they represent the “professionalization” 
human rights work. This is essentially what Foucault would call knowledge/power. They 
would channel reports of these afflictions into categories of trauma, often post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD), an official-sounding term that is really something of a catch-all. 
Most believed this was required to provide “universal” categories with which to 
document the events for historical and legal purposes. They had been trained not to 
respond to their first instincts, which was to produce a faithful transcript, but instead to 
adhere to a chronological sequence made of “Antecedents,” “Facts,” “Actions Taken,” 
“Sequelae” and “Expectations for the Future.” The afflictions Quechua speakers reported, 
such as those above, were generally listed under “Psychosocial Sequelae,” sequelae 
meaning “an aftereffect of disease, condition, or injury, or a secondary result” (Merriam-
Webster.com 2014a) but in this context bearing the connotation of an afterthought, 
especially as it is psychological.  
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She makes it clear she is proud to have worked with the PTRC and lauds its 
“worthy goals” but notes that because they have had explicitly educational goals with 
national and international aims, truth commissions have had to develop means of 
conciliation for a much broader audience, especially considering the Western mentality of 
the national and international elite. So their cultural categories have to shift, and the 
emotional resonance of indigenous ways of knowing with them.  
She notes that after a period in social science in which PTSD was over-diagnosed, 
during which trauma experts were deployed in a host of post-war situations, a critique of 
what she calls “the trauma industry” emerged. On the other hand, she explains she is not 
interested in cataloging “authentic” exotic-sounding indigenous ailments to throw up 
against psychiatry’s “artificial” universal categories. This too has been overdone. Instead, 
she calls attention to epistemological issues that have moral implications. Why are 
Western psychological concepts considered “theory” and Native categories “beliefs” or 
“customs”? While most such mental-health workers believe they are translating local 
terms into universal classifications, Theidon is most concerned with how this translation 
obscures a culturally sensitive record of peasant trauma as experienced, one which should 
have implications for healing, reconciliation and peace:  
 
How can interventions help people rebuild their lives without understanding locally 
salient theories of illness, health agency, and social repair? How do we respond to the 
needs of survivors of war without understanding the local forms and logics of social 
ties and their transformation? Without understanding what makes a being human, 
and to whom that status is conferred or denied?  [Theidon 2013:27; emphasis added]  
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Here we encounter a discourse about how to meet a complex of Maslow’s needs: 
needs for safety (security of body, employment, resources, morality, the family, health 
and property); love and belonging (friendship, family and sexual intimacy); and esteem 
(self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect of others and respect by others), but in 
culturally appropriate ways. Without adopting a shrill tone, she argues that within the 
social context of long-term discrimination, this gap in what might be called reconciliation 
technologies needs to be rethought. The trauma industry specifically and the 
peacebuilding movement in general should come to grips with the full complement of 
human needs in culturally sensitive terms and propose ways to treat these deficits in a 
holistic way.  
This form of discrimination is not just related to how international and national 
experts, working in nominal universals, make adjustments while scaling up the testimony 
of human-rights victims for an educated, international audience. It is mostly about how 
they individualize healing and reconciliation in a way that interferes with the collective 
mentality that is the prevailing ethos among villagers. Such a nuanced approach to pain, 
one with greater cultural resonance is necessary for more than just immediate 
reconciliation, but for functional psyches and relationships in village life over the long 
term as well. In addition, while it might seem as if the excerpts above concern only 
“higher” human needs, the psychological and the spiritual, these people are bereft beyond 
the adequacy of Western idioms in large part because they have lost most of the resources 
needed to put together even a meager living in the resource-poor highlands: their 
livestock, their homes, their fields and their men and boys and women and girls. In this 
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world, the psychological, the social, the economic and the spiritual may not be one, but 
they are closely related enough that they cannot be approached reductively. A simple 
coding for trauma cannot capture what they have lost.  
Are there ways to satisfy both objectives, Western/international and local/indigenous? 
Do evolving models of bi-cultural education and a new emphasis on a non-bipolar 
interculturality, now gaining ground, represent avenues for constructive change? This is 
implied, though Theidon does not dwell on it. We will turn to these concerns periodically 
and in the conclusion. One of the main questions becomes:  If we work within a system 
of basic needs, what does this mean interculturally? Are these needs universal? While 
little is wholly universal, most of them find expression across cultures. If so, how are they 
expressed in different cultures? How does this help interpersonal healing or social 
justice? And how does this serve reconciliation and peacebuilding?  
 
Poverty and war widows 
 
Marcos discussed how the political violence had severely affected Carhuaharrán, 
prompting him to solicit funding to open the Children of Jesus Soup Kitchen. I 
suggested we strengthen the request by incorporating statistics from the health post 
indicating that 80 percent of the children in Carhuaharrán and its eleven outlying 
annexes suffered from chronic malnutrition. Marcos nodded emphatically: “Yes. You 
know, here we need to think of the violence,” emphasizing that chronic hunger and 
poverty would require us to think about the violence in plural form. War and poverty 
had both assaulted his community with various consequences.  [Theidon 2013:36–37] 
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“What do people want when you talk to them [about Shining Path and its atrocities]? 
Revenge? Fines?”  
 He shook his head. “They don’t talk about revenge. They ask for economic help: 
They say, ‘If I hadn’t lost my husband – before the violence, we had fifteen bulls, 
eighty cows, eighty sheep, and other animals too.’ And when we ask them how many 
they have now, they have two, three sheep” [an evangelical minister in the highlands]. 
[Theidon 2013:83] 
 
If physiological needs precede social, psychological and spiritual needs, then, with 
adequate resources, we could pursue peacebuilding in a bureaucratized, step-wise 
fashion. But these needs occur simultaneously and all have to be met for the best hope of 
a fully functioning society. However, in the aftermath of wrenching civil conflict, it is 
likely that very few are met at all, certainly not at first. Theidon relates graphic testimony 
from villagers in Ayacucho regarding the deficits in their social, psychological and 
spiritual lives following the horrors of civil war. While she may exhibit an overemphasis 
among postmodernists on the ideological and the psychological, these needs must be 
taken seriously, and in general, they have historically been easier for the intervention and 
expert communities to gloss over. At the same time, physiological needs must be met, 
and concrete, economic security yields a sense of most abstract forms of social, 
psychological and spiritual security that foster the fulfillment of the “higher needs.”  
Theidon’s focus is elsewhere, but here she documents some of the more eloquent 
testimony regarding poverty and the struggle to restore a livelihood, both for individuals 
and the community. Here we see an overwhelming, devastating grief that requires a 
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holistic response by response teams and health professionals, one operating, as the 
victims experience their tragedy, up and down the scale of human needs. But they 
received little or none of any such integrated response to personal and collective trauma. 
Those that we are told are human-rights professionals, and not just any but appointed by 
the PTRC, should apparently practice better intercultural awareness. 
An area related to both poverty and politics to which Theidon devotes considerable 
space is a chapter called “Widows.” Not unlike the world of the Hebrew Bible, widows 
suffer disproportionately during good times and bad. In its 2001 Census for Peace, the 
Peruvian government estimated that the war created 20,000 widows (Theidon 2013). In 
Ayacucho, a third of the households were headed by women and were among the poorest 
people in the country. Among uncomfortable lessons they hold for the well-intentioned is 
that there is no dearth of discrimination among subordinate groups. After many spent the 
worst of the violence hiding in the hills, often in caves, they returned to half-empty 
villages to find their losses had just begun. As can happen under conditions of 
deprivation, the poor may conserve their resources by limiting their compassion for the 
most vulnerable among them. Theidon notes: 
 
Izcarceta nodded. “Before people had caridad [charity, compassion]. They cared 
about the {single} women with many children – they worked for them. They would 
carry wood, on their animals they would bring wood. Now, the young people – they 
loathe old women with no strength.” 
 “Why did people change? What happened?” 
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 Izcarceta shrugged. “They say they don’t have time. ‘We’re too busy,’ they say. 
We have to pay ten soles a day for someone to work our land. Where is a warmisapa 
{widow} going to get that sort of money? When all you have to drink are your tears, 
how can you pay that?”      
[2013:166; braces, emphasis added] 
 
Interviews with widows also documented that reconstruction assistance was often 
distributed differentially. Donors and their representatives would select those identified 
as “natural leaders” to participate in training and to establish the community’s priorities. 
These so-called leaders would use this standing to solidify their position on the social 
ladder, distributing aid according to patronage. If NGO leaders asked that women be 
included, their wives were designated. The widows were usually left out.  
However, in one of the unintended consequences of war and reconstruction, for 
security purposes the widows, as others did, moved farther from their fields and closer to 
the towns. They were then able to more easily attend community meetings. While most of 
the married women chose not to, attendance by the widows was mandatory because they 
were heads of households. Because of this, the new discourse about human rights 
stemming from the civil war stimulated a consciousness and solidarity regarding 
women’s rights: 
 
Participating in these workshops, you learn many things. The men should listen to 
women, between the two they need to talk… Me, now I go to the assemblies and I 
speak up. I complain about how the authorities are spending money! That’s the good 
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thing about us, the warmisapas. Even if you must sacrifice, they are always having 
us participate in the meetings. We learn about what the men are doing and we have a 
chance to participate… Ha, when we go to these trainings, the men say we’re just 
going to learn to complain… That’s why some of the women can’t talk to their 
husbands about their rights – they [the men] don’t believe in them. That’s why it 
would be good if they trained the men, too, about women’s rights so they can 
understand.  
[Theidon 2013:176; emphasis added]  
 
The widows began to experience a solidarity facing the twin evils of war and poverty. 
Responding to state-sponsored aid, embodying new roles and taking on new 
responsibilities, they began to interact more assertively with the government. They also 
set up their own voluntary associations, including soup kitchens, groups for sharing milk 
and a Mother’s Club for advocacy about state resources. Here, the widows became 
proactive about meeting their needs for esteem (self-esteem, confidence, achievement, 
respect of others, respect by others) and self-actualization (morality, creativity, 
spontaneity, problem solving, freedom from prejudice, acceptance of facts).  
Theidon (2013:167) phrases it differently, but it amounts to the same thing. She says 
they began to politicize motherhood: “Purus explained, ‘We were so sad because we 
couldn’t feed our children well. Our children cried for food, and it’s the mother who must 
do something.’ And they did.” 
With NGOs all over Ayacucho working to rebuild the region in the late 1990s, a new 
awareness of human rights was born, including the notion that women’s rights are always 
 96 
human rights. This must surely make for a more satisfied, stable and peaceful society 
going forward, and it came from the grassroots.  
 
The evangelicals 
 
In many rural communities, the [evangelical] churches were the only social 
organization that did not dissolve, but rather resisted and stood their ground. Faced 
with the totalitarian, violent message of the subversive groups…the faith that 
animated these churches led them to elaborate diverse responses: from not complying 
with the call to arms, to the articulation of a theological reflection with which they 
lived daily life, to those who decided to fight against the terror of Shining Path by 
forming the rondas campesinas. In all cases, they were the response of native 
leadership, given that the majority of the foreign missionaries had to withdraw from 
these areas, leaving the direction of their churches in the hands of local pastors and 
lay people. 
– Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report, 2003  
[Theidon 2013:67]  
 
The emphasis on softening or hardening the heart, and on dramatic personal and 
social change, is striking. One must learn to live with the memories, many of which are 
personified in the faces of neighbors or relatives, without overwhelming the capacity of 
heart and mind (emotion and intellect) to contain the experience. 
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“Changing one’s life” is a central psychocultural theme {transcending traditions, as 
demonstrated here}. Campesinos visit curanderos to change their suerte (luck or 
destiny); congregations in the Evangelical churches pray to God so that He will 
change their hearts and their lives. Importantly, when the context changes, so does the 
person. Many people described the process of arrepentimiento (repentance): “After 
repenting, we go forth with a clean heart. We are no longer the people we were 
before. We are musaq runakuna – new people. 
 This was powerfully conveyed by El Piki {a curandero} in Carhuahuran…. “It 
was difficult, but we can accept the arrepentidos [ex-Senderistas, literally, “the 
repentant ones”]. As long as they act like runakuna [people] they can come back. We 
have to pardon them or we would hate them. Dios Tayta says we must pardon them 
so we can live with a tranquil heart.  
[Theidon 2013:50; braces added] 
 
When did the community kill {execute} the arrepentidos and when did they accept 
them? 
 Marcelina explained, “When they repented, then they accepted them. When they 
didn’t want to repent, they turned them over to the soldiers. When they begged, 
crying, crying, they {the soldiers} would whip them [instead]…and people here 
understood them. They couldn’t kill them. Comun runakuna [common people of the 
community] couldn’t kill them.”  
[Theidon 2013:236; braces added] 
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While they have not always been well regarded by social scientists, evangelical 
churches in Latin America have been involved in many activities supportive of the 
peasantry. Their involvement with the remote tribes has been more thoroughly criticized, 
resulting in the expulsion of some groups, but their work with peasants and villagers has 
been given a new cast as they have combined evangelism with concrete community 
action (as above), as well as a traditional emphasis on sobriety, hard work and personal 
responsibility. Some say, on the other hand, that this reinventing of Native mores and 
mentalities, taking it from a collective to an individual ethic, is destructive of the cultural 
fabric, damaging to the emotional, intellectual and spiritual resources first peoples have 
traditionally depended on to meet basic human needs.  
In the case of the civil violence in Peru, however, evangelicals helped supply a 
psychic framework for reintegrating former Senderistas into village life. An official 
policy was engineered by the National Repentance Law, an approach to truth and 
reconciliation that urged individuals to make a confession, largely in return for amnesty 
(save a whipping or two). The paradigm was basically Christian and had great resonance 
in many villages. And while Catholic confession is private, Protestants, especially 
evangelicals, often celebrate public confession as the first step toward grace. Most areas 
were served by Catholic priests who were spread very thin, but who,  along with most of 
the evangelical missionaries, were withdrawn from the campo during the worst of the 
violence. The native leaders of the evangelical churches remained and were instrumental 
in marshaling peasant resistance to Shining Path. They did this with a crude, Manichean 
vision of earthly and heavenly justice, but it did allow them to survive, to inspire people 
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to stand up to the devils and – not incidently – to learn to read and write. These 
churches also supplied fundamental support, material and ideological, for the rondas.    
Besides becoming increasingly involved in community projects such as food relief, 
sanitation and education, especially literacy, albeit with a strong ideology thrown in, they 
also supplied a cosmology for enduring the war. Overlaid on centuries of Native 
millenarian thought, evangelical apocalyptic motifs allowed them a safe psychocultural 
space, during which food and physical insecurity, coupled with psychic stress akin to 
madness, could be endured, this according to those who experienced it (Theidon 2012).  
The other critical contribution was in the formation of the citizen-defense groups, the 
ronderos. These managed to stay the hand of Sendero when the military could or would 
not. The moral legacy of these groups is somewhat ambivalent, as they were at times 
responsible for killing the relatively innocent – mostly civilians considered SL 
sympathizers – but in general they protected people from terror without undue violence. 
Their presence as an SL deterrent also meant the military was much less interested in 
defining campesinos as rebel supporters and killing them.  
 
They {Senderistas giving up} would arrive telling us they had been engañados 
[tricked], forced to kill…. “Pardon me”…they would plead. “Pardon me,” they would 
beg the community. … 
 They [villagers] asked, “Are you going to stop being like that?” If they were 
going to stop, we accepted them… We would ask them over and over, “Are you 
going to let the Senderistas in?” They would promise not to. We asked them if they 
could forget that they had learned to kill. They promised they could. Questioning and 
 100 
questioning, they [the villagers] accepted them. So runayaruspanku [they would 
become people], they were peaceful and weren’t going back to that [Senderismo]. 
[But] they were watched night and day for where they might go. And if they didn’t go 
back [to SL], then they were like comun runa iguaina – like common people, like us.  
[Theidon 2013:235; braces, emphasis added, except for non-English] 
 
The repentance was not so public in every instance or village, nor did it mean there 
was little or no resentment, fear or disfavor shown former rebels, but repentance, and 
subsequent acceptance, if not forgiveness, was a critical feature of turning oneself in. It 
depends on what is surely a cross-cultural phenomenon. It is a relative of those forms of 
therapy used in certain extreme versions of treatment for addicts and the hard of heart 
such as criminal recidivists, one that depend on deconstructing and reconstructing the 
personality and character of the individual in question. The other salient intercultural 
feature is the mix of traditional and European moral and legal norms. Conversations with 
villagers (Theidon 2013:240) affirmed that that longstanding cross-cultural concepts of 
justice also featured confession and repentance. Whether informed by Catholic, 
evangelical or Native models of psychic and behavioral reform, the sentiment must be 
heartfelt, so Theidon (2013:241) observes. The performative speech involved in this 
judicial ritual must be convincing:  “Confessing, atoning, sobbing, apologizing, begging, 
promising – sincerity would depend on both words and action.” 
The searching questions and repentant answers mirror a ritualistic call-and-response 
format characteristic of Christianity but also of many cross-cultural liminal moments in 
which wrongdoing is expiated and people are reintegrated into the group. Theidon also 
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emphasizes that in nearly all religious traditions, retribution stands side-by-side with 
redemption. In this case, the retribution is inquisitional, a public grilling regarding 
culpability and sincerity that has the all-important effect of exorcising guilt if not demons 
and halting the physical violence, of predicating reconstruction and reconciliation on the 
prevention of revenge.  
 
COLOMBIA: 
HUMAN-RIGHTS ROOTS, WORKERS ON THE EDGE  
AND THE ROUTINIZATION OF COMPASSION 
 
Peace with justice or peace versus justice? 
 
Human rights activists who traced their roots to the militancia [militancy] of the 
1970s and 1980s drew on a repertoire of cultural meanings for their activism based on 
two major cultural influences on the Colombian left – the Catholic Church and the 
Communist parties…. These institutions provided cultural frameworks for 
appropriate activist emotional responses…. Colombian activists most often described 
this revolutionary consciousness in human rights practice as mistica, loosely 
translated as “mystique,” which captures the connotation of otherworldliness, 
romance, a commitment beyond rationality.... Activists used the mistica to describe 
the profoundly motivating emotional force that defined human rights activism for 
them, a commitment to this work as both a connection to the victims of political 
violence, a covenant with them, and a means of articulating the broad hope for justice 
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and social change. In this vision, risk becomes part of the emotional appeal, as 
sacrifice, suffering, and even martyrdom were celebrated among radical Catholics 
and Communist Party activists as central signifiers of true vocation.  
[Tate 2007:148] 
 
Some of the most emotional debates about human rights activism that occurred during 
the 1990s, however, focused on the transition from solidarity groups to professional 
human rights NGOs, a transition that involved institutional mandates and practices, 
as well as the emotional identities of activists. Did adapting to the codes of 
professional activism signify abandoning activists’ historic commitment to radical 
social transformation? This question was one of the most contentious issues over the 
next decade.  
 [Tate 2007:149] 
 
As noted, civil society provides an important buffer against the abuse of 
disadvantaged groups and supplies critical resources for advocacy on their behalf. In 
addition, it not only aspires to lead; there are critical times when it does in fact advance 
the discussion and provides a fundamental and sustainable direction. Human rights and 
the environment provide convincing evidence for the latter, social justice less so.  
In the midst of the horrific civil violence of the last half-century, one of the most 
important peacebuilding activities of this period, since the Universal Declaration, has 
become the human-rights activism of any number of nongovernmental organizations, 
many working with a commitment that is religious or nearly so. Regarding the stages of 
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peacebuilding, it is a fundamental activity of the earliest two phases. It has an 
important bearing on where peacebuilding trends and how it is socially constructed – by 
common people, opinion leaders and decision makers, by individuals, small groups and 
large organizations. In addition, we will also explore the longer term effect of a 
heightened awareness of the interconnectedness of all living things – inspired in 
transformational ways by indigenous and peasant worldviews holding the land sacred.  
In part, because any number of human-rights workers in Colombia came from social-
justice and development work, and this work was backed by a religious and intellectual 
movement reinventing Christianity to be more about the collective than at any time since 
Constantine, they felt a staunch allegiance not just to individual victims, but to a 
communitarian vision that could address the full range of human needs across scales and 
geographies. The victims become emblems, icons, of the collective ethos required to 
undergird lasting peace, so that the discussions about the professionalization of human 
rights advocacy were not just about its routinization, its bureaucratization, draining it of 
force, zeal and detail, but also critically about any atomization of compassion, any 
restriction of its depth and breadth.  
Local human-rights workers live and work on the physical and emotional front lines 
of the civil violence. They know the local, national and, for the most part, the 
international landscape. They also have the best knowledge among rights workers of the 
varied conditions on the ground, where the torture, killings, rapes, disappearances and 
displacement take place. International professionals, on the other hand, have the best 
access to powerful people and critical resources on the geopolitical level, those who can 
influence, amend or transform public consciousness and policy. As Lederach explains, 
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mid-level workers provide crucial connections between these local and international 
players.  
Human-rights became institutionalized in Colombia during the early 1980s as a 
response to nearly two decades of repression of social movements and insurgencies 
featuring a great deal of extralegal killing. As leftist activism created a new endangered 
species made mostly of indigenous, peasant and union leaders and leftist intellectuals, the 
left turned to human rights to build a conceptual framework with which to create an 
awareness about abuses by the state (and its allies, the elite) and to highlight the 
vulnerability of the left to the violence of the entrenched powers. This meant that many 
who moved from leftist to human-rights activism brought with them their profound 
political critique, even as they had to give up some of their most ideological tendencies 
and some treasured notions about the moral superiority of the rebels’ violence.  
At this time as well, the vast majority of the population, 85-90 percent, was nominally 
or legitimately Catholic, and liberation theology, a theology of advocacy for the 
subordinate classes and peoples, was becoming increasingly popular among the young 
and progressive as a thinking, feeling person’s religion. A heady mix of Marxist analysis 
and leftist religious ideals were coursing through progressive parts of the society, 
especially liberal intellectuals, workers and peasants. Accordingly, the human-rights 
movement in Colombia was infused with a romantic, sometimes utopian, at times 
fatalistic, ideology that eventually saw that human rights were a logical extension of 
leftist politics. When the movement had to interact with and produce well-packaged 
narratives for the international human-rights leadership, such as the UN and the 
Organization of American States (OAS), and, especially, donors, this “encounter” of the 
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truth and those speaking it to power with the international human-rights community, 
as it was absorbed into the international value system, forced the discourse of human 
rights to become more individual, apolitical and structurally flexible. It was made 
palatable to the wealthy and powerful, albeit of a putatively liberal stripe. The 
international human-rights professionals were aware of this transformation of discourse, 
analysis and attitudes, of course, but it was easier for them to accept. They knew the 
touch-and-go world of international politics (Tate 2007). They knew that half-truths and 
half-measures often reigned and a lighter hand was often needed.  
The legacy of liberation theology is mixed in Colombia because it was then, and 
remains, a very conservative country. The church was then led by one of the most 
conservative of bishops, Msgr. Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, now a cardinal. Trujillo was 
secretary general, then president, of the Latin American Council of Bishops and played a 
key part in the Vatican’s strategy under John Paul II to neutralize liberation theology.  
At the same time, one of its most important exemplars has been former Jesuit Camilo 
Torres, an activist priest prominent in Colombia in the 1960s who felt chased from 
academic life and helped found the ELN. He basically served as a chaplain but probably 
carried a gun. We have referred to Torres and Gutierrez as leaders of liberation theology 
from Colombia and Peru, respectively, and we will be citing a few key passages from 
Gutierrez later. So here we ought to offer a characteristic glimpse at Torres’ thought. 
Torres led the way in action and reflection before the term “liberation theology” was 
popular. Chosen emblematically, we offer this passages: “The duty of every Catholic is to 
be a revolutionary. The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution. The 
Catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal sin” (Torres 1971).  He also 
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somewhat famously said that if Jesus were alive in Latin America then, he would be a 
guerrilla. If this seems problematic morally, bear in mind that theories of just war were 
used liberally and convincingly by many left-of-center scholars, activists and popular-
sector leaders.  
In addition, Colombia’s progressive religious community was bolstered by the fact 
that Medellín hosted the 1968 Conference of Bishops. One of the most far-reaching 
statements on religion and social justice in church history came from this event. The 
conference set a challenge before the Latin American church, to relentlessly protest 
unjust social conditions and create “a preferential option for the poor,” an advocacy for 
the poor and powerless. Some would call it the charter of liberation theology. This began, 
as well, to have an ethnic cast to it, one that would take some time to fully develop into 
its own social movement. 
In a chapter called “Solidarity with Our Class Brother,” Tate explains that:  
 
For many of the un- and undereducated rural and urban poor, participation in these 
[solidarity and conscious-raising] groups was their first experience with political 
activism…. Participation expanded members’ social networks and created a new 
activist identity.… Marxist notions of solidarity and struggle with the oppressed 
replaced the traditional Catholic teachings of passive acceptance of poverty and the 
understanding of charity as giving to the poor. [Representing this kind of leader,] 
Doña Eugenia described this transformation as it affected her sense of herself as an 
activist working within the church: “With Father Vincente I learned the difference 
between solidarity and charity. If I give you the food that is left over, that I don’t 
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want because I am full, or the clothes that I don’t need anymore, that I no longer 
wear, that is charity. Solidarity is when I share what I have with my class brother. I 
began working in the jails as solidarity work [with political prisoners].  
[Tate 2007:78–79; emphasis added]  
 
Doña Eugenia was from a rural background had not had much formal education, but 
she had read and met Torres and was deeply moved by what he had said about fidelity to 
one’s class brothers and sisters. She also worked for the leftist United Front, distributed 
their clandestine newspaper and rounded up medicine for the guerillas. In this passage, 
she makes an eloquent statement about meeting her need for belonging by helping those 
who have been deprived of the means to meet even their most basic human needs. This, 
we are to understand, is the fundamental meaning of the mistica. 
Later, moving up the ranks in human-rights work, she became more aware of and 
more critical of the better connected national and international workers. Tate notes that 
the early human-rights movement in Colombia was deeply split over the proper place of 
class solidarity and leftist thinking, torn by criticism that human rights were a bourgeois 
concern, individualistic, deflecting attention from poverty and collective rights due 
peasants, Indians and the urban poor. “For militants in Marxist parties, the universal 
aspirations in rights language was unconvincing. Many simply rejected the idea that rich 
people had rights, focusing on abuses experienced by peasants and workers during the 
course of their class-based organizing efforts” (Tate 2007:101). 
Others found leftist organizing futile and its soul-searching misguided if not 
unconvincing. Tate recounts one lawyer’s odyssey into rights activism, a decision she 
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characterizes as a result of “feelings,” not a well-reasoned critique of the social 
violence. However, he seems to have his reasons, most having to do with choosing 
political effectiveness, however limited, over ideological or religious consistency:  
 
I worked as a lawyer for three years and in leftist projects in [the poor neighborhoods 
of] southern Bogotá, as part of the civic movements that were related to the church. I 
had friends from the university that were very close to the people working with the 
Christian base communities {grassroots study groups for social action and reflection}, 
part of the Camilista movements {inspired by Torres}, which was an attempt to create 
a political party that was a complete failure. They were close to the ELN, and had a 
completely stupid discourse… We spent a long time discussing if we should support 
the armed movement or not – a complete waste of time. People generally left; some 
people went into the ELN, some people into the human rights movement.  
[Tate 2007:99; braces, emphasis added] 
 
Faced with a range of public criticism, often from the state or the right, but also from 
the left, the human-rights movement had to become more image conscious. But it was 
caught between the “devil” of sectarian differences and the “deep blue sea” of achieving 
nominal consensus by soft-pedaling class and its role in the repression. It would 
eventually be denounced by some it once counted as allies as being conciliatory with the 
worst elements in society. For the most part, however, at this stage, given that executive 
orders frequently declared states of siege that trampled on civil and human rights, 
supported by leftist scholars and their critique of Colombia as a virtual rights-abusing 
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dictatorship, with its roots mostly in the left, the human-rights movement targeted the 
state as the enemy.  
One activist remarked: “We were organizations against the state, we were never 
nongovernmental organizations. Everything that had to do with the state was bad: 
repression, inequality, lies, corruption” (Tate 2007:104). Even so, the daily violations – 
the disappearances, the torture, the illegal searches and seizures – forced community, 
peasant and union organizers to work on human rights regularly, even if publicly 
criticizing them as the sole focus of advocacy (over social justice) and, more often, 
privately. Here a great deal of tension emerged in the struggle to remain faithful to a 
vision of meeting the most fundamental physical needs of others (as well as their needs 
for belonging and esteem) while struggling with their sense of the right kinds of local, 
national and international connections. At the national level, the government was 
considered corrupt and oppressive, but its players, especially in dialog with human-rights 
workers at that level, to whom local workers consistently wanted better access, could 
serve as brokers of approximate justice between those suffering at the local level and 
those who could apply leverage from the international level. Under great duress at times, 
with their very lives at stake, they could take advantage of a critical analysis of human-
rights standards in national and international law that were woeful at protecting fellow 
advocates. Peacebuilding has little meaning until justice is served, they believed, but they 
would engage in human-rights work if it would serve the ends of social justice.  
In contrast, the Peruvian human-rights community didn’t much distinguish between 
victims of the guerrillas and those of the state or paras, Tate (2007) reports. In her 
opinion, they misapplied humanitarian law to cover the abuse and murder of those 
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considered armed actors in isolated  circumstances or in league with them, such as the 
ronderos or those who gave material support to the guerrillas.  
 
They were careful not to champion the rights of the guerrilla collaborators, defining 
their mission as to “protect and support innocent victims,” in a policy adopted in 1987 
at a national meeting of human rights groups. After the massive detentions following 
the antiterrorism legislation, they launched the “in the name of the innocent” 
campaign (estimated at approximately one-third of the nearly 22,000 people 
detained)…. One unintended outcome of this policy was that human rights activists 
became de facto judge and jury, with their adoption of particular cases often 
influencing the outcomes (detainees not represented by human rights lawyers were 
assumed guilty). [However] rejection of guerrilla violence also made Peruvian 
activists more supportive of democracy and ending the war. While Colombian groups 
focused on “humanizing the war” through the [appropriate] use of international 
humanitarian law, Peruvians realized that negotiation with Shining Path was 
impossible, resulting in greater support for democracy and state-sponsored initiatives.  
[Tate 2007: 330, n. 8] 
 
While Tate’s focus is elsewhere, it would be fascinating to know if this approach had an 
effect on the cohesion of the human-rights movement and the mental health of these 
workers in Peru relative to those in Colombia (perhaps from a reduction of cognitive 
dissonance and resistance).      
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On the other hand, in Colombia, the leftist social critique took another direction, 
closely related to the political aspects of peacebuilding and its effects on peasants and 
indigenous peoples. This was to emphasize an alternative model of human rights that 
championed people’s justice and collective rights. In a landmark event in 1976, the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, signed by a number of NGOs and 
generally called the Algiers Declaration, developed articles declaring that every people 
has the right to exist, to self-determination and to free themselves from colonial – or 
neocolonial – domination. Sponsored by the International League for Liberation and the 
Rights of Peoples, it set up a chapter in Colombia by the late 1980s. Over the years, the 
Algiers Declaration has become an alternative human-rights paradigm in workshops 
across the country.  
This declaration has also been used internationally to support popular tribunals that 
indict nations for their violations of the collective rights and autonomy of peoples. The 
most well-known example might be the (Bertrand) Russell Tribunal indicting the United 
States in 1967 for crimes against the people of Vietnam. Another Russell Tribunal 
convened in various sessions from 1974-76 to call military dictatorships in Latin America 
to account.  
Along those lines, one convened in Bogotá in the fall of 1989. Human-rights experts 
from across the continent presented their findings. Colombian NGOs were well 
represented. As expected, some human-rights professionals criticized the tribunals for 
being tainted by partisanship. Others lauded them for creating a place for a crucial 
alternative discourse on human rights, for bringing structural violence into the discussion 
and, moreover, for highlighting it.  
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Another critical event in the history of international human rights and indigenous 
peoples has been the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf).  In some sense, the 
Algiers Declaration prefigured and prompted it. In part urged on by that declaration, the 
General Assembly passed it on September 13, 2007. It has been signed by all the 
countries of the world, though not until recently by the United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. Colombia also lagged.   
 
The mystique, the madness and the social construction of the truth at the middle range 
 
In [his] history of the UP, journalist and former Peace Brigade volunteer Steve 
Dudley reflected on the impact of the sustained violence on party activists, many of 
whom became involved in human rights activism as the party was decimated [as the 
political front of leftist parties, the UP, gained standing, 3,000 of its key members 
were murdered in the late 1980s and early 1990s, stopping it in its tracks]. 
He…frames his narrative around the life and death of Josué [Giraldo, a noted UP 
member and human-rights lawyer who was murdered]. In one passage Dudley 
describes a conversation with Father Amar Garcia, a priest who knew Josué well and 
described his struggle as a “religious compromise.” 
 
Garcia said the same was true for other UP members. They pretended to disregard 
the church, but their struggle closely paralleled their belief that their sacrifice 
would be rewarded. Within the party it was. Garcia said that the party functioned 
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using a strange honor code. “To be threatened was to get more prestige,” he 
explained. “That’s why they took risks. Risk is what gave them importance. The 
one who was the most threatened was the one who was the most important…. I 
don’t know what it was, sympathy for death; sympathy for martyrdom.” 
[Tate 2007:156–157; emphasis added] 
 
The violence confronting activists and communities where they worked was one of 
the factors that drove these vitriolic discussions [over the nature of integrity, 
obligations to the dead, alcohol abuse and infidelity as coping mechanisms or neglect 
of self for victims]. “This fight becomes focused on the cycle of death, that it is all 
right, if while defending life, you find death,” another activist concluded. “But death 
is becoming an end in itself.” The despair of constant violence, and the celebration of 
sacrifice, has led to the glorification of violence and the view that death is the only 
option. “The slogan has become, ‘they kill us or they kill us’…which gets activists 
and communities into the logic of death – death as inevitable and desirable,” he said. 
Organizations that do not experience the same persecution are viewed with 
suspicion…possibly harboring paramilitary informants or covertly supporting 
military programs. “If people aren’t threatened or killed, they are suspects; 
organizations whose members aren’t killed are suspect,” he went on to say.  
[Tate 2007:160; emphasis added] 
 
Before we turn to the next phase in the development of the Colombian human-rights 
movement, its increasing professionalism and those effects at various levels, we should 
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examine the emotional causes and consequences of the very difficult profession such 
workers pursue. The two excerpts above won’t likely do it justice, but they are a 
revealing part of the story. With key excerpts from Tate and some psychological and 
spiritual interpretation, we will try to represent the stresses, motivations and part-time 
madness (or alternately, religious transcendence) that these grassroots and mid-level 
human-rights workers experienced. 
We should also note here that we are prompted by a number of scholars examining 
social movements who have increasingly called attention to the emotional lives of the 
participants as a neglected area of social science, seeing it as a critical reason for the 
resilience and staying power of certain movements (Tate 2007). In the face of public 
misunderstanding, meager funding, limited results and political persecution, even death 
threats, why do such people continue to do the work they do? They do so because of the 
emotional rewards, rewards that are spiritual or nearly so. These reasons are both deeply 
personal and very social. They are the main part of what binds these workers to one 
another and to the arduous, nerve-wracking work they do.  
Making it more literal, less symbolic, than the excerpts above, Calhoun (1991:51) has 
said that such workers bear the risks “not because of the likelihood of success in manifest 
goals but because participation in a course of action has over time committed one to a 
[social and moral] identity that would be irretrievably violated by pulling back from risk” 
(Tate 2007:147) – we could say a need for self-esteem, confidence, achievement, respect 
of others and respect by others. In this case, higher-order needs at the national level drive 
a commitment to helping those at the bottom of the social ladder, to meeting basic needs 
at the local level, especially for food, shelter and safety.  
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One worker talks about a form of pleasure resulting from a passion for the group, 
for its cohesion and solidarity. It provides a motivation beyond actual outcomes. This 
might even be considered a neo-tribal effect that meets a need for belonging, in which 
human-rights workers and victims become a single group that must be defended. Yet 
another scholar looks at human-rights advocacy in the Southern Cone and explains that 
“dense but diverse interpersonal networks” embedded within broader, more impersonal 
networks make this life worth living in a way it would not be otherwise.  
These observations should hold lessons that could be transferred to other aspects of 
peacebuilding, much of which has to be done under equally difficult conditions. On the 
other hand, a commitment to the victims that is this deep can produce conflicts between 
this and one’s other commitments – for example, to create palatable, consumable 
narratives for the international audience in order to get something done, not to mention 
one’s broader obligations to friends, family and self, to some degree of normalcy.  
This passion for victims can be expressed in many ways, but two in particular stand 
out. Those at the grassroots jealously defend the legacies of individual victims (they often 
know them, or their reputations, individually), their desire to remember them and the 
overriding need not to compromise their lives, deaths or memories by sacrificing the 
fundamental political and economic aims of their activism. In other words, they would 
hate to sanitize the repression to make a case to donors and other agencies that might be 
uncomfortable with passion or partisan politics. The mystique of this work always hovers 
in the background. It breaks into the foreground in moments of conflict. A lawyer and 
UN consultant described his commitment this way: 
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I started human rights work because of wanting to work with the 
community…trying to achieve what I think is just…. I can feel the same thing 
working with NGOs or the state, the same dynamic, the same mistica.” While 
defending his decision to work in different institutions, he noted that some former 
colleagues had changed when they took new jobs. “Some of the campaneros 
{compatriots} were very radical when they worked in NGOs, then they went to work 
with the government and they burgesiaron [became bourgeois].” But, he insisted… “I 
have the same mistica of the work that I have always had, I haven’t cut the cord. This 
isn’t a political position, it’s the nature of the work {that motivates me}.  
[Tate 2007:151; braces added] 
 
Another also vowed his militancy had not changed, just his approach, moving from 
leftist activism to human rights. This ongoing passion allows him to deal with the fear 
that always shadows such work. Working for a higher goal than self-interest frees him to 
take risks, he said. However, he believes that the definition of his constituency has 
changed. He can no longer side with some victims and not others. “Human rights is a 
short-term vision if we only defend a certain kind of people and leaders. We [also] need 
to be on the side of the victims of the insurgency, and they do exist” (Tate 2007:150). He 
described it as a refined or distilled passion, one disciplined by the emerging 
professionalism of the field.  
 
Dona Eugenia disagreed, and emphatically, confronting him at a human rights 
workshop when he urged the professionalization of human rights [a reporting 
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protocol] and the need to place the rebels’ violations on a par with those of the 
military and paras. She tore into him for abandoning his, and his movement’s, ideals: 
“You were a boy from the slums who was committed to defending the people…. Now 
you are otro cuento [something else].”  
[Tate 2007:152] 
 
She then related her own story and revealed the source of a good deal of her 
bitterness. After receiving death threats and barely avoiding capture, she escaped to 
Ecuador, where she felt abandoned by her former colleagues. She blamed this on the 
class barriers created by the appeal to donors. She castigated her former organization, the 
Committee on Solidarity with Political Prisoners (CSPP), the one that gave her a start, for 
selling out to international money.  
 
How can it be that when you are in exile, people don’t look for you, [to] make sure 
you are all right? The CSPP, now that they are an NGO with money, don’t care. It is 
like we are friends if we are in the same position, but once you go up in the world, we 
can’t be friends any more because you have a new position, you are comfortable, and 
you have different interests. 
[Tate 2007:152] 
 
Dona Eugenia found her need for physical safety and sustenance overriding enough 
that it challenged to its core her sense of belonging, of solidarity with her fellow human-
rights workers. These, she felt, had sold out to the national and international level and 
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were beginning to ignore the basic needs of those at the local level, of the people they 
vowed to serve when they took up the “cross” of human-rights work. Others commented 
in various ways about vexing issues regarding everything from spiritual to social and 
development needs going unmet as they struggle with the lack of communication and 
empathy across scales, becoming fed up with arrogance and organizational dysfunction at 
the national level.  
 
Activism in Colombia also consists of complicated layers; these groups do not 
constitute a single “local” but [involve] multiple levels of access to resources 
[funding for office space or legal defense], education [how to report to an 
international organization], and travel [access to higher levels and the tourist 
destinations the upper-level actors routinely visited for their conferences, often 
criticized by lower-level workers].  
 These differences are greatest between “national” groups (generally understood as 
Bogotá-based groups), groups in larger cities (primarily Medellín), and [on the other 
hand] those in small towns and rural areas…. Activists in small towns and rural areas 
are often much more attuned to the particular dynamic of violence in their areas and 
less willing to adjust their analysis to include national dynamics or the concerns of 
international counterparts…. Such activists are often profoundly critical of their 
“national” (Bogotá-based) counterparts as being out of touch with local realities and 
failing to share resources and information.… Activists’ critiques included demands 
that the circulation of information, training and resources from national groups to 
local groups should be improved. Many voiced concerns that their position as holders 
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of privileged information desired by international counterparts was being 
usurped by national brokers.  
[Tate 2007:186; emphasis added]  
  
At another point, at a workshop on human rights, she records the transformation of a 
relatively straightforward narrative into a complex tale of justice not only delayed but 
tortured into a miscarriage, misshapen beyond simple right and wrong by local intrigue, 
multi-lateral rivalries and a coercion-based politics in which almost no one plays fair.  
 
The group time almost up, the personero [representative/spokesperson] agreed to 
present our report [an exercise in documenting abuses]. Rodrigo [a national worker 
teaching incident-report writing] had started us off with the barest outlines of the 
context: a closed factory, a union, paramilitary groups, two assassinations. Now [after 
a local worker explained the situation in detail] the context appeared much more 
complicated, including not only those factors but also guerrilla groups, secret 
meetings, allegations of corruption, and the shifting political profile of the armed 
actors in the region. Conflict over land and resources, paramilitary politicization and 
increasing guerrilla abuses, as well as efforts by local officials with armed actors, 
had no place in the linear human rights narrative focused on individual 
assassinations, which the activists were being trained to produce. 
[2007:141–142; emphasis added] 
 
These last two excerpts stand in contrast to Lederach’s assertion that national brokers 
hold the key, or a key, to effective action. The explanation lies in the fact that Lederach is 
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describing optimal functioning and what Tate is describing is definitely suboptimal – 
blocked, not open, communication, what happens when good organizations, and the 
people in them, become, not bad, or even obtuse to the purpose of their work, but are 
surrounded by a situation already in flames, a fire in a crowed theater where the exit signs 
have all burned out. In the middle of this, they can’t shout Fire at the top of their lungs. 
They have to exhibit calm and help clear the theater systematically. This is where the 
stress on national workers is at its height. Still, it cannot compare to the social and moral 
chaos on the ground, the world the local activists and their victims live in all the time. 
However, the national workers are tasked with, and committed to, producing measurable 
results that can at least slow the violence. To appeal to the resources of the international 
level, they found they had to take the local stories and forge a consistent narrative and a 
working consensus. We turn to that next.  
 
Creating consensus in the crunch  
 
The central element of the public face of professionalism was the consensus of the 
human rights community. Because professional human rights activism is a 
dispassionate and objective analysis of the facts according to international legal 
standards, all activists must agree on the diagnosis of the problem and the proposed 
solution… Though many human rights activists in fact had profound differences, in 
their international lobbying they attempted to display a united front.  
[Tate 2007:208] 
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We cannot look at all the possible nodes of interaction across all scales, or even 
most, so we will focus on one of critical consequence, the lobbying of the United Nations 
by Colombian human-rights groups. We will examine a crucial aspect of the local-
national-international nexus: the need to create an coherent narrative for the UN Human 
Rights Commission. (The commission was abolished and replaced with a Human Rights 
Council in 2006, largely to regain impartiality in certain aspects of its work.) Such efforts 
by Colombian NGOs have been considered a model of how to work together to get 
results at the international level.  
Tate (2007) notes that in preparing to lobby the commission, the Colombian NGOs 
found they had competing demands, for example, for an internationally significant 
special UN human-rights rapporteur (reporter), as opposed to an independent expert, a 
lower status option favored by the commission. To achieve a consensus, they had to 
spend much more time talking to one another than to the commission. In the end, 
however, this effort was ground-breaking. In a hard-won agreement on policy 
recommendations, they devised the first “Joint Declaration,” a formal request before the 
commission. Though it required intensive discussions prior to its presentation, it was 
considered the single most important tool in their lobbying. Among other lessons, 
workers had to realize that the commission was not a court taking testimony and making 
judicial decisions but a deliberative body governed by the political interests of its nation-
states. The assignment of a special rapporteur – which the government opposed as a 
moral victory for the guerillas – was abandoned in favor of a new request, which was 
granted: establishing an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia.  
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This is a good example of Lederach’s ideas. As a mid-level actor, the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ), human-rights professionals with legal training, performed 
the critical role of synthesizing and distilling a number of NGO narratives and objectives, 
or providing excellent resources to facilitate this. They set the Colombian NGO 
community up to execute a targeted lobbying campaign focused on a particular goal.  
Various experienced leaders of NGOs headquartered in Geneva said they believed the 
consensus model to be a paradigm for NGO involvement with the commission (Tate 
2007). This was largely a function of the resources the CCJ could command. For one 
thing, they were able to draw on an exceptional funding base, no doubt assisted by 
attorneys’ salaries and professional connections. It allowed them to put together a full-
time staff that could stay in Geneva for extended periods, sponsoring meetings and 
soliciting input. They also took advantage of broad global contacts, including those who 
had done human-rights lobbying before. This professionalism (defined by the standards 
of the international level) facilitated the consensus position among NGOs. The approach 
involved a series of meetings with the delegates from the states making up the 
commission, as well as officials of the United Nations. It also entailed working closely 
with international NGOs, particularly in a campaign to enlist more NGOs in support of 
the Colombian proposal. The last and compelling angle involved the imagination required 
to propose a new institution, a commission office in country, along with a nuanced 
understanding of the commission’s rules and norms and how to use them creatively.  
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The other side of the story 
 
While many groups critiqued the U.N. lobbying strategy…some groups [in particular] 
developed radically different ideas about what [such] international work should look 
like. They rejected the central focus on foreign governments, embassies and 
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, arguing that states will always 
seek their own interests [and so may sabotage or stall the process]. Rather than 
attempt to convince government representatives to bring pressure on the Colombian 
government…these activists believed they should develop alliances with social 
movements in other places, focusing on solidarity among oppressed peoples. 
Examples frequently mentioned…included unions, peasant groups and popular 
organizations.  
[Tate 2007:187;emphasis added] 
 
None of this consensus-building means that the move was received equally well by 
all human-rights workers in Colombia, especially those nearest the violence. In addition, 
at the national level, civil-society groups had to come to grips with what the Colombian 
government wanted. First, even before the final agreement, the national NGOs took issue 
with the way the state expected to handle the reporting. They wanted instead a values-
based analysis that looked critically into the social-political, and ultimately economic, 
sources of the violence and demanded action from the authorities. The state wanted them 
to merely document events and actions taken. A second conflict involved how the 
documentation was distributed. The state asked that only the UN professionals and 
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members of the commission receive copies. The agreement ultimately included an 
analysis of the social-political context but withheld publication for a year after the events. 
The report was first given to the High Commissioner and then to the states that were 
commission members, after which, it was released publicly.  
Regarding another part of the agreement, on one level, the NGOs favoring it wanted a 
special rapporteur because the role entailed the authority to criticize the government 
publicly, via a censure, though this option is generally reserved for dictatorships, the state 
pointed out. Additional barriers the NGOs encountered were objections from the 
delegates of other Latin American states, who had their own reasons to obfuscate 
regarding human rights. Another obstacle to advocacy at the international level has been 
getting the international players to shift their focus from drug-trafficking abuses that 
portray the government as a victim to human-rights violations in which the government is 
at fault.  
More far-reaching concerns, however, came from those with less patience dealing 
with international bureaucracies and more immediate concerns closer to home. One 
indigenous activist in particular, from southern Colombia, expressed his disgust and 
dismay. He thought it was a waste of time to come: “I don’t see how this makes any 
sense. No one speaking has any experience of human rights violations, just states and 
governments, and international NGOs [are represented]” (Tate 2007:111). Of his three 
visits to Geneva, he went on to say, “It is a detestable space. It is incredible the way 
people play with the tragedy of the people there” (Tate 2007:112).  
His preferred option for human-rights activism was to create more permanent and 
lasting alliances with international social movements and rely much less on the influence 
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of European governments and donors. Another critic, a union activist who was a 
founding member of a national human-rights NGO, said the agreement represented a 
geopolitical winner’s view of justice. He also said that the international sanctions and 
boycotts used by the North Atlantic states to discipline other states, generally in the 
developing world, were a matter of wealthy nations using human rights to subvert the 
economies of poorer nations. This causes activists to hold back denunciations of abuses, 
he said.  
In the view of this activists, the higher-order needs of the national and international 
workers again trump the lower-order needs of the people they set out to serve. His 
response was to urge the collaboration of unionists, peasants, women’s and indigenous 
groups across national borders. In the eyes of these disaffected activists, it is not that 
compromises must be made, not that national and international networking is not needed, 
but that a moral perspective based on a holistic approach to meeting human needs has 
been lost. They believe that the national and international workers have lost their way 
morally and their interests, and those they represent, of the people suffering on the 
ground, would be much better served if their networking built alliances with those more 
committed to meeting basic needs at the local and regional level, matters of decent 
wages, land reform, gender equity and protection of the lifeways of those whose 
existence, material, social, psychological and spiritual, has been sundered by an 
onslaught of developmental and political genocides.    
However, all too often, these grassroots organizations are overburdened and 
understaffed and have all they can do to deal with concrete issues in their own countries. 
They lack systematic access to political and economic power. Developing these 
 126 
relationships has proved time-consuming, costly and often ineffective (Tate 2007). 
Specific strategies have been fewer and more limited than those aimed at international 
organizations. The rejoinder from the local workers is that lobbying the UN is also time-
consuming and expensive and often yields diffident results. NGOs have a very limited 
voice there and no voting privileges, they point out.  
What we can hold to here is that this early stage of peacebuilding depends on a very 
complicated, even arduous process of working against political, economic and cultural 
odds to help people at the local level meet a variety of human needs, from basic to higher 
order, while coordinating a number of pressing issues across local, national and 
international scales with limited funds, people and access to policy makers. This spanning 
of gaps across levels of human needs and political leverage puts national-level workers 
under a great deal of stress. And sometimes, this causes the group to splinter, to fission in 
anthropological terms.  
Independent of its problems and divisions, as noted, this advocacy is the leading edge 
of peacebuilding, even as the violence continues. Any holistic approach to peace must 
consider in depth and detail the many players, levels and dynamics of human-rights work. 
It must examine their personal relationships, their individual and social psychology and 
their spiritual needs. This is not to say no one ever considered this, but that it might be 
investigated more thoroughly and linked more directly to various aspects and models of 
peacebuilding. 
In particular, many of the human-rights workers in Colombia felt they had an 
obligation to fight not just the professionalization, but the individualization, of human-
rights work, to make sure the broader publics, local, national, international, understood it 
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as a collective or communitarian affair, that unless whole communities, nations and 
economies, even ecologies, are healed (or repaired), the human-rights struggle is heroic 
but piecemeal, a salve to conscience but not a social transformation. This is the subtext to 
the debate about the professionalization and individualization of human-rights work.  
 
Conflict resolution: needs met and unmet 
Conflict-resolution issues in these two populations have different complexions, but 
they offer closely related lessons in theory and practice, in individual and social dynamics 
and in restoration economics and ecology. Among the highland villagers, conflict 
resolution is embodied in a ritual of repentance supported by a national repentance law. 
However, buying into the trauma industry, the new, post-authoritarian face of the state 
exercises good intentions but has problems assisting conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
in the deepest sense because it leaves the villagers without familiar psychological 
categories with which to understand their grief and anger, their trauma.  
With human-rights workers in Colombia, conflict-resolution techniques would have 
been valuable in preserving good will across a spectrum of views embodied by these 
professionals. This would have been helpful going forward in various ways, social, 
psychological and political, even if some eventually would need to split off to preserve 
their sense of integrity. Where they did exercise a crucial form of conflict resolution was 
in arriving at a working consensus regarding their request of the UN’s human rights 
commission. They did this primarily with much labor-intensive dialog.  
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Taussig and terror as culture, history as sorcery 
A social and cultural anthropologist who has had a great deal to say about many of 
the issues in this study, especially in Colombia and Peru – from land tenure and use, to 
the colonization of agriculture, to crucial ideological and mythological dynamics of 
conquest – is Michael Taussig. On his web site with Columbia University, he explains 
that among his interests are:  
 
1) the commercialization of peasant agriculture, 2) slavery, 3) hunger, 4) 
...commodity fetishism [consumerism], 5) the impact of colonialism (historical and 
contemporary) on “shamanism” and folk healing… 7) the making, talking, and 
writing of terror… 10) a two-week diary detailing paramilitary violence [and] 11) a 
montage-ethnography of the Pacific Coast of Colombia.”  
[Columbia University Department of Anthropology 2014:online]  
 
Taussig offers any number of points of entry for our purposes. The task is to choose 
just a few. Among them, he has produced an analysis of the subsidy that peasant 
agriculture provides for what he calls "capitalist" (or industrial) agriculture. Then, in 
“Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the 
Explanation of Torture,” he does a penetrating confessional and literary treatment of a 
South American “heart of darkness,” using the novel by Joseph Conrad (Heart of 
Darkness) as the central conceit for exploiting indigenous peoples to death. He compares 
Conrad’s book on the rubber industry in King Leopold’s Congo, including the actual 
conditions, with the beginning of the Amazonian rubber trade in the early 1900s.  
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Alongside Conrad, he examines the writing of reformer and journalist Roger 
Casement, who also crusaded to stop the slavery and killings in the Congo. As it happens, 
Casement investigated a terror-filled company in the Putamayo region, the Peruvian 
Rubber Company. These sorts of European-funded rubber plantations also operated with 
similar bonded labor in Colombia, Ecuador and western Brazil. In the Putamayo, 
Casement documented the slavery of many tens of thousands of Huitoto Indians, 
enforced with torture, beatings, mutilations and massacres. It is estimated that 30,000 to 
40,000 died (Brysk 2000).  
In addition, while Taussig’s History as Sorcery is a winding road, it conveys in 
evocative detail, historical and symbolic, how the conquered mythologize and 
remythologize their conquerors and their conquerors' mythology, molding them in 
narrative and ritual, fitting them to key parts of their own version of the past, using them 
to better face the present and imagine the future.  His is a very thick, thick description, 
and I cannot do it full justice here, but I will explore a few of these themes in a brief 
excursus.  
Peasant economies and capitalist agriculture in the Cauca. In a study of an Afro-
Colombian peasantry growing mostly sugarcane in the southwestern part of the country, 
Taussig examines a much-debated issue regarding the extent to which small holders who 
also work as wage labor on larger estates subsidize the success of large operations 
because they employ family labor paid in kind, not cash, and so are apparently more 
efficient. This, he maintains, is an efficiency largely captured by their disadvantage in the 
global market and the fact that the larger holdings have eaten up the minimum acreage 
needed for subsistence, thereby producing a captive, cheap labor pool. A counter 
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argument holds that unpaid family labor is actually a cost that makes these farms less 
efficient.  
Taussig says the hybrid system, wages plus subsistence and some income from small 
holding, works by intensifying labor and by cutting the costs of reproducing labor 
(ordinarily of recruiting and training it, sometimes by conscripting or enslaving it). This 
labor shortage incidentally has not resulted from a shortage of indigenous peoples in the 
region, but from how few have been willing to do it so without coercion, a key ingredient 
sometimes. What he calls “non-capitalist” social organization, including a non-capitalist 
agriculture, supplies a subsidy critical to industrial agriculture and capitalism in general 
that makes those very large institutions seem more efficient than they are. Seen this way, 
he says, peasants and large landowners subsidize each other, the difference being the 
peasants’ subsidy allows the “capitalist farmers” to extract more surplus value from their 
operations while spending very little to reproduce their own labor, that is, on the cost of 
maintaining a cheap but stable supply of labor. Besides intensifying labor, getting more 
out of the workers for less, this system works because peasants supply public and social 
services the state does not, in education, water and health, for instance. Third, political 
tensions are reduced because there is a compliant labor force, trade unions are 
suppressed, seasonal and economic business fluctuations are dampened and there is a 
lower demand for public services. Peasant subsistence production is an indirect subsidy, 
but nevertheless quite real, Taussig (1978) concludes. Later he notes:  
 
In any event, the development of large-scale capitalist farming in this area is 
dependent on the fact that a significant majority of its wage-labor force provides part 
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of its subsistence costs outside of the normal capitalist institutions. Capitalist 
development of this sort does not so much displace peasant and other forms of non-
capitalist production, but rather incorporates their very real economic efficiencies so 
as to balance the costs of capital investment which are otherwise [met] by 
international financing.  
[Taussig 1978:87-88; emphasis added] 
 
This is capitalization as (neo)colonization, the economic paradigm haunting Latin 
America for centuries. 
The Putamayo rubber boom and a genocide of lowland Indians. The crux of the 
Amazonian rubber boo m was that, like much of industrial agriculture, it required a large 
and relatively cheap labor force. This became crucial as plantations, with no natural 
economic predators, grew extensively, consuming more land and requiring more workers. 
Most Indians were not interested in rubber tapping unless their other options, hunting, 
gathering and small farming, did not produce enough. Therefore plantation owners and 
their managers had to force Indians into service and keep them there with debt peonage. 
A plantation would start with many tens of thousands of indigenous peoples and once the 
operation was stopped, might have only a few thousand left. After an expose in a British 
magazine on Peruvian Rubber, a British company, Casement was asked to investigate 
further and report to Parliament on the depredations and atrocities wrought by this 
mercantilist-style enterprise. Parts of these reports also were published in popular and 
scholarly journals. Taussig (1984a) summarizes one as follows:  
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The article continues by declaring that the peaceful Indians work night and day 
collecting rubber without the slightest remuneration. They are given nothing to eat or 
wear. Their crops, together with the women and children, are taken for the pleasure of 
the whites. They are inhumanly flogged until their bones are visible. Given no 
medical treatment, they are left to die after torture, eaten by the company's dogs. They 
are castrated, and their ears, fingers, arms, and legs are cut off. They are also tortured 
by means of fire, water, and crucifixion tied head-down. The whites cut them to 
pieces with machetes and dash out the brains of small children by hurling them 
against trees and walls. The elderly are killed when they can no longer work. To 
amuse themselves company officials practice shooting, using Indians as targets, and 
on special occasions such as Easter Saturday…shoot them down in groups or, in 
preference, douse them in kerosene and set them on fire to enjoy.  
[1984a:475] 
 
In another place, Casement writes of enforcers sent by a rubber-station manager to 
wipe out a group of Indians who did not recruit enough other Indians as labor. The 
enforcers were recruited from non-Huitoto tribes and were called the muchachos (the 
boys). This is the tried and true means of the wholesale harvest of human resources and 
enslaving peoples: using  one group to hunt humans (“I don’t have to outrun the bear 
[slaver]. I just have to outrun you.”).  
In this case, Taussig transforms the argument above regarding labor shortages, the 
same Casement made when he tried to explain the barbarity of the rubber trade, that labor 
scarcity [of  willing not potential labor] produced such intense pressure on the labor pool 
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that it had to be resolved by debt slavery, which had then to be enforced by hideous 
human-rights violations – torture, mutilation, disease and death. Taussig believes, 
however, that market forces, while powerful, do not fully explain this level of 
debasement. He (1984a) calls it a “cultural construction of evil.” He supports this with 
Casement’s reports documenting that the station managers and their leadership could not 
be persuaded that by killing Indians they were costing the company many thousands of 
dollars in scarce labor. They were somehow possessed by a fanaticism in which they 
“had lost all sight or sense of rubber-gathering – they were simply beasts of prey who 
lived upon the Indians and delighted in sharing their blood” (Taussig 1984a:479).  
Taussig says that the terror had become an end in itself, a surrealism of paranoia and 
darkness, where everything spoke of death. Part of his conceit involves juxtaposing 
Conrad’s social realism with the surrealistic qualities of Casement’s, which he calls 
“mythic realism,” even though he was writing a government report.  
 
It seems to me that stories like these were the groundwork indispensable to the 
formation and flowering of the colonial imagination during the Putumayo rubber 
boom. “Their imagination was diseased,” wrote the Peruvian judge Rómulo Paredes 
in 1911, referring to the rubber-station managers, “and they saw everywhere attacks 
by Indians, conspiracies, uprisings, treachery and in order to save themselves from 
these fancied perils...they killed, and killed without compassion.” Far from being 
trivial daydreams indulged in after work was over, these stories and the imagination 
they sustained were a potent political force without which the work of conquest and of 
supervising rubber gathering could not have been accomplished. What is essential to 
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understand is the way in which these stories functioned to create through magical 
realism, a culture of terror dominating both whites and Indians.  
[Taussig 1984a:492; emphasis added] 
 
As we have seen above with Theidon and Tate, this culture of terror produces its own 
epistemology, morality and mythology, its own forms of symbolic domination and 
exploitation along with the physical and political. Taussig later notes that Judge Paredes 
says that the rubber-station managers saw lethal danger everywhere. They were obsessed 
with the notion that they were stalked on all sides by poisonous snakes, big cats and 
cannibals.  
History as sorcery and implicit social knowledge. Taussig (1984b) takes these themes 
further in “History as Sorcery.” There he explains that eventually, over decades and 
centuries, the acculturated Indians of the highlands began to mythologize the destruction 
of the lowlanders, perhaps as a way of distancing themselves, but also as a warning. They 
appropriated a demonology of Huitotos that framed them as cannibals, sorcerers and a 
variety of mythic beasts resembling devils. Then, over long stretches, highland shamans, 
as demonstrated by one Taussig worked with, incorporated this fetishism of terror into 
healing rituals and testing spirits. Taussig here, by extrapolation, demonstrates that 
peacebuilding not only means restoring public services and rule of law. It means dealing 
with the long-term effects of a culture of terror on the individual and the tribal 
unconscious, on how we make meaning out of, and learn from, however we can, the 
horror. He calls this implicit social knowledge.  
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“History as Sorcery” is a tale of mythic construction and reconstruction, of the 
sublimation of terror into demonology, and of that symbolic darkness into primordial 
myth. In the latter, it combines random violence – the evil wind – with evil manipulated 
for personal reasons – sorcery (1984b). In this hermeneutic, sorcery – individual, 
personalized – and the evil wind – impersonal and implacable – come together as a 
symbolic representation of the history of conquest. Taussig calls this history as sorcery. 
To counter this horrific legacy, this spiritual inversion, using both Christian and highland 
spiritual resources to encode the memory and mystery of the Huitotos and their horror 
within a redemptive narrative, the collective unconscious produces another inversion, a 
paradox: The Huitotos are conflated with the original beings, the stronger, superior first 
people of the highland cosmology.  
Taussig then describes the fieldwork he did with a well-known Andes shaman. In this 
account, the combined image of the Huitoto, the “lower people” (demons of the 
underworld) and the nearly superhuman first people, is appropriated in a healing ritual 
Taussig observes, a search for a lost husband, who has disappeared, interestingly, in the 
jungle, in the hot lowlands.  
He summarizes the broader cultural and psychic developments that concern him as 
follows: 
 
Bishop Pefia Montenegro in the seventeenth century urged with an intensity 
bordering on fanaticism that Indian rites had to be extirpated root and branch because 
these rites brought back into consciousness what he called “the memory of 
paganism.” But working with the same premise that ritual embodied and re-awakened 
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memory, the twentieth-century Capuchins…working with the Huitotos, 
developed…the opposite conclusion and strategy: namely that to erase the pagan-
stimulating function of memory, the rituals should be maintained so that with the 
memories they embodied could be intertwined with the images…of Christian suffering 
and redemption: the death of the sinner, the Last Judgment and heaven and hell.  
[Taussig 1984b;107; emphasis added] 
 
The paradox of the Huitoto symbol in a late-modern shaman’s healing ritual presents an 
image of “tameable savagery,” Taussig says. Examining it, we see the lowland dwellers 
and their legacy have been dominated by the terror-filled “demonstration projects” of 
civilization performed by the rubber companies, then by the magic-saturated version of 
the invaders’ civilization established by the Church – sent in soon after the exposés to 
“save” the Indians, an effort that resulted in many thousands more dying, from smallpox, 
malnutrition and overwork.  
  
 So far, we have touched upon the overlay of Catholicism and native spirituality, in 
general terms in the introduction where it seemed mostly smooth and inevitable, and in 
more specific terms in the ethnographies of Theidon and Tate, where such mixing is more 
haphazard and conflictual, at best hit and miss. Taussig offers another such example, in 
which there is no easy resolution of one over the other, but in which the Huitoto myth 
becomes a part of a broader cultural quest for psychic wholeness and healing on both 
individual and social levels.   
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Is it possible that these opposed modes whereby history has put memory in the 
service of colonization are themselves registered in contemporary magic and are 
necessary to its power? That the evil winds buffeting the living with the memories of 
the preconquest pagans correspond to the bishop's and the early colonial politics of 
memory, while the resurrection of the Huitotos corresponds to a modern mode of 
trying to use memory to change and dominate people? Is it possible that these winds 
and savages stand as…images of distinct historical modes of memory production and 
reproduction, whose political economy finds its most finely wrought expression in 
shamanic imagery where it is precisely the task to rework, and if possible undo, the 
history of sorcery?  
[Taussig 1984b:107] 
 
In treating the trauma of terror, to be truly intercultural we need to have a therapeutic 
hermeneutics of consciousness and cosmos, a spiritual and mythic world in which the 
rubber massacres in Putamayo, the re-imagining of conquest as a psychic counter-
measure and a symbol of healing and the shaman’s song as a search for the lost, can all 
be integrated into a narrative of restoration and appropriated for personal or social power. 
This needs to happen not only within a single abstract cosmology but within a single 
village, highland or lowland, and within a single individual or group. As with llakis in 
Ayacucho, or the mistica of human-rights workers, it represents another profound 
spiritual response to trauma.  
But is Taussig embellishing here? Or just projecting? Is this more than fancy 
travelogue? Here it helps to make use of philosopher Paul Ricoeur's two kinds of 
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hermeneutics (from his well-known essay on Freud): one of suspicion, reductive, 
analytical, borne of critical theory – familiar to liberation theorists, social critics and 
investigative journalists as they deconstruct the ways and means of power – and one of 
faith, or revelation, non-reductive, holistic, borne of interculturality, familiar to therapists, 
anthropologists, healers and peacebuilders, as they try to reconstruct it.  
Both are required to come to grips with Taussig’s cultural construction of evil, to 
ensure that individuals and groups find the psychic and spiritual resources to deal with, 
exorcise and appropriate such a trauma-based symbolic universe for purposes of 
transformation within a given set of meanings and symbols. In Theidon and Tate, the 
epistemological and ethical hazard is about routinizing trauma and flattening its affect 
(and effects). With Taussig, it is another, ironically one he notes as a problem with 
Conrad’s writing but not in his own, that of aestheticizing horror, making it exotic and 
compelling but abstract, like a horror film or novel. What he does emphasize, and 
explores in detail, is the political meaning of magic, sorcery and healing, how for 
peasants and indigenous peoples, it is inseparable from the history of conquest.  
How violence flows toward money: How that is the order behind the chaos  
While we have portrayed these two nations as societies on the brink, we are not, of 
course, interested in demonizing the people of Colombia or Peru. These are, after all, just 
human beings trapped in intractable cycles of social, economic and political violence, a 
social chaos beyond the control of most people with average resources. While both 
nations are making strides toward peace with justice, what emerges is the picture of a 
society in the middle of an ongoing civil war, yes, but also a criminal war, a gangland 
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with armies whose resources are sometimes larger than the armed forces of many 
countries. 
Integral to this normalization of multi-sector terror is a state corrupted by class 
privilege, by a legacy of social coercion that relies ultimately on murder and by drug 
money that has been fundamental to economic growth. Just living a decent life in this 
social environment is an incredible tribute to law-abiding, social capital-building citizens 
of all classes – that they keep going to work, raising children and supporting churches 
and civic groups, that they continue to vote and that they still base their gains on work 
and good will, not violence. Such observations are supported by some of Latin America’s 
best political minds: 
 
Given the scope of this collective experience of violence, it is not possible to expect 
that peace will be an immediate result of the negotiation process. This situation is...so 
complex that even if we could negotiate institutional reconstruction with the 
guerrillas tomorrow, the reconstruction of the State and the social fabric could take 
decades.... It is a society that is beyond the prospect of formulating a project of unity 
or national order. [Instead it] is involved in a perpetual process of “negotiating 
disorder,” of making it, in lieu of eliminating it, at least bearable.  
[Sanchez 2001:30; emphasis added]  
 
The major organizing principle that comes close to explaining this much social chaos 
is not poverty itself – though that is its long-term engine – or the inevitable corruption 
created by the massive structural violence, but the speed of social and economic change 
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(Paluso and Watts 2001). Responding to an imbalance of wealth and power growing 
exponentially, an expression of potential social energy become kinetic, and redressing 
this imbalance violently, like a hurricane, dam failure or tsunami, it becomes a 
catastrophe.  
Continuous with a long tradition of private militias in the campo, but made 
increasingly unstable by access to new wealth, in Colombia, for example, in the 
petroleum-rich regions of Arauca, Casanare and Putamayo, the banana zone of Urabá 
near Panama and various areas of mining, petroleum or coal riches, destabilized by a 
guerrilla movement that can support itself well with illicit profits, a state militia, a narco-
militia and a citizen militia run amok, this influx of extreme wealth can wreak genocidal 
havoc. 
An older but stable domination by large landowners and multinationals has been 
replaced by a free-for-all with little legitimacy, one that disadvantages corporations and 
unions, landowners and peasants, alike. Over the last 25 years, the banana zone in 
northern Colombia has become a base for moving drugs and trading arms. Social 
violence across sectors also characterizes the emerald industry in Boyaca, where the 
patrons treat the workers and guerillas as a mafia would, backing up their coercive 
relations with violence. This is also true of regions of gold mining in Antioquia in the 
north-central, coal in Cesar and La Guajira in the northeast and oil and gas pumping in 
Santander, Arauca and Casanare, near Venezuela (Sanchez 2001; IWGIA 2013).  
Violence, then, spreads where rapid economic exploitation replaces agrarian 
subsistence, and more specifically, where the following conditions occur in a cybernetic 
relationship: poverty with increasing segregation of wealth, limited social mobility and 
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high rates of migration, all augmented by increasingly rogue forms of authority. The 
local and regional authorities can be legal or extralegal, but if extralegal, count on more 
violence. It ties peasants, workers and indigenous peoples to a railroad track with two 
trains bearing down on them. One is the ever-rising expectations borne of new wealth 
from resource-rich areas, especially where an established oligarchy used to mete out 
rewards discretely. The other is the multi-vector terror that plays on the rising 
expectations of the peasants, indigenous peoples and poor, but keeps them perpetually 
frightened and put down.  
Outside the scope of this paper but deserving mention, urban violence, with its cycles 
of crime and vengeance, has also mushroomed in the last 30 years. This includes violence 
by gangs attached to the drug trade, 122 in Medellín alone between 1985 and 1990, a 
high point, and the sicarios, assassins who work for the drug dealers in vendettas, 
sometimes against upstart criminal organizations to keep unauthorized distribution down. 
Another involves the so-called “social cleansing” of the homeless, prostitutes, 
delinquents and small-time criminals (Sanchez 2001), often performed by paras hired by 
business or government. 
 
 This does not mean the situation is hopeless but complex and challenging. There are 
many interrelated dimensions to be coordinated across scales of human needs and social 
organization. We explore most of these important aspects of peacebuilding in various 
parts of this study. These supply the broader social and economic contexts within which 
the violence recounted in the case studies took place and within which any serious 
peacebuilding must perform a lasting transformation. None of these objectives will be 
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achieved quickly but they must be advanced and undertaken. In summary, they are 
(from shorter to longer term):  
 
 Zones of peace and national coalitions that can develop public opinion and 
political leverage for support of peacebuilding initiatives; 
 Rituals of reconciliation in culturally sensitive forms;  
 Education for peace, in a succession of ways we will outline and others we cannot 
– if there is hope for the future, it is with the youth;  
 Job training, relocation assistance and counseling – moral, psychological, 
vocational – for everyone from demobilized combatants to displaced persons and 
victims of the violence; 
 Protection for labor and peasant unions and their leaders, also for human-rights 
workers; 
 Judicial protection and reform; 
 Also, critically, a legal-judicial-social assault on:  
o Organized crime; 
o Impunity for rights violators; and 
o National leaders who allow extractive industries and agribusiness to run 
roughshod over peasant and Indian needs and community plans for 
development;  
 Crop substitution – instead of drug suppression with toxic sprays – but of crops 
with a viable market; rice and cocao (cocoa bean) appear promising; 
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 Land reform, especially for tenants and small holders, including restitution for 
fraudulent titling and for the displaced; 
 Socially responsible investment, including an emphasis on environmentally 
friendly and smaller enterprises – micro-lending is of great help here; 
 Using leverage by the international business and lending community to get states 
to negotiate; and 
 Retraining large corporations in sustainable, equitable development. 
 
While we cannot explore all of these activities of peacebuilding in detail, we will explore 
some of the most important efforts in these areas. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Church and State, Peasants and Indigenous Peoples:  
Conflict Mitigation, Mediation and Transformation 
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OTHERS IN THIRD-SIDE ROLES:  
AN EMPHASIS ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS 
Parallel to the international NGO community runs the advocacy of the local, regional 
and national NGO communities. As we have said, they also generally represent those 
conflict-resolution specialist Ury (2000) would call “the third side,” often in classic ways. 
He argues that resolving difficult conflicts, from the interpersonal to the civil and 
geopolitical, often depends on involving the principals of the “third side,” the 
stakeholders in the community in which the conflict takes place. These people have much 
to lose if the conflict is not resolved peacefully. When the third side is engaged, the 
conflict broadens from social and political dichotomies to a consideration of many 
interlocking interests.  
One remarkable example here is an indigenous rights movement emerging from three 
decades of repression (1960s-1980s) that has found it can sometimes circumvent 
unresponsive states and gain a hearing in the international community – for example, 
with the OAS, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the United Nations and 
the NGO community (Brysk 2000). Institutions such as the church, the national and 
international business communities and international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) can also perform 
third-side roles. They can often apply leverage by granting or withholding funding.
2  
Other third-side initiatives often involve a complex of local-to-national-to-international 
connections and leverages. We will explore these manifestations of the third side in what 
follows.   
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The Catholic Church in Latin America 
A crucial part of the “third side” is the Catholic Church, the region’s most dominant 
religious force by far. It applies its own national and international leverage. Because of a 
shortage of priests, more than half have come from Europe, and many brought critical 
thinking with them. Still, for most of the last 500 years, the church served as one of the 
primary agents of colonialism, herding Indians into missions and indoctrinating them. 
Some of these saved Native peoples from starvation or massacre, and a few noteworthy 
priests spoke out about mistreatment. Catholic missionary strategy eventually overlaid 
Christian iconography on Native spirituality, which was less trouble and violent than 
eliminating it. The church instead found cultural parallels where possible (Cleary and 
Steigenga 2004).  
Against the grain of this cultural and political hegemony, a serious but fledgling 
progressive movement in the church began in the late 1950s. By the 1960s and 1970s, it 
was in full flower as an increasingly well-articulated theology of liberation began to 
challenge the established ecclesiastical and political order. This movement was catalyzed 
by a gathering of cardinals and bishops assembled by Pope John XXIII in the early 1960s 
for Vatican Council II, usually called Vatican II. It pushed Catholicism to make many 
changes to become a more populist and popular church. In addition, a fundamental 
gathering of the leadership of the Latin American church was held in Medellín in 1968, 
during which its bishops affirmed a groundbreaking commitment to the poor.  
This much-celebrated, much-debated movement, while distinctively Latin American, 
relied on a neo-Marxist analysis of class conflict, combined with the liberation motifs of 
the escape from slavery in Egypt and Jesus’ allegiance to “the least of these” (as he once 
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characterized the poor). It included Indians as members of an oppressed class but 
sought to assimilate them into the majority culture with full rights and benefits. Since the 
1980s, however, it has become increasingly supportive of Native spirituality and 
lifeways, both in dialog with Catholicism and on their own terms. The debate about 
indigenous spirituality in the Catholic Church in Latin America is likely one of the most 
soul-searching and far-reaching in a long while (Calder 2004).  
Identity versus class notwithstanding, this is a movement of profound solidarity with 
the subordinate classes and dispossessed races, one deeply involved with peasants and 
Indians that, at some cost in blood, torture and imprisonment, has produced countless 
spiritual and practical benefits. It has done so with grassroots consciousness-raising via 
small study groups called base ecclesiastical communities, which raise awareness and 
target initiatives among subordinate groups and classes, providing conceptual, financial 
and in-kind support, often small-scale projects focused on health care, clean water and 
production and credit cooperatives; literacy and other educational efforts; and building 
civil-society groups advocating for civil and political rights.  
The base communities were originally led by catechists, lay pastors in effect, created 
to deal with the shortage of priests. As many were composed of peasants and Indians, 
soon their activities dovetailed with the aims of liberation. Many initially featured 
literacy campaigns. In them, peasants would teach one another and mutually discover the 
wider world and their place in it, and most of all, supported theologically by the 
transformative premise that “God champions the oppressed,” they began to realize their 
status is not willed by God but a social construction. They have been involved in land 
reform and, increasingly, in human rights as well. They also increasingly have been 
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influenced by indigenous understandings of the sacred nature of community and 
communion with the land. 
Liberation theology has caused a deep rift in Catholicism between those caught up in 
its vision of peace with justice and those who believe it is heretical (preferring more 
traditional visions of same). Outside the church, it has been criticized, even demonized, 
by state and military officials, especially by those who believe it is communist-inspired 
and deserves no quarter. It also was beleaguered by censure under Pope John Paul II, an 
ardent anti-communist from the days when the Soviets dominated Poland. His tenure 
included the removal of sympathetic bishops and the silencing of progressive theologians. 
Remarkably though, under John Paul II, the Catholic Church has admitted to complicity 
in the abuse of indigenous peoples and has apologized. This is in contrast to the last pope, 
Benedict XVI, and his desire to reassert the total authority of the church, and with it, the 
old ethnocentrism. Pope Benedict also was resistant to liberation theology, had in fact 
served as its inquisitor under John Paul II. 
To the surprise of many, the newest head of the Catholic Church, the first Latin 
American pope, has been quick to proclaim a new ethic from the Vatican. Pope Francis, a 
76-year-old Argentine, has explicitly emphasized the church’s commitment to the poor. 
He has modeled this by living and dressing more simply than previous popes, by 
appointing new cardinals and bishops and by seeking to reform the church’s constitution 
and its governing body, the curia. 
A compilation of his sayings regarding the church’s responsibility to the poor cannot 
be misconstrued. What remains to be seen is how far he may go before more conservative 
forces try to regain control. For the time being, he has re-energized a church worn down 
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by sex and financial scandals, by bickering over polity and by fights over modern 
versus ancient forms of liturgy. Selected statements by Pope Francis regarding poverty 
are: 
 
A way has to be found to enable everyone to benefit from the fruits of the earth, and 
not simply to close the gap between the affluent and those who must be satisfied with 
the crumbs falling from the table, but above all to satisfy the demands of justice, 
fairness and respect for every human being. 
[an address to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, June 20, 2013] 
 
 Among our tasks as witnesses to the love of Christ is that of giving a voice to the cry 
of the poor.  
[an address to the Archbishop of Canterbury, June 14, 2013] 
What might need to change in your own heart in order to respond to the call to “give 
voice” to the cry of those in poverty? 
Poverty calls us to sow hope…. Poverty is the flesh of the poor Jesus, in that child 
who is hungry, in the one who is sick, in those unjust social structures.  
 [a meeting with students of Jesuit schools, June 7, 2013] 
[all from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and Catholic Relief Services 2013:online]   
Lately, adding to the cultural and theological complexity, in response to the burgeoning 
movement celebrating indigenous pride and culture, liberation theology increasingly has 
been altered by an emphasis on indigenous spiritual traditions and norms or, in some 
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places, on a syncretism that puts indigenous religious values on more equal terms 
(Cleary 1997; Klaiber 1998; Cleary and Steigenga 2004). There are a number of 
interesting questions that follow, including whether the church should become so good at 
empowering Native spirituality that it could put itself out of business. This is an 
exaggeration of course but not entirely idle musing since the church, after experiencing a 
renaissance from the 1960s through 1980s, has been losing members at an accelerating 
rate in the 2000s. Even so, what concerns us here is how these religious voices affirm 
intercultural understanding and socio-cultural justice and, most importantly, doing so, 
prevent mass violence and ecocide.  
Also of interest is the influence of Protestantism, which, aside from the liberal but 
mostly limited influence of the mainstream denominations, represents the fastest-growing 
segment of the religious landscape, mostly by evangelicals. Less well explored is that 
many of these have historically been less concerned with Indian rights and development 
than with evangelizing the globe in order to bring about the religious utopia known as the 
millennium. They have been criticized for disrupting traditional cultures, privileging 
North American cultures and for being agents of the U.S. government or its corporations, 
many of which have funded these groups, including firms with natural-resource interests 
such as Weyenhauser and government actors with various security interests such as the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Central Intelligence Agency 
(Cleary 1997). Some evangelical organizations have been investigated, censured, sent 
home or restricted in scope. Most by now have made some accommodations with the 
cultures of the people they say they are there to help. How far this education goes and 
how much they can set aside their ethnocentrism remains to be seen. But we should note 
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in particular that they were one of very few civil society organizations that stood up 
to Sendero and slowed its path.  
 
Another theoretical distinction is sometimes made between “negative” and “positive” 
peace. According to Galtung (1969:183), negative peace is the end of physical violence. 
Positive peace is the end of the deficits leading to the physical violence. The first 
involves stopping the violence. The second entails changing the social, economic and 
ecological conditions that make up the roots of the conflict. These objectives in particular 
need to include promoting social justice for and the political involvement of 
underrepresented peoples and groups (United Nations System Staff College and Catalan 
International Institute for Peace 2010). Perhaps another, more descriptive set of terms 
might be the “short-term” and “long-term” aspects of peacebuilding. The case studies 
above have involved both aspects but emphasize the more immediate needs. Next we will 
outline examples oriented to the long term. We will only be able to provide some 
commentary on each, but they deserve mention.  
Another set of descriptors, perhaps more telling yet, might be (without prejudice) 
reactive and proactive peacebuilding. The former consists of immediate human-rights 
advocacy, action and alerts, including conflict mitigation efforts such as Witness for 
Peace, zones of peace, sanctuary movements and mediation with short-term aims. These 
have more to do with the civil-political rights in the UN’s Universal Declaration. 
The major proactive approaches are conflict transformation, transitional justice, 
sustainable-equitable development and education for peace and justice. Conflict 
transformation, while a general term, can be typified as the prevention of violent conflict; 
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moving from long-term violence to sustainable outcomes; improving ways to analyze 
conflict and incorporating them into organizations dedicated to peace; reconstruction, 
reconciliation and healing; and social, political and economic programs. These longer 
term efforts are usually related to the UN’s social, economic and cultural rights. 
 
PERU: 
A NONVIOLENT CITIZEN DEFENSE, A CHURCH DIVIDED 
AND AN INDIGENOUS AWAKENING 
 
The rondas campesinas  
Emerging in the northern Sierra out of traditional forms of justice in peasant 
communities, initially concerned mostly with corruption, petty theft and grand theft such 
as cattle rustling (where livestock are  wealth), the rondas campesinas grew into citizen 
militias, not just community watches. But in dramatic contrast to the AUC in Colombia, 
they generally have reserved armed violence only for extreme cases, such as attacks by 
SL. Starn, Degregori and Kirk (1995:425) call the rondas “one of the largest and most 
sustained rural movements of the late 20th century” (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007:91). 
They were fundamental in stopping Sendero in the highlands and represent one of the 
most peaceful uses of a citizen militia in Latin America. They also represent a variant of 
a “zone of peace” (ZoP). These can be loosely defined as any declaration by a local or 
regional group that violence is not welcome, often within a city or region, and will not be 
tolerated (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007). They are similar in certain critical ways to that 
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established by the Nasa, profiled in the Colombian third-side examples, but the 
ronderos are armed – for law-enforcement only – and have judicial standing.  
Having established their value policing rustling in areas with a weak state presence 
and a corruptible judiciary, they then became involved in the development of customary 
norms for judicial decisions in cooperation with local and state government. They have 
left a lasting legacy by resolving conflicts through general assemblies, developing mutual 
state-local support for night patrols and community development and creating openings 
for other cooperative approaches to community problems. Langdon and Rodriguez 
(2007:179, n. 15) explain that this community ethic does not evolve solely out of 
participation in communal land use, though this provides the basis for much of the 
cooperation, but that such communities are governed by many interconnected networks 
of kinship and reciprocity: “In these cases, the ronda campesina is the communal 
organisation, having assumed the social functions of [other] community organisations in 
formally recognized campesino communities.” Using their arms only for defense against 
Sendero and other threats, the ronderos have rejected torture, disappearances and capital 
punishment. They promote negotiations, settlements and community service instead of 
corporal punishment. By the 1980s, they represented local justice in about 400,000 
communities (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007).  
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The Catholic Church in Peru: A theology of liberation or reconciliation? 
Since the 1960s, liberation theology has provided a theological, philosophical and 
political basis for a this-worldly emancipation of peasants and Indians from their 
decidedly marginal status in Latin American society. It has challenged the ecclesiastical 
and political status quo in the name of the ethic of social justice in the Hebrew scriptures 
(or Old Testament) and the ethic of universal love in the Second (or New) Testament. 
Based in critical theory, liberation theology expresses its overt ethical priorities by 
proposing that those poorly represented in the competition for resources have an 
“epistemological privilege.” Epistemology is about our ways of knowing, often explained 
as “how we know what we know.” The epistemological privilege of the poor and 
powerless (Gutierrez 1973; Segundo 1976) refers not to any greater knowledge base but 
to a special vantage point on systemic injustice, defined as gross inequity in distribution 
of resources and rewards in a given political ecology.  
This school of theology and its educational counterpart, pedagogy of the oppressed, 
emerged in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. In standing with the poor and 
powerless, it proposes that people experience their fullest humanity, including a deep 
sense of the transpersonal, as they become aware of a situation of injustice and attempt 
publicly, through a variety of nonviolent means, to redress it. It starts with what 
theologian Gustavo Gutierrez (1973) calls a pre-theological assumption: The world 
should not be the way it is. This realization is as important as any recognition of the 
divine or transpersonal that starts with a peak, oceanic or mountaintop experience or any 
other sense of union with the universe. It rests on the conviction that human beings 
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become critical and embrace freedom. It starts with Paulo Freire's (1970) twin 
assumptions in Pedagogy of the Oppressed:  
 
 The real calling of a human being is to be a subject who acts upon and transforms 
his or her world and in doing so moves to new possibilities of being, of fuller and 
richer life, individually and collectively.  
 The world that this kind of person seeks to understand and ultimately transform is 
not a closed order, a static system to which people should adjust. It is instead a 
problem to be solved, the material such people must use to create history. They do 
so as they overcome patterns of life that are dehumanizing and create what is 
qualitatively new.  
 
Both of these precepts have psychological and political dimensions. At the start of “In 
Search of Sociology,” Segundo (1976:39) notes that, “without a…determination to turn 
theology [or the transpersonal] into a serviceable tool…for a social praxis that is 
liberative, a false and quasi-magical concept of the divine will dissolve [it] in universal, 
ahistorical concepts.”  
 In the practice of social and ecological justice, then, Gutierrez says, “Sin is regarded 
as a historical fact, the absence of brotherhood and love in relationships among men, the 
breach of friendship with God and with other men, and therefore, an interior, personal 
fracture” (1973:175). It has an objective, and above all, a collective, manifestation: “Sin 
is evident in oppressive structures, in the exploitation of man by man, in the domination 
and slavery of peoples, races and social classes. Sin appears, therefore, as the 
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fundamental alienation, the root of a situation of injustice” (1973:175; emphasis 
added). For those uncomfortable with theological language, it might be helpful to put sin 
in quotation marks and think of it as a social metaphor. God is conceived of as the good, 
which is derived from God in Old English. It is then understood as a break with the good 
between or among individuals, within or among collectivities and between them and 
nature. 
Peru is home to the man interestingly regarded as the founding father of liberation 
theology, Gutierrez, and many progressive parts of the Catholic Church bear his mark 
and influence. Peña (1994) notes that Gutierrez has explained that such a theology did not 
fall out of the sky. It came from priests and other religious workers working closely with 
the poor, especially peasants in the campo or those displaced to the cities by poverty, war 
or expansion by large landowners. In city or country, they often take over vacant land in 
squatter invasions. When these are put down violently, the stirrings of a civil war begin. 
In other such instances of solidarity, the liberation church, sometimes more 
provocatively, sometimes less so, has helped peasants and Indians give voice to a 
politically and ethically well-articulated confrontation with the state and its longstanding 
partner, the elites. The question then becomes: Is this peacebuilding or aggravation of 
conflict? As above, the basic contention here is that social and economic justice is a non-
negotiable condition for peace. A marginalized people do not remain that way forever or 
even for very long. In addition, as in other parts of Latin America, clergy have fulfilled 
third-side roles as mediators, or have enlisted others to do so.  
In response, often supported by the Vatican, conservative clergy have organized 
significant opposition to this expression of Indian and peasant resurgence. Peña notes: 
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The more visible of the challenges against liberationists focused on their support of 
the popular sector. According to Levine (1986:6), popular groups constituted the 
masses in social sectors oppressed or exploited by an economic [and] social system. 
Equally important was their emergence as a politically significant force in Peru. Since 
the early 1900s, this sector was the focus of successfully led protest movements 
(Tovar 1982:24). By the 1970s, they had organized 364 strikes in 1968, 788 in 1973, 
and 779 in 1975, before leveling to 440 in 1976. The 1980s experienced the 
proliferation of the revolutionary movements Shining Path and Tapac [sometimes 
Tupac] Amaru. There is no evidence that supporters of liberation theology in Peru 
support Shining Path and Tapac Amaru. This is because in part, as Berryman 
(1987:195) explains, “no liberation theologian has provided a theological rationale for 
killing.” Also, “to the extent death is theologized, it is in reflections on martyrdom, 
the willingness to give one's life to others, not to take others’ lives.” Therefore…the 
strategies of protest movements (strikers, land squatters, and worker groups) led 
Catholic officials to publicize their opposition to political activism…. The 
retrenchment policies of the Catholic Church in Peru and elsewhere, in the 1980s, 
against liberation theology and its proponents were linked to a general opposition to 
decentralized power in the Church and to popular political protests.  
[1992:162] 
 
Subsequently, one church official in particular who was vehemently opposed to 
liberation theology founded a movement celebrating traditional religious and cultural 
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values and began to organize against it. He framed this effort with a sonorous phrase, 
“the theology of reconciliation.”  
 
In 1973, a group calling itself "God and Country" began appearing at the Catholic 
University of Lima. By 1974, the group included [a nationalist youth organization] 
and its religious sector – Sodalitium Vitae [meaning Fellowship of Christian Life in 
English]. Its founder, Luis Fernando Figari, was a secondary school teacher [who] 
later broadened his constituency when he became a…teacher at the Santo Toribio 
Seminary in Lima. Figari's ties at the seminary led to support from influential 
bishops…. In 1974, three years after Father Gustavo Gutierrez and others began 
publishing their work on liberation theology, Figari began publishing his ideas on 
reconciliation. Opposed to the liberalization of the Church, Figari organized 
Sodalitium Vitae and began his attack against liberationists.  
[Peña 1992:163] 
 
Their critique of social activism emphasized conservative values, asceticism by the 
clergy as an example for the poor, and traditional Catholic teachings. Sodalitium Vitae 
promoted these values by espousing an ideology of reconciliation. Peña believes it was 
successful enough, especially through the more conservative 1980s and 1990s, that it was 
able to rewrite the meaning of liberation theology. “Reconciliation meant diffusing 
political activism by encouraging opposition groups to find common ground on which to 
resolve their differences. In other words, reconciliation meant conflict resolution through 
nonviolence” (Peña 1992:163)  
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This raises some very complex issues, those we already visited in both Theidon 
(2012) and Tate (2007): Is peacebuilding better served by a strident advocacy for the 
oppressed, or by a posture of nonviolence emphasizing reconciliation? Is reconciliation a 
political and ethical Trojan Horse? Is there something beyond a zero-sum middle ground? 
Is there a “both-and”? There are no easy answers to these questions, and violence should 
never be more than the very last resort, but an enlightened approach to peacebuilding 
would surely hold that one must never gloss over the exacting, pervasive stranglehold on 
structural violence exercised by the status quo: Peace without social justice is not 
sustainable.   
 
In the wake of dirty war: A major mobilization of indigenous peoples 
Struggling against a wall of oppression, running through the soul-searing, multilateral 
violence, has been a decades-long struggle by indigenous peoples, peasants and the urban 
poor to reclaim their dignity, their livelihoods and their social-political standing (Brysk 
2000). Many would say it has been 500 years in the making.  
Across Latin America, in the wake of the dictatorships, repression and pseudo-
democracies from the 1960s through most of the 1980s, a host of indigenous and peasant 
organizations were born. If, as Hitchcock and Twedt (1995) offer, indigenous peoples are 
killed simply because of “who they are,” they are now protecting that identity by 
projecting it onto the international stage so that it can never be denied again. They are 
calling attention to who they are holistically, across a range of needs and sensibilities, and 
across multiple scales, demonstrating the pride they feel in their whole culture and the 
essential dignity they experience within them. It is the international correlate of the 
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“Nunca mas” (never again) campaigns that lead to or accompany truth commissions 
on the national level. In addition, across multiple scales, a wealth of other NGOs 
concerned with peace and justice, sustainable development, fair trade and human rights 
have become active in indigenous rights. 
Hemispheric awareness of indigenous peoples was catalyzed by the celebration of the 
500
th
 anniversary of Columbus’ stumbling onto the West Indies. This event inspired their 
own (anti-) quincentenary moment. Along with the advent of neo-liberal economic 
policies and nominal democracy has been the flourishing of a host of indigenous and 
peasant organizations, at a variety of scales, local, regional and national, that have fought 
its more damaging economic realities, sometimes in public protest, sometimes in 
lobbying and electoral movements and sometimes by creating alternative economic 
systems. In this process, the international NGO community has exercised its political 
leverage with Latin American governments, and the human-rights movement in particular 
represents a critical part of the road to peacebuilding.   
Independent of insincere-seeming government efforts, this indigenous mobilization 
keeps growing and represents classic social-movement dynamics and, in its use of 
national and international leverage, third-side resources. Catalyzed by the long-standing 
violence, a continent-wide response to the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s landing and 
significant opposition to the free-trade agreements (now ratified in Colombia and Peru), it 
has articulated these demands: regional self-determination; full political and civil rights; a 
greater proportion of public funds and services; safeguards against theft or unauthorized 
use of protected lands by national and multinational corporations, among the most 
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important; and protection from territorial occupation, torture, killings and village 
destruction by the armed actors (Brysk 2000; Cleary 2007).  
 
The indigenous awakening in Peru 
Though poverty is diminishing, the story of peasants and Native peoples in Peru has 
no especially satisfying end at present. Still, an indigenous legacy has been reborn in the 
last 30 years that has catalyzed a movement for inalienable collective rights, including 
those related to development, and a movement for territorial autonomy that is gaining 
momentum. While historically lagging behind its neighbors Ecuador and Bolivia, 
Peruvian indigenous empowerment has embraced the all-important task of creating 
peoples fully indigenous and fully citizens, including revamping education, government 
and civil society at the local and regional levels.  
An important example, programs touting not just multiculturalism but 
“interculturality” emphasize literacy in both Quechua and Spanish, along with cultural-
awareness instruction in both. Inter- rather than multi-cultural activities speak of greater 
equality between cultures, its proponents believe. This cultural paradigm includes a 
peasantry with strong Indian roots and tends to emphasize cultural, not political (or class) 
consciousness, in part because it emerged under Fujimori, when political activity could 
get one killed. This produced some ironies, requiring careful attention and ensuring that 
any movement for empowerment of peasants and Indians would not be purely revivalist 
efforts. For example, experts from the state and NGOs want to teach children to read and 
write in Quechua, but their parents say the schools should teach Spanish, the language 
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they must learn to ascend in the larger society. From this dialog emerged a greater 
emphasis on both languages and cultures (Starn, Degregori and Kirk 1995). 
Meanwhile, authentically indigenous organizations are emerging all over, gaining 
momentum and developing an all-important indigenous leadership. Bilingual and 
intercultural educational reform is seen as a key to indigenous self-determination and the 
empowerment of future leaders (García 2005). Though they have much in common 
generally, perhaps because each group has a different religious heritage, indigenous 
spirituality has not thrown up an iconic public image of self-sacrifice, even unto death, as 
with liberation Christianity, but it has been able to help change our ways of thinking 
about the earth. Celebrating and promoting it as well as any spiritual tradition on the 
planet, most of native spirituality represents a reverence for the source of all sustenance 
and its irrevocable bond with the people who have tended it and made it their brother and 
sister, their mother and father, as opposed to a resource base for extractive industries, 
destined for private benefits at social costs. This movement too becomes a “third-side” 
player, operating at various levels of human needs across scales. Far from being a 
dreamy, counter-culture utopia, this is probably one of the most important social visions 
of our time, as critical to our survival as any other. 
 
Education for peace 
 Out of the civil violence of the 1980s and 1990s, Educa (shorthand, not an acronym), 
an educational NGO that had been doing programming in schools in rural parts of Peru, 
committed to a peace-education program as an integral part of curriculum and everyday 
activity at school. It runs peace-education projects in the schools and communities in the 
 163 
Andean region. It began to teach conflict transformation as a new approach to 
resolving a range of problems (Roush 2014). As a result, the political and educational 
leadership of the Huancavelica region, for example, has permanently incorporated peace 
education into its curriculum. In the manner of Lederach’s model, this is mostly aimed at 
principals, teachers, students, parents and local and regional leaders, who then can pass it 
on to the grassroots and rank-and-file. 
 Another organization, ODECA, has worked intensively for the national movement of 
civil society groups called So It Doesn’t Happen Again (a version of Nunca Mas). As a 
founding member, it has directed the educational efforts of the movement, working to 
enhance peace by making peace education a critical part of the curriculum and 
educational environment. In particular, it teaches using dialog, discussion and debate, 
while respecting others, to reach consensus (Roush 2014). In response to the findings of 
the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (PTRC) in 2003, more than 170 
organizations came together to form So It Doesn’t Happen Again. Its mission was to 
promote the understanding of difference at the micro-, meso- and macro-scales. It also 
tries to promote the case for reconciliation via reparations. This effort has been supported 
by the National Education Commission. Among its charges, the commission creates and 
approves educational efforts and advocacy about conflict resolution and positive change 
(Roush 2014). 
 
Other critical contributions  
 Truth and reconciliation. After Alberto Fujimori resigned and fled the country, 
interim President Valentin Paniagua formed the PTRC in 2001. It was charged with 
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documenting extralegal deaths, torture, disappearances, displacement, means of terror 
and other human-rights violations from 1980 to 2000, during the governments of Terry 
Belaúnde, Alan García and Fujimori. It also offered ways to better support human rights. 
It found those killed to be three times the number thought, 69,000, shocking the nation. 
About half were committed by Shining Path, a third by government forces and the rest by 
other guerillas or paramilitaries. It determined that 75 percent of the victims were 
peasants and indigenous peoples. The violence also displaced hundreds of thousands 
(Gandhi 2011; Buckman 2012b). 
The commission consisted of  ten men and two women, all from Lima. Only one 
could speak the language of the people who suffered the most, Quechua, none Aymara. 
In its favor, the Peruvian military and other government officials were not given 
immunity, and the hearings were broadcast on national television. The commission also 
dug up mass graves and used forensic methods to establish cause of death. Campesinos 
were allowed to watch and share their testimony. The media gave these more attention 
than the hearings. Memorial services were held across the country. As the shock wore 
off, people mourned in earnest. The commission urged reparations for the victims and 
emphasized that most of them were poor and Indian, most of those peasants. It urged a 
public acknowledgement by the state of the atrocities, prosecution of the guilty, 
governmental reforms and greater acceptance of Peru’s multiethnic heritage.  
Criticism of the commission included the following: (1) a focus on individual victims 
drew attention away from the cry for justice by abused groups such as peasants and 
indigenous peoples (and the urban poor); (2) merely investigating events and publishing 
the findings does not address the enormous losses of people and land by the peasants and 
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Indians, whether to the government or to Shining Path; (3) the recommendations did 
not urge any greater public- or private-sector support for indigenous life and institutions, 
nor did they provide a critique of the legacy of social, political and cultural 
discrimination against those of Native ancestry.  
In 2003, President Alejandro Toledo apologized on behalf of the government to the 
survivors of the violence and emphasized the severity of its effects on peasants and 
Indians. He outlined a five-part proposal for reconciliation: (1) improve health, nutrition 
and education for all Peruvians, especially the poor; (2) improve physical, 
telecommunications and electrical infrastructure; (3) increase productivity in agriculture 
and agribusiness; (4) enhance investment by the private sector; and (5) improve the 
resources of the state and civil society. Some of these objectives have been met by rapid 
and stable economic growth as Toledo sought to expand Fujimori’s neo-liberal economic 
policies, including privatizing state businesses and services. However, despite his 
Stanford credentials, his administration was beset with scandals and mismangement, and 
most of those outside the main currents of the economy remained so. 
As with Fujimori, little improvement in the lives of working and low-income people 
yielded an increasing mistrust of free-trade economics. Also, despite a mandate to root 
out corruption and prosecute human-rights abuses, Toledo’s prosecutors moved very 
slowly. Finally, by 2006, a number of cases had been tried, resulting in several hundred 
convictions. However, with the uncovering of bribery and drug-trafficking charges 
against him and his administration, Toledo had an approval rating of 8 percent. Four 
years of economic growth above 5 percent had been distributed very selectively, said 
many tens of thousands in the streets (Forero 2006). 
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 Constitutional reform. As in a number of other Latin American countries, one of 
the more concrete improvements for peasants and indigenous peoples in Peru has resulted 
from a constitutional reform giving them greater legal guarantees. These serve as an 
important foundation for peacebuilding going forward. The constitutional overhaul 
represents one of the most significant legal-judicial transformations in the service of 
justice, which includes service to peacebuilding. In 1994 a new constitution was 
approved that: (1) stated officially that the government “recognizes and protects the 
ethnic and cultural plurality of the nation”; (2) protected customary law with provisions 
for the fundamental rights of the individual; (3) recognized collective property rights; (4) 
made indigenous languages official in indigenous territories; but (5) did not produce legal 
recognition for Afro-Peruvians; (6) nor recognize the political autonomy of indigenous 
territories (though they have some within municipal authority).  
 
COLOMBIA: 
A STATE DIVIDED,   
CHURCH, PEASANTS AND INDIANS INCREASINGLY UNITED 
 
The Catholic Church: From mediation to social justice and human rights  
The Catholic Church in Colombia has been involved in peacebuilding in a number of 
ways. One of the most significant was the intercession of the Colombia Conference of 
Bishops between the rebels and the Barco administration. This mediation resulted in the 
demobilization of about 4,000 fighters from 1990 to early 1991. From this time on, the 
church began to say emphatically and publicly that the issues causing the armed conflict 
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were largely neoliberal economic policies, state and judicial corruption and the 
divisions between rich and poor.  
 
The bishops often issue statements and proposals at the diocesan level that address 
the local context of violence [as follows]: groups of bishops, sometimes accompanied 
by their priests and members of religious orders, speak out collectively on common 
problems at the regional level; and the Conference of Bishops brings together all the 
bishops of the country in assemblies, where they speak with one voice…. Practically 
all the Colombian bishops’ assemblies in recent years have addressed problems 
related to the conflict and prospects for peace.  
[Gaviria 2009:174; italics added] 
 
As part of this role, it set up a peace commission to work with the National Conciliation 
Commission and the National Social Ministry Secretariat to engage in discussions with 
grassroots groups committed to peacebuilding. While a civil-society institution and not a 
state initiative, this is not unlike the commissions extolled by Lederach above. It is a 
good example of mid-level civil-society coordination  and leverage coming to fruition 
over the long term. 
Because of the multi-dimensional, multi-sector nature of the violence, in classic third-
side activity, the church often seeks to bring together a wide range of stakeholders, to 
discuss what its place in resolving the conflict might be, particularly in the areas of public 
safety, political discussions and support for democracy. These roles have most often 
involved facilitation of dialog and negotiations, in providing moral guidelines and in 
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mediation. Such activities are known as pastoral dialogs, and their very existence in 
the conflict has been criticized at times by political and judicial players. The state has 
actually tried to limit this form of witness and its peacebuilding orientation.  
But the consensus within and without the church has been that this is one of its 
fundamental duties and that the goal has always been about resolving the conflict by 
championing the rights of the powerless (as opposed to any such activities that enhance 
it). These dialogs have also helped resolve other issues generated by the conflict such as 
kidnapping, massive displacement and the needs of single-headed households. Because 
the church has access to an international audience and resources, it has started a global 
campaign for the displaced through one of its international relief organizations, Caritas. 
From this push, one initiative has been to campaign for a law preventing forced 
displacement. Another has been to raise national awareness of the plight of the displaced, 
including sponsoring The Day of the Migrant. Yet another has involved setting up early 
warning systems regarding impending displacement, as well as accompanying the 
displaced, including whole communities, on their migrations. It has also argued for land 
recovery and land reform for such people. At 4 million displaced, Colombia is now third 
in the world (Refugees International 2013).         
Noteworthy for this study has been its advocacy for the indigenous peoples of the 
Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta. Comprising five tribes, they have suffered badly from the 
depredations of various armed actors, creating many displaced communities. Due to a 
very weak state presence, their lands have been dominated by both rebels and paras, both 
of whom “established systems of social and judicial control in the 1980s and 1990s 
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serving to damage and undermine traditional indigenous authorities and systems of 
governance,” according to Minority Rights Group International (2005). 
When the rebels moved out around 1999, the paras moved in. Because of the previous 
rebel presence, the paras suspected an important tribe, the Kankuamos, of collaborating 
with them. While the group insisted on its neutrality and victimization, the paras began to 
apply standard methods of terror designed to move people off their lands. Acting in 
concert with the army, they began to assassinate, massacre, disappear, threaten and 
confine them and force their young into their service (Minority Rights Group 2005). By 
the mid-2000s, paramilitaries who allegedly had been demobilized were committing half 
the crimes in the area (Minority Rights Group 2005).  
In response, the church published “The Situation of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.” Endorsed by the National 
Social Ministry Secretariat and Ombudsman’s Office (2003:96), the report called for “an 
urgent need to implement a comprehensive emergency plan aimed at protecting 
fundamental rights; guaranteeing respect for economic, social and cultural rights, and re-
establishing the real and effective presence of the state, taking into account the right of 
indigenous communities to consultation and decision making by consensus” (Gaviria 
2009:180). By calling attention to one of the least publicized but most severe 
humanitarian crises among Native peoples and in the country in general, it pushed the 
state to help these groups and created a model for dialog and action regarding indigenous 
issues and the humanitarian crisis. 
In addition, while establishing a social witness for peace and reconciliation, the 
progressive church has not relented on its prophetic role as a critic of social inequality 
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and an advocate for the indigenous peoples, peasants and urban poor. In a 2002 
conference, “Toward the Colombia We Want,” the bishops examined issues such as 
poverty and the economy, reforming the justice system and new ways of viewing national 
security. They stated clearly that peace must evolve out of social justice and that 
equitable development is a precondition. In another conference, it mapped out the main 
areas needing work in building a lasting peace: (1) a negotiated settlement in which all 
armed actors, other relevant institutions and trained facilitators are involved; (2) building 
and rebuilding of civil society; and (3) creating “structures at the community level that 
guarantee social justice and peaceful coexistence” (Gaviria 2009:176). In a particularly 
prophetic role, it criticized the Free Trade Agreement then being negotiated with the 
United States as asymmetrical and reaching well beyond development (into exploitation). 
The church has also called for a national peace policy as a guide to peacebuilding.   
 
The indigenous awakening in Colombia 
As in many Latin American countries, over the past few decades, indigenous peoples 
and peasants in Colombia have advocated for self-determination; human and civil rights; 
better public services, especially health care and education in rural and remote areas; a 
ban on appropriation of tribal lands by large corporations; and protection from rights 
violations by belligerents and drug traders.  
To protect these rights, they have formed, among other such associations, the 
National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), founded in the Amazon in 1982 
to speak for 34 groups in the national assembly; the National Peasant Association 
(ANUC), promoting land reform for small farmers and the rural poor; and various 
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regional groups, chief among them, the Indigenous Council of the Cauca Region 
(CRIC), the Organization of Antioquia (OIA), and the Regional Indigenous Organization 
of Putamayo, the department bordering Ecuador and Peru with a great deal of rainforest 
and coca cultivation. Another important group is the Coordinating Body of Indigenous 
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) (Minorities at Risk 2004). Also hopeful, as 
mentioned in relation to Peru and elsewhere, is an emerging emphasis on 
“interculturality” in political groups and education reform (Rappaport 2005).  
In addition, the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), like the 
Catholic Church, a major third-side presence, has helped mobilize protests and, more 
proactively, development projects of benefit to the community and not multinational 
corporations. More than 30 civil-society and human-rights groups, national and 
international, have affirmed that the demonstrations are nonviolent attempts to end a 
physical and cultural genocide (Martínez 2008).  
 
The Nasa: An award-winning model  
A well-regarded example of third-side mobilization, southwest of the department of 
the Valle de Cauca, for which Cali is the capital, the Nasa, a settled indigenous people, 
have been badly brutalized by the violence of guerrillas, paras and drug gangs. Of the 
Pacific-bordering Cauca, a department south of the Valle, they are the second-largest 
group of the Native peoples in the country, are much studied, well organized and 
increasingly heard from. They number around 140,000 and have historically occupied a 
range of ecologies up and down the mountains. Armed only with their emblematic staffs 
– long sticks or poles – they set up their own guard in response to the cross-sector 
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violence, for which they received the National Peace Prize in 2000. In 2004, the 
guard rescued five Nasa leaders kidnapped by FARC without resorting to violence 
(Ballvé 2006).  
In addition, on October 12, 2008, the Day of the Race – the indigenous answer to 
Columbus Day – promoted by the National Mobilization of Indigenous and Popular 
Resistance, large-scale protests began in La María, an indigenous territory in Cauca. 
Native organizations blocked the Pan-American Highway, the main road running north 
and south. In response, the army and police fired on unarmed demonstrators from 
helicopters and armored vehicles. This repression mobilized more protests, involving at 
least 200,000 Native people across the country. An estimated 60,000 indigenous people 
participated in an earlier march (Wirpsa 2009). Sixteen of 32 departments saw such 
demonstrations, most of which were supported by the International Affairs Commission, 
the Liberal Party and the Alternative Democratic Pole. Often the security forces simply 
declare the protesters are guerillas, or equally suspect, guerrilla supporters, even though 
they may only carry staffs and seek to negotiate demands with Uribe, as did the Nasa.  
 
Other critical contributions  
 Zones of peace, sanctuary movements and Witness for Peace. In the absence of 
adequate protection by the security forces, a large number of communities in Colombia 
have declared themselves zones of peace. These were described above as community 
declarations that violence is banned in a given area and all nonviolent means will be used 
to stop it – “an attempt to establish norms which limit the destructive effects of violent 
conflict within a particular area or during a particular time period or with regard to a 
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particular category of people” (Langdon and Rodriguez 2007:91). While they are not 
always successful in ending the violence, one of their main effects has been to transform 
a mentality of victimization into one of resilience and assertiveness. They represent a 
classic “bottom-up” advocacy for peace.  
 As Alvaro Villaraga explained in an interview with Rojas (2007), the following 
efforts can be considered the three main areas of peacebuilding in Colombia. They are: 
(1) women’s empowerment – this area is just as significant as the others we have 
examined, but it is too broad to do it justice here – Catalina Rojas (2009) explores these 
in Bouvier (2009); (2) indigenous mobilization as a territorial and cultural movement; 
(3) community-based humanitarian actions such as zones of peace. 
 The United Nations Development Programme has highlighted these projects as 
effective means of building peace. Among others, as of the late 2000s, this kind of 
resistance has been established in the departments of Tolima, Antioquia, Cauca, 
Barrancabermeja, Uraba, Narino, Calda and Arato. These represent the will of the 
community galvanized by a new story in terms Ury (2000) would surely endorse. They 
embody an emphatic challenge to the notion that important dialog can only take place at 
the national level between the rebels and the state.   
Many of these efforts resulted from financial support by the European Union’s 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, working with the Colombian NGO, 
Redepaz (Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against the War, or just Network for 
Peace, a coalition of about 400 organizations). They created “One Hundred 
Municipalities of Peace in Colombia,” an initiative designed to foster gender equity, 
peaceful relationships and local democracy. More specifically, they outlined the 
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following objectives: (1) citizen participation; (2) educational intervention; (3) public 
action and involvement in peacebuilding; (4) information and communication projects; 
(5) building and strengthening local civil-society leadership (Rojas 2007). 
While Redepaz took the lead, contributions of money, ideas and people also came 
from the Catholic Church and other religious organizations; a variety of indigenous 
communities; national NGOs for peace, human and women’s rights; peasant 
organizations; schools and universities; local political leaders and assemblies; and cities 
and communities. Challenges and shortcomings emerged of course, but they also held 
lessons. These included: (1) though EU funding intended as seed money was extended 
from 18 months to two years, it was too little for a number of long-term efforts; (2) the 
variety of projects and actors made it hard to evaluate success; (3) the degree of resources 
devoted to education versus the creation of peace networks and communities was not 
clearly stipulated; and (4) a overall strategy regarding the coordination of the various 
efforts and actors was lacking (Rojas 2007), no doubt a challenge in a concept so new.   
Other critical issues involve the obvious disadvantage of nonviolent actors facing off 
against violent ones quite inclined to exert their will. In one case, in Mogotes, the ELN 
killed a mayor accused of corruption. The mayor’s relatives retaliated by accusing a 
leader in the municipal assembly of being corrupt as well. This opened up a process of 
mistrust that weakened the community’s resolve. A hunger strike by a local priest 
demanding peace re-energized the process. This demonstrated there is a counter balance 
in grassroots numbers, in citizens united and resolving not to be intimidated by violence, 
and in the galvanizing presence of a moral witness such a priest. The Mogotes ZoP even 
won the national peace prize for its efforts in conflict mitigation (Rojas 2007). 
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In the interests of space, only one more will be examined. In Samaniego, the 
Peace Table was established. A different kind of peace committee, a coalition of 25 
private and public organizations, including youth groups and children, it developed a plan 
calling for the following: (1) building an information system for the most vulnerable parts 
of the community; (2) establishing policies for groups most in need of protection and 
support: children, women, the elderly and the disabled; (3) distributing public-service 
messages on the needs of the populations above; (4) networking with other institutions 
that serve at-risk people and (5) creating evaluation methods within a unified municipal 
plan.  In the face of many obstacles, including being in a region of heavy insurgent and 
paramilitary activity, the program has endured. Its biggest challenge has been securing a 
commitment to the project across various municipal administrations. This has resulted in 
many of the programs being reduced or cut (Rojas 2007).  
Still, one of the most innovative initiatives has come from the children. In 2003, the 
Movement of Children for Peace established the Foundation for Children and Youth in 
Peace. It promoted exchanges of war toys for nonviolent ones, ran peacebuilding 
workshops among youth and pursued media exposure for its aims. It also helped the 
displaced with food, housing and health care. In general, the problems in Sanamiego 
involved security challenges in a region dominated by paras, rebels and drug traffickers – 
the main issue with peace communities generally; inadequate funding; the challenge of 
dealing with thousands of the internally displaced, most of whom need public assistance; 
and issues related to the fumigation of drug plants, including problems in mental health, 
environment and food production (Rojas 2007). Another critical problem facing these 
communities is a lack of support from the national level, the leaders of which can feel 
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threatened by any attempt by another party or sector to exert its influence. President 
Uribe spoke out against ZoPs as hampering the fight against the rebels.  
Discussing Colombia’s peace communities, Rojas (2009) sums up the difficulties 
they face as rooted in economic deprivation. The key to eliminating the reasons for the 
rebellions and the repression they foster is sustainable development, she says. It is my 
most well-considered opinion, well-supported by most of the expert, religious, 
indigenous and humanitarian communities in this study, that this is all well and good, but 
it is probably a half measure. Without development that is both sustainable and equitable, 
peace is a happy but empty thought.  
Also under this rubric are sanctuary movements, “underground railroads,” so to 
speak, that move victims of dirty war to safer places. Along with ZoPs and Witness for 
Peace (below), these have all been applied in Colombia. These represent conflict 
mitigation, not resolution, but are noteworthy for the courage of their practitioners, the 
righteousness of their aims and their immediate, if ad hoc, life-saving effectiveness. The 
history of U.S. sanctuary movements has been most dramatically expressed in spiriting 
African-Americans to freedom during slavery and moving victims of political persecution 
in Central America, especially El Salvador and Guatemala, to the United States, Canada 
and other countries during the civil wars there during the 1980s (Smith 1991).  
Another conflict-mitigation program emerging from Central America in the 1980s 
was Witness for Peace (WTP). Originally intended to help prevent an invasion of 
Nicaragua by the United States, brandished by the Reagan administration as necessary to 
thwart Communism, progressive religious activists from the United States went to the 
border of Nicaragua and Honduras to stop U.S.-sponsored  terrorists from entering 
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Nicaragua in defiance of national and international law. They positioned themselves 
as human shields and began to document human-rights abuses.  
In response to the human, social, and environmental destruction wrought by Plan 
Colombia, the counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency program funded by the United 
States, Witness for Peace opened an office in Colombia in 2000. It has also documented 
forced displacement and has organized a coalition of worldwide human-rights and faith-
based organizations in solidarity with Colombian communities under siege (Witness for 
Peace 2010).  
In each of these cases, Christian, often liberal Protestant, church people have been 
instrumental to these approaches to peacebuilding. These are mostly means of mitigation, 
but they have an important place in peace and justice studies. There is, however, too little 
space for these except to note the relative effectiveness of each. They have both left 
important legacies. Two NGOs continue this work, a sanctuary system for Colombian 
refugees and a WTP office coordinating witness in the Colombian countryside. They 
provide striking, inspirational models for the collaboration of religion and human rights 
in the service of peacebuilding.  
Education for peace. In a far-reaching social agreement, Colombian initiated a 
national educational plan for 2006-16 that sets out ground-breaking objectives for 
education for peace. The plan’s purpose is to outline all efforts available, public and 
private, for meeting the right to a quality education. In a grassroots process involving 
about 20,000 education professionals, arrived at in consultation with members of the 
public, the group came up with 10 important areas of concern. Peace education, 
coexistence (convivencia) and citizenship education and participation were the first 
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priorities. They helped guide a new initiative in the national educational plan for 
individuals, groups and communities (Roush 2014). (Copies are available at 
www.plandecenal.edu.co or from secretariatecnica@educacionparalapaz.org.co.) 
 One example, the Community-Based Institute on Peace Education (CIPE) 
demonstrates this new education plan. Their web site explains succinctly: 
 
CIPEs are sustainable, community-based, non-formal peace education teacher 
training initiatives designed to address the lack of formal opportunities for the 
preparation of educators in the methods and practices of peace education. CIPEs are 
locally developed and taught in the local language [practicing interculturality] to 
more adequately address local manifestations of violence, local and national 
educational policies, and prepare educators in culturally and contextually relevant 
educational practices. 
[IIPE 2009:online] 
 
In partnership with the Peace Education Center of Teachers College at Columbia 
University, which founded and guides the global CIPE movement, the National Peace 
Academy supports and coordinates the effort in Colombia. In addition, Peru, India, the 
Philippines and the Ukraine have founded CIPE communities. (More resources are 
available at: http://www.i-i-p-e.org/cipe/.) 
 The CIPEs are a project of the International Institute on Peace Education (IIPE), 
founded in 1982 by Columbia’s Teachers College. The IIPE offers residential, 
cooperative hands-on education in peacebuilding. Organizers and attendees work toward 
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a multicultural learning environment using many interactive approaches. The IIPE 
also promotes networking and community in the host region. During July 12-18, 2010, 
the IIPE held its annual meeting in Colombia. It was co-sponsored by the National Peace 
Academy and the Foundation for Schools of Peace (Fundación Escuelas de Paz), which 
is administered by the Ministry of Education and a consortium supporting education for 
peace (IIPE 2009). 
 Others educating for peace. Colombia has a number of other NGOs involved in 
education for peace: the Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace (Asamblea 
Permanente de la Sociedad Civil por la Paz), which, as its name suggests, works with 
civil society; the Life, Justice and Peace Corporation (Corporacion Vida, Justicia y Paz), 
a church-related program working directly with local communities; the Foundation for 
the Development of Ethnic and Cultural Education of the Pacific (Fundacion para el 
Desarolla Etnoeducativo y Cultural del Pacifico), which works on human rights and 
education of youth; the Foundation for Reconciliation (Fundacion para la 
Reconciliacion), dedicated to a just reconciliation; Just Peace (Justapaz), which works on 
peace and justice issues; Media for Peace (Medios para la Paz), a journalists’ group 
promoting responsible coverage of peace and human-rights issues; Redepaz, the well-
known NGO of civil-society groups that gathers and disseminates peacebuilding 
information; and Vallenpaz, an NGO working in Valle del Cauca and Cauca for the 
transformation of rural conflict (Insight on Conflict 2011). 
 A mobile school. Lastly, worth mentioning in this section is the School for Peace and 
Coexistence (Escuelas de Paz y Convivencia, EPC). Sponsored by Caritas Colombia of 
the Catholic Social Pastoral Office and the Jesuit Program for Peace, it was founded in 
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Manizales in 2003, northwest of Bogotá in the country’s coffee-producing region. It 
represents a national program that looks at peace holistically, from the interpersonal to 
the geopolitical levels. Its significance for our study is that, similar to the Circus for 
Peace cited by Lederach, the EPC is a mobile school that operates in 49 dioceses in 21 of 
the nation’s 32 departments (states). It works with priests and pastoral agents, who then, 
through a multiplier effect, train youth and educators. It also works along the same lines 
with parishes and other religious communities; community leaders; civil-society 
organizations such as civil-defense or mothers’ groups; government and 
nongovernmental organizations at the local, departmental and regional levels; schools 
and universities; and the public. Due to its multiplier effect, it has by now trained tens of 
thousands in  peacebuilding (Rogers, Bamat and Ideh 2008). 
 
Transitional justice 
 Like Peru, Colombia passed a law authorizing a truth and reconciliation process, but 
in contrast, its impact was blunted by provisions granting amnesty to the paras, so much 
so that many peace and justice advocates would come to think it perverse. Colombia 
passed this so-called Peace and Justice Law in 2005, which allowed for the 
demobilization of thousands of paras. But many more remain, perhaps 70,000 or more, 
and many of those have reinvented themselves within security firms, perhaps as many as 
30,000. Prior to its passage, up through 2004, talks with the paras were ongoing, but drug 
traffickers were believed to be guiding much of the agenda. Working without public 
input, the Uribe administration requested that Congress limit or eliminate legal penalties 
(provide impunity) for the paras to assist their demobilization. Investigations into human-
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rights abuses linked to death squads and traced to prominent politicians in the Uribe 
administration proceeded haltingly as impunity slowed progress. During the civil war, 
indigenous, labor and environmental leaders, the latter two also often of Indian descent, 
were invariably targeted for assassination. They objected strenuously to impunity for the 
paras, particularly for the death-squad leaders, also condemned by human-rights 
organizations.  
 By 2006, it was estimated that about 30,000 of 100,000 paras had laid down their 
arms, and when some leaders refused, they were arrested. However, many have merely 
reformed as private enterprise. This is so prominent, it has been called the neo-
paramilitary movement. Most of all, much national and international outrage remains 
over their immunity to prosecution. The law also contained provision for a truth and 
reconciliation process but not much came of it for many years.  
Recently, however, the notion has been revived. Nearly a decade later, the 
government began working with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) 
in New York to bring together international experts who have worked on truth 
commissions to discuss what such a commission does and how it might work in 
Colombia. Members of civil society and government officials participated in the ICTJ 
course offered in March 2013. The best news for survivors and victims was the recent 
passage in 2012 of the Legal Framework for Peace. It allows Congress to create a truth 
commission to provide legal accountability for those exempt from the earlier bill. 
Eduardo Gonzalez, director of ICTJ’s Truth and Memory Program, led training in 
truth and memory projects that call attention to the underlying (structural) issues that 
cause the civil violence. In these workshops, Gonzalez explains that the effort must go 
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further than just basic documentation. It has to involve broader patterns and histories 
of violence and lay out complete reports leading to policy options. It should also secure 
gender equity and the participation of children. It also needs to record in detail the 
indigenous perspective on seeking truth and a special focus on violations against such 
peoples (ICTJ 2013). 
 
Constitutional reform 
 In 1991, a new constitution created provisions for the autonomy of indigenous 
peoples and set up guarantees for their political participation within a corporatist model. 
Within this new charter, Indian communities were recognized as having collective, not 
just individual, rights. They were also given right of consultation and veto over 
development on their lands, especially regarding extractive industries (Ramirez de Jara 
1997). (This exists in theory and is more challenging in practice.)  
Spearheaded by the ONIC (National Indigenous Organization of Colombia), it 
secured more than 37 articles in the constitution. In its aftermath, for the first time, 
compañeros walked miles to the polls instead of being carried by trucks sponsored by 
political parties. Indigenous candidates won most of their elections handily. However, 
while the political rights have been observed, the development rights have mostly been 
ignored.  
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Chapter V 
 
Lessons Partially Learned: 
Local, National and International Connections 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
In human rights and peacebuilding, oddly enough, a key question for the expert 
community becomes, Do we really want to put ourselves out of business? (Or maybe not 
so oddly.) Well, yes and no. Then again, of course we do. But it is a limit concept, like 
social justice, racial harmony or unconditional positive regard. It is at least one way to 
understand the goal of peace and justice work, in this case, that is. We, like dentists, 
would like to be so good at what we do that we are no longer needed.  
 When universities fly. It is an odd form of hubris perhaps. Regardless, we won’t get 
there, so half-measures are necessary. International expertise in human rights and 
peacebuilding is one of those half measures. This is not so much criticism as inevitability. 
It is a partnership, after all, or should be. All the measures, techniques and ideas 
discussed here, in practice, require local people to execute them. At the same time, 
someone has to organize the data, interpret the text and read the landscape, social, 
political, economic, even ecological. That is what social science should do well, what I 
have tried to do here, guided by the daunting realization that peacebuilding following 
civil war is as complex as the social disaster that requires it. One should just about equal 
the other in diversity of causes, drivers or social debts demanding payment.  
 In attempting to rein in this complexity, I have tried to focus a great deal on 
relationships of and across scales, and in the midst of a persistent asymmetry of scale, 
look at the meaning of interpersonal and small-group relationships and their importance 
in making the bureaucratizing of peacebuilding more humane. This is defined as making 
it a more mutual cultural or subcultural exchange. It means making it as intercultural as 
possible, and so, making it more manageable socially and psychologically. We expect 
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that through various forms of dialog and interaction, differences among sectors and 
armed actors would become less mythological (demonized), and more familiar, more 
manageable. This is as simple as saying that healed and reconciled people create healed 
and reconciled, and so more functional, institutions. These institutions are made of 
codified and ad-hoc relationships, so formal and informal relationships play a part.  
What we see convincingly is that in virtually every instance of local-to-national or 
national-to-international transactions, there is a significant amount of interaction between 
and among the levels. It is not strictly linear or top down. Of course, more than seeking to 
make the “upper levels” obsolete, more important is matching needs and resources across 
regions, scales and disciplines and making sure actors at each scale have been sensitized 
to the needs of the other. A classic case for our purposes is the well-meaning yet 
Western-dominated mental-health efforts in Ayacucho. Another might be any 
psychological and spiritual assistance, or conflict-resolution work, that would have been 
of use to human-rights professionals in Colombia. This should probably mean both 
precept-based education about cultural and subcultural differences and interaction on the 
interpersonal level. It involves a focus on relationships, but also on strategic matters such 
as funding plans, health and education strategies or how to get national governments, 
international NGOs and transnational corporations to listen to local concerns.  
This would mean exchanging views not only from Putamayo to Geneva, and back, 
but Putamayo to Cauca, and Cusco to Lima and Lima to New York or Brussels and 
Washington to Oxford and both with Cajamarca. In keeping with Lederach’s guidance, 
perhaps more important is keeping Putamayo in close touch with Bogotá and Arequipa 
and Ayacucho in constant contact with Lima, using the grassroots-to-middle-level 
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connections to get the best targeting of resources, sharing of lessons and currency of 
knowledge base.  
 
Intercultural and international connections 
In these interactions of experts, values and knowledge bases, interculturality should 
increasingly be a given, but it is not. Think of the indigenous activist from southern 
Colombia and his visits to the UN offices in Geneva. As far as he is concerned, those at 
the international level are just new colonial managers, added to the others. In his view, 
they may have only become a little more sensitive to their charges and a lot more 
sensitive to public relations.  
On the other hand, there is probably greater hope in an information age than before it. 
Relations across scales are more fluid, dynamic and far reaching. They enjoy more multi-
lateral interaction and have more potential to transcend social or national boundaries. 
Assisted by this information revolution, more than 20 years after the inception of an 
unprecedented mass mobilization, peasants, indigenous peoples and the urban poor have 
continued to mobilize against neo-liberal economic policies, sometimes called 
globalization or free trade (causing the left to insist on fair trade). One dramatic result of 
the turn to democracy across the continent in the last few decades has been a proliferation 
of indigenous, peasant, faith-based and human-rights nongovernmental organizations. 
They make up the bulk of civil society, from the grassroots to the national and 
international levels. This movement has used the political openings of the economic 
liberalism to speak out against the latter’s damage to workers, communities and ecologies 
(Brysk 2000). The mobilization has produced some milestones that are easy to measure 
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and document, and some that are not. Among the first group, we should note the 
following accomplishments in conventions and declarations:  
(1) In 1989, the UN International Labor Organization passed the Convention on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, No. 169. It replaced the assimilation-oriented ILO 
Convention 107 and instead champions autonomy in development.  
(2) The UN International Year of Indigenous Peoples, also the year of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, introduced in 1993, passed by the 
General Assembly in 2007. 
(3) Two years later, the UN inaugurated the International Decade of Indigenous 
Peoples, 1995-2005. And because it was much needed,  
(4) the Second Decade of Indigenous Peoples, 2005-2015.  
 
As indicated by the need to declare a second such decade, we can reasonably assert 
that, so far, this international resolve has produced a few economic gains, some political 
gains but important cultural gains. The latter may serve as a foundation for achieving 
more of the first two. 
Meanwhile, the deadly assault on peasants and indigenous peoples goes on. Beyond 
stopping the extralegal murder of the innocent, it is the thesis of this study that any 
consideration of mass violence, and any peacebuilding to follow, needs to consider the 
many economic, psychological, social and spiritual deficits (arrayed across a hierarchy of 
needs perhaps) inherent in neo-liberalism, which generally fosters inequity in 
development and pares social programs. Surely some social-welfare initiatives are due 
peasants and indigenous peoples in these two countries because of how brutally they have 
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been excluded from the benefits of Euro-American management of economy, polity 
and society over 500 years. Certain forms of state intervention in the economy and 
politics of an otherwise elite-dominated society would seem to be morally due and 
economically necessary. This is easy to affirm abstractly, but it pits those whose view of 
social ethics tends this way against the IMF’s traditional approach to structural-
adjustment programs, which make major investment contingent on austerity measures. 
They tend to strip out social programs, neutralize peasant and trade unions and lower 
wages. Whether the new privately driven cultural and political progress made by 
indigenous peoples will yield greater social and economic justice in the long run remains 
to be seen. But it may offer greater autonomy and self-determination in civic and civil-
society activities, and this should assist a more equitable development.  
In many situations, particularly the lowlands, where the situation is dire in many 
places, where indigenous peoples are still learning to get the political and economic 
powers that impinge on their land and lives to listen to their demands, what likely has to 
happen is they have to make a well-integrated, well-timed use of international NGO and 
intergovernmental resources to counter the influence of huge multinationals, international 
actors with budgets greater than many countries, and the governments in their thrall. It is 
likely that local mobilization by itself may not be enough, in other words. It needs to be 
marshaled in concert with international backing.  
In light of the critical importance of the international community to any hope of 
ending the assault on peasants and remote peoples, it is clear that national indigenous and 
peasant leaders have a crucial coordinating, teaching and advocacy role – and an equally 
critical symbolic and ideological role (ideology meaning a coherent body of ideas that 
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supports a set of symbols and behaviors). This advocacy should champion but not co-
opt their communities’ needs, from basic to higher order, and present them to the 
international community with minimal distortion. This has produced recognizable, 
sometimes dramatic, results.  
Since the neo-liberal opening, while always at risk for inaction or duplicity, Latin 
American governments have responded to international pressure for enforcement of 
human rights with key constitutional and political changes. This should surely help foster 
peace, but probably more in the long than the short run. They may have had utilitarian 
reasons for doing so, such as access to international lending and foreign investment, or 
reasons of conscience, or both. But they have begun to respond. Ultimately, these 
fledgling gains require more committed action from within and more sustained attention 
from without, including sanctions with teeth, to move from law to policy. Even so, the 
international NGO and intergovernmental communities provide a fulcrum for moral 
leverage with many governments in Latin America. This mobilization may prove to be a 
turning point continent-wide.  
If the issues are seen this way, in terms of scalar asymmetry and human-needs 
hierarchies, indigenous and civil-society groups are learning in leaps and bounds about 
their ability to manage political leverage and use ideological and spiritual resources – 
what Bourdieu would call symbolic capital (or capacity) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) 
– across scales. In this Native-identity moment and mobilization, fundamentally cultural 
but deeply economic and ecological as well, we see an example of a relatively successful 
“bottom up,” more intrinsically motivated movement. But it also requires instrumental 
yet important roles to be played by national and international organizations. If there is 
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good communication and relative good will across the social-political and cultural 
sectors, and across spatial and organizational scales, this should lead to peacebuilding. 
 
Identity, dignity and social movements 
Identity movements can be critical to affirming the dignity of the whole person within 
his or her whole culture and in supporting the fulfillment of the “higher” human needs 
(Galtung 1969; Burton, 1998). Regarding the subaltern, these needs apparently have to be 
met in order to generate sustained action on critical matters affecting the “lower” needs. 
As a way of unifying this array of needs, a deceptively simple but holistic approach to 
meeting needs for peacebuilding comes from Cheryl Lynn Duckworth (2011) in Land 
and Dignity in Paraguay. Examining the indigenous-rights movement in Paraguay, she 
uses what she calls the dignity frame to interpret how the indigenous communities have 
organized their demands for peace and justice into a coherent narrative.  
Much discussed of late in social science, framing, she explains, is “a process by 
which a social group involved in a movement understands, presents and explains their 
worldview and the specific claims they are making” (Duckworth 2011:2). With this 
deceptively simple but far-reaching organizing principle, Paraguay’s indigenous 
communities were able to sum up their demands for respect in light of a universal value – 
autonomy, or self-determination, political, cultural and economic. They were then able to 
highlight a long list of dehumanizing conditions affecting indigenous peoples. Within this 
paradigm, issues of critical inquiry have included contested use of natural resources and 
rights to land – particularly its privatization under neoliberalism, which commodifies 
what indigenous societies hold as a sacred, common trust. Others key demands are 
 191 
related to establishing intercultural education and universal health care. This assertion 
of dignity, this challenge to the state and the elite, began under the repression of the 
Stoessner regime (1954-1989) and continues to this day.  
Burton and Galtung both assert that dignity is a basic human need. They say it 
involves autonomy, self-esteem, social standing and belonging. In contrast to the many 
years of negative stereotypes of indigenous peoples that Euro-American cultures have 
promoted, it means being known accurately, explains Duckworth (2011). It captures a 
range of peasant and indigenous demands in a single, simple concept, offering a way to 
address the full complement of human needs under one banner, in the manner of the U.S. 
civil rights movement (“I Am a Man.”) and a host of others (Duckworth 2011).  
In addition, catalyzed by a pan-Indian mobilization, the constitutional changes in each 
country represent critical examples of local-to-national connections, of local effort and 
influence coming to fruition at the national level. This makes use of a newly 
“complementary” international role, an example of complementarity (Mitchell 2013), a 
coordination across scales, sectors and organizations. This included the comparative 
perspective on transitional justice offered by the EU, the United States and key Latin 
American governments. These written guarantees take their place among the important 
milestones toward building a lasting peace, but they have yet to reach their potential. In 
particular, consultation on development is frequently ignored, often via payoffs or closed-
door negotiations at the state level.  
Regarding other intercultural matters, the Catholic Church provides a social 
laboratory of function and dysfunction across cultures and scales. Historically, it has only 
practiced a limited form of intercultural exchange through a European-dominated 
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syncretism. In it, indigenous myths, symbols, rituals and celebrations were tolerated, 
but the Church basically enveloped key indigenous counterparts. More recently, though, 
it has opened up an intercultural dialog in earnest that looks to take peasant and 
indigenous spirituality seriously on its own terms. This could be a rich source of further 
research.  
This represents the evolution of liberation theology from modernist to postmodernist 
idioms. While at the international level, the Catholic Church first supported, then 
repressed liberative theology and its pedagogy, the liberation movement has survived due 
to a strong grassroots-to-national connection. Because the church is a large, multinational 
organization, it can operate at the international level. At all three levels, local, national 
and international, it has produced a host of initiatives to meet needs at the “lower” end of 
the human-needs hierarchy, and increasingly, it has let Native peoples and the rural poor 
determine their own ways of meeting their needs at the higher levels.  
We also find that, historically, the international level of the Catholic Church has been 
more likely to ignore lower-level needs for the higher, while the NGO community 
historically has been more likely to ignore higher-level needs in favor of the lower needs. 
Within the church, with the advent of liberation theology, this has begun to change the 
terms of theory and practice. The NGO human rights, and peace and justice communities 
are also beginning to address human needs holistically, not just piecemeal and 
legalistically. 
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Intimately counting the dead: Reconciliation and transformation across subcultures  
Among other insights, Theidon and Tate offer a window on the crucial role of 
spirituality in sustaining groups and individuals during periods of tremendous social and 
interpersonal stress, in the midst of the civil violence we have chronicled. In two different 
Andean settings, they are both vitally concerned with personal, group and political 
relationships among the common people, among political and religious leaders and 
among the human-rights and peacebuilding communities. Of particular interest are the 
relationships between international experts and local people, and those as connected 
through the national level, which is a point of articulation, both meanings intended, a 
pivot point and switching yard flexible enough to have good access to international 
perspectives, secure enough to offer a voice for local needs.  
As well as political dialog, each demonstrates why intercultural language and 
education, down-time encounters and exchanges fostering personal relationships are also 
important to peacebuilding. In addition, in each case, spirituality represents a 
fundamental form of psychological adaptation, a social and psychic technology providing 
a point of access to the transpersonal and/or greater psychic resources. Theidon and Tate 
focus on this as a psychic anchor as people struggle with intense stresses within and 
outside of the group.  How it works, socially and psychologically, is not fully spelled out, 
but it should make fertile ground for future work. We will summarize some of those basic 
outlines here.  
 
Regarding Theidon’s (2013) intimate enemies and the repentance of the Senderistas, 
Christianity provides the symbolic background, a metaphysical and political reference 
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point for the transformation of the hearts and minds of villagers and rebels. But the 
phenomenon of forgiveness is virtually universal, and all cultures have ways to process it, 
formally and informally. Using this mythic backdrop, the locals developed their own 
indigenous ritual for reintegration into the community, their own expiation of sin.  
Forswearing past cultural and physical assaults, including the murder of fellow 
villagers, the authority for which was rooted in a international, universal worldview 
(Marxism), the former insurgents vowed to observe a wholly local perspective and ethic. 
This is another conceptually fascinating and peace-supporting aspect of interculturality 
and an implied critique of any alienated, international mentality. 
Also in Intimate Enemies, regarding the documentation, processing and treatment of 
trauma, we see a dysfunctional local-to-national relationship, one that limits local 
expression to conform to international standards of data gathering and narrative 
construction. In light of the virtually sacred quality of certain soul-searing cultural 
narratives – well explored by Taussig, Theidon, Tate and others – regarding the mental-
health workers in Ayacucho, we are confronted with a high level of dissonance in the 
cultural construction of local needs. It leaves local people without a familiar language 
with which to express their grief, without a common emotional stock, a psychic currency, 
across scales. As these are emotionally and spiritually charged issues, hard to 
conceptualize, verbalize and process under any circumstance, victims need the comfort 
and nuance of their own symbols and language with which to express their most complex 
emotions and values. Observing this need for culturally appropriate psychological care 
might be considered a cross-cultural, mental-health right, a variation on “First, do no 
harm.”  
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Interestingly, this is not only a scientific but a hermeneutical issue. By this we are 
saying that meanings, not just transliterations, are involved. In other words, it is 
profoundly local, it exists in a social, cultural and political context, and, if mishandled, it 
leads to inadequate local care and deeper needs for healing and empowerment. Some 
form of culturally appropriate trauma counseling should be available to these 
communities, and their own traditions and healing specialists need to be involved at a 
basic level. This needs to be investigated going forward.  
 It also seems likely that some form of the problem-solving workshops highlighted 
above by Lederach could be adapted for therapeutic purposes to assist reconciliation in 
situations like Ayacucho. They could balance the emotionalism of the ritual repentance 
and allow villagers to develop emotional and conceptual tools with which to confront 
how former mortal enemies might live together. Doing so, they could appropriate 
traditional (local to regional) judicial formats, as with the ronderos of Peru in one case or 
the traditional tribal conciliators of Colombian and the Nasa in another (Zapata 2006). By 
tailoring it to an existing cultural model, such a forum could provide a structure for 
exploring potentially explosive contents.  
 We also see that the near-asphyxiation of nuanced expressions of trauma performed 
by Western bureaucratic methods, the flattening of affect Theidon (2013) documents in 
the trauma industry resonates with what Tate observes regarding the bureaucratization of 
human-rights reporting. Both reflect an ethically removed and context-free routinization 
of care in the guise of professionalism. National human-rights workers report they were 
squeezed between local needs for the social construction of the truth and the requirements 
of the international NGO and intergovernmental community for a standardized discourse 
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in human rights. This, however, is less universal than Euro-American, less timeless 
than modernist. In all, it represents a very important, virtually Weberian, aspect of the 
local-national-international connection.   
 We could also confidently recommend some form, or varied forms, of counseling for 
the human-rights workers in Tate’s ethnography as well. These too would need to be 
intercultural, or inter-subcultural, as it were. They would need to integrate local and 
national worldviews, in particular the liberation and reconciliation paradigms. Tate 
doesn’t emphasize it, but they would also have to deal with a papered-over racism lasting 
a few hundred years 
Without getting too exotic with terminology, we could even say these issues of 
cultural and symbolic conflict, of dialectic and dialog, have to be resolved within a 
hermeneutics of consciousness. Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpretation. 
Consciousness has a succinct definition we have put in an endnote,
3
 but in this context, it 
is akin to a history of mentalities, of master narratives, the history of a people as received 
and their experience of that history. It largely determines a group’s goals and approved 
means of getting there. These may be similar or substantially different from one people to 
another, usually some of both. This is where interculturality lives. It is a symbolic 
interface culturally and an interpersonal interface psychologically, a cross-cultural 
exchange of both, that is.  
Regarding peacebuilding and mental health, people need local help first, from experts 
they know and trust. In highland Peru, this needs to include curanderos who can interpret 
trauma, grief and bitterness in local terms. Interculturally trained curanderos (in some of 
Western medicine, that is) would be the best bet, as they need to educate their various 
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peoples about various Western approaches to healing, as well as explain things in a 
way that satisfies Western professionals and donors. Then, working with a small team of 
anthropologists, linguists and medical and psychological professionals, they would 
translate the villagers’ experience for the national and international communities in ways 
that lose little of the local meaning. Not too fine a point can be put on this. In the case of 
the highland villagers, little national or international help was available in ways that were 
a good fit with the local experience. The attentions of a few linguists and anthropologists 
might have remedied this situation a great deal. Regarding human-rights workers in 
Colombia, better training and face-to-face encounters with local peoples, including the 
remote tribes, would have helped national workers more accurately and responsibly, with 
greater cultural sensitivity, teach local workers about international standards for human-
rights reporting.  
Is there a cultural bias in this process, and how does it affect peacebuilding going 
forward? These and spin-off issues should point to good ideas for future research. 
 
Tate does not say so, but regarding human-rights workers in Colombia, it seems they 
too suffer from too much memory. Ironically, there are now a few therapies, mostly 
pharmacological but also psychological, that treat post-traumatic stress disorder by 
blocking horrible memories, but they were not available in the early 2000s (Brain and 
Behavior Research Foundation 2013; Hale 2014). And are these desirable, medically, 
psychologically, spiritually?  
Such a treatment entails ethical and psychological complications and would probably 
not have been a fit with the culturally critical hard edge (“they kill us or they kill us”) and 
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virtually religious discipline (“I have the same mistica…I haven’t cut the cord.”) 
these dedicated, highly educated, but romantic, workers valued. The subcultural 
cloistering, combined with a working emotional illiteracy (denial) sufficient to get them 
through the day, likely would have interfered with expressing any need for therapy, or 
confession and expiation, or for that matter, rituals of reconciliation, though they 
doubtless could have used such spiritual technologies.  
Moreover, is it possible something like these activities may have occurred and we are 
not told, perhaps out of discretion or due to other priorities? Is that a limitation on the 
data (not of course on the intentions of the researcher)? Is it a limitation and affectation of 
anthropologists that we will analyze in great detail such needs among non-European-
descended peoples but more rarely among Euro-Americans? Among the less educated at 
the local level but not among the well educated at the national level? Among the less 
exalted victims of civil violence but not among the more heroic champions of such 
victims? This is not to criticize Tate, whose accounts are detailed, searching and incisive, 
and who was surely constrained by time and money, but to articulate needs for future 
research, to help secure the best information on these important subjects. Is it possible 
that there may be, in some times and places, an implicit racism in the bureaucratization 
and professionalization of human-rights work? These are interesting questions for further 
work.  
 In light of the recent call from the UN to protect human-rights and civil-society 
workers better than ever before, we see that better care for their physical safety and 
mental health of would mean better care and concern from these workers, more resilience 
and stamina, more cohesion, leading, we hope, to more sustainable efforts overall and 
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less pressure to seek an accommodation tilted toward those who have the most 
advantages already. We would expect it to produce greater solidarity facing an intractable 
enemy, one that can have virtually metaphysical implications for those near it, the ways 
and means of mass violence.  
We see as well the importance of spirituality in making sense of extraordinary, soul-
searing suffering, but with different cultural meanings. For the highland villagers of Peru, 
an indigenous belief system is stretched to its limits, so much so it leads to an appeal to 
Western psychiatry for its best-known and probably most superficial form of treatment, 
pills. Within their own spiritual traditions, the villagers have a variety of symbolic and 
emotional resources with which to communicate their experience of mass violence, and 
with the help of the community, to move past it. But they have too little assistance, 
traditional or modern, to make full and effective use of their own mental-health 
resources. The Western belief system of psychiatry offers some, but these ideas are 
poorly translated and poorly understood by those who need them.  
For human-rights workers in Colombia, through the liberation paradigm, conflict 
theory embedded in Christian symbology offers intellectual and emotional resources with 
which to build solidarity and cope with the chronically high levels of stress and 
depression attending human-rights work. It does seem some form of psychological 
treatment – perhaps fit more comfortably within paradigms of conflict resolution and 
problem solving, but also individual or group work if needed – could have helped bolster 
the personal lives of these individuals and helped treat emotional and spiritual divisions 
within the group.  
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 Ironically, the less educated villagers (in Western, middle-class terms) are 
saturated in suffering and want to make better of use of their own symbolic and 
conceptual resources, but they are also open (or susceptible) to Western ways of dealing 
with it. On the other hand, the better educated human-rights professionals seem to ignore 
such therapy in the interests of psychic and spiritual toughness. Seeing tremendous 
suffering all around them, knowing their lives are at risk when they try to do something 
about it, they try, mostly unsuccessfully, to wall it off or incubate it for motivation, 
different ways to keep it bottled up and under control.  
 The Peruvian villagers need good, common intercultural mental-health and spiritual 
tools. Their situation is almost clearer interculturally. They seem to be a population 
interested in and open to treatment. The human-rights workers needs are more 
complicated psychologically and culturally. They have volunteered for their role and are 
allegedly better educated, more ethically and politically literate and are better equipped to 
deliberate about what they should do or be in the world, what role they should play and 
its moral consequences. They need something like an interculturality made of the 
dialectic of meanings in the broader human rights community, its ethics and politics, one 
that can integrate competing paradigms of social (substantive) and criminal (procedural) 
justice.  
 Within village life, individuals are unique and have distinctive personalities, of 
course, as does their suffering, but the prevailing mentality is collective, so the suffering 
should be treated accordingly, on both levels, that is. This too, the dialectic of an 
individual versus a collective mentality, is a matter of interculturality. The repentance 
ritual does this fairly well.  
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 The Colombian human-rights workers, on the other hand, are torn between their 
social-justice roots and their new identity within human rights. This tears at the group. 
Most understand the importance of a collective, or collectivist, vision, but, 
psychologically and politically, too often seem restricted by the individualistic ethos of 
the dominant social order.  
 Finally, the evangelical churches, some more committed to social issues, some less 
so, have performed a critical role in helping villagers deal with untold trauma and 
suffering. There is too little space here to go into the costs and benefits of evangelical 
witness among the rural poor in the Andes, but it has not been entirely about cultural 
imperialism, even as sensitive social scientists and human-service workers have some 
hard questions about the past.   
 
Truth and trauma  
The truth and reconciliation process represents a beginning, but it is only one part of 
transitional justice. In both countries, reparations are only discussed in the abstract, 
efforts at land reform have been largely thwarted, economic and ecological destruction 
continues in the name of development and communities and peoples continue to be torn 
asunder or disappear. Too often transnational corporations are barely held accountable to 
national governments. Working from the national level, they hold sway at the local level 
because of their leverage at the international level, their access to global capital. Using 
Lederach’s terms, especially regarding large extractive industries, we could say the 
grassroots level needs better help from the pivot point, the conceptually articulate and 
structurally flexible national level. Again, the notion of a translation across mentalities 
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and value systems, a hermeneutics of consciousness, suggests itself. This could be 
called the science and art of interpreting interculturality. It is how we construct an 
intercultural world that we can negotiate in common.  
The truth commissions also offer an instructional moment, a contrast in local, national 
and international meanings, in action and inaction. In Peru, the process involved local 
people and reached into the most affected parts of the population. It pursued multiple 
media, explored many ways to reach the campo and used multiple resources to gather and 
bring them news of their testimony. It also included a national repentance law, which 
provided a ritualistic format for local truth and reconciliation, noted above.  
This was nearly the opposite of Colombia. There, the Uribe administration brokered a 
closed-door, high-level deal that delivered impunity to death squads, kept their violations 
secret and had a very limited effect on their demobilization. It is a interesting inversion of 
Lederach’s ideal – but because the national level sealed itself off from the resources of 
the local and international levels. More recent stirrings of a real truth and reconciliation 
process have emerged since and are already making good use of international resources, 
this in the form of the well-regarded International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). 
In March of last year, it gathered international expertise from many truth commissions to 
advise Colombian professionals. At the national level, members of civil society and 
government have learned and will continue to learn from the ICTJ’s distillation of 
experience (ICTJ 2013).  
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Between the grassroots and elite levels 
While scholars and practitioners have placed a great deal of emphasis on various 
grassroots approaches to peacebuilding, much less has been devoted to how these two 
levels –  the local and elite – interact with one another, and how they might do so better. 
Christopher Mitchell looks into this in the introduction to Local Peacebuilding and 
National Peace: Interaction Between Grassroots and Elite Processes (Mitchell and 
Hancock 2013), a follow-up to an earlier book he edited with Landon Hancock on peace 
communities across cultures (Hancock and Mitchell 2007). The first volume was of 
significance at the time because the concept was new and some believed that, if secured 
by negotiations among local leaders, rebels and security forces, peace communities 
would spread and bring about peacebuilding on the national level. The evidence for this 
is mixed. At some times and places, peace communities have been respected by military, 
para and insurgent leadership. At others, chief executives have denounced them as 
undermining state authority in a way that is treasonous, paras kill whom they will and the 
insurgents resent self-determination by any other entity and undermine it with threats and 
violence. However, in some nations at some times, local peacebuilders have been allowed 
to participate as third-siders in top-level negotiations. In others places at other times, they 
have been shut out. 
According to Layson (2003) and Mitchell (2013), a useful distinction can be made 
between horizontal and vertical peacebuilding. The vertical is the interaction between the 
state and the rebels. The horizontal relates to a number of interests at the same level, 
either the grassroots, or, alternately, running parallel above it, the elite level. It is well 
documented that national agreements can open up the possibility for peace, but the proof 
 204 
is on the ground and much work generally remains. With this in mind, Mitchell 
(2013) creates a simple diagram that conveys many relationships in a basic, four-line 
grid. Connected by an arrow pointing both ways, it puts elite and insurgent leaders at the 
top on opposite poles and grassroots leaders and “local influentials” at the bottom, 
connected by another arrow. Arrows also run up and down between the national and local 
levels. The functional and culturally appropriate coordination along these axes of peace, 
justice, humanitarian and development activities that make up effective peacebuilding is 
what he and others call complementarity. 
He cites an example from the island of Mindanao in the Philippines. Local 
peacebuilding has become more effective there for having included representatives from 
the three main cultures, Moro, Catholic and Lumad. These efforts have involved training 
peace workers in setting up micro-credit facilities; examining media ethics surrounding 
the conflict; and setting up “spaces for peace,” “sanctuaries for peace” or “peace and 
development communities,” the latter through the UN Development Programme. They 
have also promoted as much engagement as possible by civil society in national 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.  
Civil-society groups used pressure and persuasion to get President Arroyo to convene 
a peace panel – similar to the peace commissions noted above. It was largely composed 
of religious, ethnic and regional representatives from the grassroots. In other words, 
national-level peacemaking – solutions negotiated at the upper levels – do not ensure 
there will be peace at the local levels. This uncertainty is greater if the top-level 
negotiations are removed, geographically and organizationally, from local people.  
 205 
In the book’s conclusion, Mitchell and Hancock (2013) outline stages of conflict 
resolution and transformation that are similar to the phases of Barnett et al. (2007). Both 
represent a continuum more than discrete stages, but they allows us to organize the data 
in time and then develop expectations in space. With Barnett et al. in parentheses, these 
stages are: (1) during the violence (stability creation);  (2) during late negotiations or very 
early in the peace (restoring institutions); and (3) during the broader post-conflict period 
(socio-economic dimensions). Beyond their documentary existence as social facts, more 
intensive study of peace communities would be helpful in better understanding early-
stage indicators of peace. We should, in other words, investigate the extent to which they 
can serve as a set of these indicators.  
During the violence. Elites, insurgents and paras will advocate and negotiate for their 
preferred futures, and local efforts are often ignored or denounced. Both the state and the 
rebels may see peace communities and neutrality as sympathy for the other side, even 
treasonous, as Uribe insinuated regarding zones of peace (ZoPs) in Colombia. They are 
equally vulnerable to government or insurgent violence, and, at best, their concerns might 
merely be ignored at the national level. Sometimes, this forces communities to switch 
from emphasizing peacebuilding to less controversial things like development and 
democracy (Hancock and Mitchell 2013).  
During the peace process or soon after. Elites and rebels both want control over the 
significant parts of peacemaking, as they had with war making. Local initiatives may be 
able to prompt negotiations, but infrequently. Once they begin, unless concerted efforts 
are made to involve civil-society actors, local efforts and concerns can be dismissed. 
Sometimes local leaders can be incorporated into negotiation teams, if only as advisors. 
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This is a good way to anticipate local reactions to agreements, so they don’t collapse 
from a lack of local support, a point to be impressed upon decision makers. The situation 
calls for a unified civil-society approach. If divided, the concerns will probably be 
ignored. A classic example is the Colombian NGOs hammering out their agreement 
regarding demands before the UN Human Rights Commission (Hancock and Mitchell 
2013).  
During the post-conflict period. Elites still have most of the advantages and will try to 
dictate policy and programs. However, local NGO initiatives probably have more leeway 
at this stage than at the others. They can go around the national level to solicit training, 
resources and funds from the international level, as practiced lately by indigenous 
movements across the continent. Local-level NGOs often want to emphasize community 
development (economics), and regional and national organizations want to emphasize 
community relations (politics), the latter primarily agreements among departments and 
between them and the state or certain NGOs. The best time for complementarity, 
Hancock and Mitchell (2013) believe, is during peace negotiations or early in 
implementation.  
 
Building for the long term: Sustainability and equity  
The main focus of this study has been on activities ranging from the micro-scale to 
the meso-scale. They have dealt mostly with the early stages of peacebuilding, the 
chronological leading edge. And I have tried to outline a number of factors in the early 
stages cutting across scales and, ultimately, looked at these phases as formative periods 
that could determine the approach to  constituencies and their needs going forward.  
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These other aspects of peacebuilding, the socio-economic dimension of Barnett et 
al. (2007), have to do with the long view of peacebuilding, the preventive aspects that 
constitute the conceptual leading edge. A complex of issues requiring long-term critical 
inquiry involves the interrelationship of sustainable development, social equity and land 
reform. As a guide to theory, practice and grassroots organizing, we will also look at food 
sovereignty and land-rights work pioneered by an international peasant network.  
 Indicators of sustainability and social equity. First, to make headway on a host of 
critical issues closely related to sustainability and social equity, the expert community has 
made a singular project of building a database of indicators of sustainability, 
development and social equity. We will refer to this herein as sustainable-equitable 
development.  
 Regarding such a perspective on sustainability and equity, it is increasingly apparent 
we are on the vanguard of an epistemological revolution. Many organizations are 
devising indicators of sustainable economics, social justice and healthy communities, 
highlighted here as infrastructural to peacebuilding. These should be of great value to 
monitoring and evaluation (M and E) programs, which matter a great deal to donors, 
international lenders and organizations such as the UN or OAS. But they also have value 
for any work in social or natural science aimed at the restoration of community, ecology 
or economy.  
 Regarding comprehensive indicators of sustainable equity, one of the most prominent 
developments is the data gathering done by the United Nations. In response to the 1992 
Rio Summit and its Agenda (for Century) 21, the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development produced Indicators of Sustainable Development: Framework and 
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Methodologies, published in 1996. It revised it in 2001 and published a third edition, 
Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies, in 2007.  
The first edition documented more than 100 indicators in four categories: social, 
economic, environmental and institutional. Each was classified by driving force, state 
(condition) and response indicators. Each had documentation on its relevance, its 
definition and methodology and its limitations, as well as on data availability, agencies 
creating it and additional readings. A sampling of these indicators shows: combating 
poverty; promoting sustainable human settlement development; changing consumption 
patterns; transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity-
building; integrated management of land resources; conservation of biological diversity; 
protection of the atmosphere; and integrating environment and development in decision-
making (UN 1996: ix–xiii).  
Before exploring these indicators of sustainability, however, we should explain that 
the UN has also developed a set of human-rights indicators, but they are not focused on 
the long-term, preventive aspects of peacebuilding we are exploring here. To save space, 
they are listed in an endnote.
2  
They are more closely related to the civil-political rights 
historically lauded in the United States, not to the social, economic and cultural rights it 
has ignored. These are sometimes referred to as procedural and substantive rights, 
respectively (UN OHCHR 2012).  
The UN now categorizes these data-gathering pressure points, parameters and 
metadata in terms of structural indicators, process indicators and outcome indicators. 
Responding to feedback from governments and agencies making use of the indicators, the 
UN has also streamlined the subject matter. The list now consists of more basic 
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categories, called indicator themes. These are poverty, governance, health, education, 
demographics, natural hazards, atmosphere, land, oceans, seas and coasts, freshwater, 
biodiversity, economic development, global economic partnerships and consumption and 
production patterns. Note the increase in environmental categories. The most recent 
report explains the changes:  
 
The division of indicators along the lines of four ‘pillars’ (social, economic, 
environmental and institutional) is no longer explicit in the newly revised set. This 
change emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of sustainable development and 
reflects the importance of integrating its pillars. Consequently, new cross-cutting 
themes such as poverty and natural hazards were introduced and existing cross-
cutting themes such as consumption and production patterns are better represented.  
[UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2007:online; emphasis added] 
 
Since poverty covers a broad range of issues, it was conceptually limiting to keep it as 
one sub-theme under equity. It is now a separate theme that includes sub-themes related 
to income, sanitation, drinking water, energy access and living conditions. 
Using the indicators. Cooperating organizations have pledged to use these indicators 
in their capacity-building activities and offer feedback to enhance their usefulness. They 
are currently established by the Commission of Sustainable Development and, supported 
by two other datasets, the indicators of the Millennium Development Goals and the 2010 
indicators on biodiversity, are considered the best indicators on sustainability and equity. 
Feedback from clients and the expert community goes into updates posted on the web site 
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of the UN Division of Sustainable Development. Other reputable organizations have 
joined the search for the best indicators. The UN’s Earthwatch program (UN System-
Wide Earthwatch 2014) lists some of these on its web site.  
Another initiative regarding indicators of peacebuilding, sustainable development and 
human rights comes from the move to integrate the best methods for monitoring the 
social, economic and cultural rights into the data gathering of the national human-rights 
institutions (NHRIs), of which there are about 70 worldwide. The Brooklyn-based Center 
for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) has been working on this for some time and has 
made important, integrative strides. CESR is committed to: (1) integrating the work of 
various social-justice advocates under one umbrella; (2) mobilizing communities in 
defense of their own rights as a constituency-based movement; (3) involving social 
scientists in applied research to document violations and propose remedies; (4) 
demanding legal, moral and political accountability from state and non-state decision 
makers; and (5) improving living conditions in keeping with basic human-rights 
principles (CESR 2013a). It generally presents an assessment of a country’s standing on 
social, economic and cultural rights to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights 
prior to its visit to that nation.  
In 2003, in conjunction with a number of human-rights and development 
organizations, CESR established the International Network for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net), an information hub for people working on the full spectrum 
of human rights. It also sponsored a white paper on these issues that became an Oxfam 
publication on the rights-based approach to development. Offenheiser and Holcombe 
review this paper and discuss the challenges and opportunities of this approach. In sum, 
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they say that NGOs using such a model, which they support, will have to change their 
way of operating:  
 
Pursuing a rights-based approach is an end to business as usual for international 
development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs will need to move 
beyond supporting delivery of services to building the capacity of civil society to be 
an organized and effective balance to the power of governments and of the private 
sector. This transformation will have profound effects on the basic business plans, 
evaluation systems, and staff competencies of international development NGOs. 
[2003:abstract]   
 
In addition to their role in M and E programs and research, such indicators should be 
shared with as many national-level decision makers, change agents and opinion leaders as 
can be enlisted. This push for persuasion is based on the notion that national-level leaders 
often have the best command of the long view, as Lederach contends, but may lack the 
latest data on local conditions. This should include both humanistic information – 
narrative, interpretive meanings – and numerical information – geometric and 
proportional meanings. The CESR believes these two areas of human-rights discourse 
and policy, the procedural and substantive, have come from separate disciplinary lineages 
but are waiting for theorists and practitioners to help them mesh seamlessly and reinforce 
one another. CESR has published widely on bringing these two sets of rights together, 
morally, socially and conceptually. It advises using NHRIs more intensively in the 
development, application and revision of these monitoring tools (Corkery 2011).  
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With key indicators for sustainability, equity and human rights, we would then 
begin to explore the critical exchanges and relationships among manifold biospheric and 
human systems. We would use this to develop basic accounting (and accountability) 
systems with which to track and manage the development of all manner of very small to 
very large ecosystems. These should include human-made ecosystems.  
For each of these, we would look for appropriate indicators of sustainability, equity 
and interdependence. We expect them to tell us reliably of socio-economic and socio-
ecological health, especially where there is social, economic and geopolitical conflict and 
where human-rights abuses need to be better addressed (and peace better built). In 
particular we would want to look closely at urban-rural, North-South and global-local 
relationships to determine under what kinds of conditions human-rights violations, 
including those of the environment, are likely. We want to establish a warning system 
regarding human-rights and socio-ecological failure, in close connection. These often 
precede state failure, so this should be considered basic to the preventive aspects of 
peacebuilding. We propose that human-rights violations are more likely to occur during 
the breakdown of key capacity-building processes that support the fulfillment of a range 
of human needs, the interlinking of basic human needs and institutions required to meet 
them.  
As a relative consensus is reached on key indicators for a given socio-ecological 
system, the focus shifts to promoting the implementation of policies that foster the 
building of the social and ecological capacity that can begin to meet a wide range of 
human needs. We also want to ask what roles and responsibilities the public sector should 
assume and which the private and NGO sectors should devote themselves to. This 
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objective is crucial. It opens the door to achieving cohesion and collaboration among 
the public and private communities that are the major players in environmental, economic 
or cultural policy. This means launching a dialog across scales that has yet to fully take 
place.  
With these indicators as discussion points and with a data-driven, moderate tone, we 
would seek to throw open a multilateral public discussion about sustainability, social 
equity and human rights, about sustainable-equitable development. What have we, as a 
global society, learned about building social, economic and environmental capacity? 
What are the expectations across scales and the responsibilities of each to the other? 
What are the obligations of large-scale societies to smaller-scale societies and how do we 
meet them?  
To try to answer these questions, we are looking for an empirical basis for support of 
the socio-economic, cultural and environmental human rights. By analyzing the data on 
support for various ecologies, human and natural, we would seek to interpret for the 
global public and its decision makers the rates and meaning of socio-environmental 
change. We want to use them to see where the bodies politic, economic and ecological 
are becoming unhealthy, and when and where environmental or human rights abuses are 
likely.  
 Land reform. Finally, central among issues needing urgent attention is land reform. It 
is a virtual “third rail” issue in public policy and this affects the social construction of 
civil strife and peacebuilding, but it must be addressed. It has been tried periodically in 
both countries over hundreds of years with limited results, though greater gains have been 
made in Peru. There, the Velasco regime began land redistribution in the late 1960s but it 
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was largely blunted by the late 1970s, when a right-wing military government 
deposed a left-wing military government. Moreover, it has been seriously slowed since 
the end of the 1990s and the return to civilian rule.  
 In Colombia, land reform has been always been part of the rebel discourse, but 
beyond that has only been discussed abstractly during negotiations. Only lately has 
President Santos agreed to land reform as part of peace negotiations with FARC. In 
Colombia, with only partial results to show, the last serious attempt at land reform – 
about 60,000 land titles given to small farmers and tenants in the 1970s and 1980s – was 
turned back as drug mafias, paramilitaries, insurgents and wealthy landowners violently 
uprooted small farmers and agrarian workers and recreated a more concentrated 
ownership of land. A more recent move to redistribute land taken from drug gangs and 
paras has not produced much actual transfer. In a paper for the FAO, World Bank experts 
Grusczynski and Jaramillo discuss the conundrum regarding land reform in Colombian. 
This serves for a number of countries with civil wars:  
 
On the one hand, it will be difficult to develop an inclusive and pro-poor rural 
development strategy without facilitating land access to part of the landless 
population. On the other, it is unlikely that the rural conflict can be resolved without 
including a substantial land access programme…. [But] it is difficult to propose 
decisive policy action for the short term while there is an ongoing complex war in 
which two guerilla movements, paramilitaries and the military fight each other on 
multiple fronts in the Colombian countryside. It is unfair to expect potential 
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beneficiaries of land reform or productive projects to thrive while their basic 
security is under threat.  
[2003:online; emphasis added] 
 
In other words, it is very hard to build peace without land reform, and it is very hard 
to enact land reform in a war zone. They argue that the effort and expense of the land-
reform process will only be supported if it is part of a holistic plan for peacebuilding, but, 
as we have noted, stopping the violence and making sure it does not recur has to happen 
first and consumes public resources, institutional energy and social engagement. 
Complicating things but in the proactive domain, entering the debate only recently, is a 
voice advocating that the land rights of the displaced be respected and in particular be 
better protected by modernizing survey, titling and administrative systems. It also could 
benefit from judicial reform. They advocate an end to incentives that favor large farms, 
including generous loans for machinery, easy credit for inputs and irrigation and 
production subsidies. These distort the market and disadvantage smaller family holdings. 
Because family workers are paid in kind, not in cash, small operations are generally more 
efficient economically. Large operations are apparently more efficient politically.  
 Food sovereignty. Land reform is critical because hunger and malnutrition are chronic 
problems in the rural parts of these countries and often lead to violent conflict. Over the 
past few decades, this has produced a movement for food sovereignty, not a new concept, 
but one with a new frame that links it to demands for human rights and helps it acquire its 
own status as a right: the right to productive land, enough to meet one’s needs. Food 
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sovereignty means not only self-sufficiency in food but title to and control over the 
land that can produce that food.  
 In this pursuit, the Transnational Institute, through the agrarian justice initiative of its 
Economic Justice Programme, has highlighted issues of food sovereignty on their web 
site, at international conferences and symposia and in various white papers. (The 
Transnational Institute is part of the International Institute of Social Studies of The 
Hague, Netherlands.) It sponsored the second “Food Sovereignty Colloquium” on 
January 24, 2014. Their last such conference was “Food Sovereignty: a Critical 
Dialogue,” held September 14-15, 2013, at Yale University. Other organizers included 
Food First, Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies and the Journal of Peasant Studies.  
 Another organization is so basic to the food-sovereignty movement that it is 
considered a prime mover. Via Campensina is an international peasant and smallholders 
network. It has made its role and mission the staunch defense of their rights. On its web 
site, it explains:  
 
La Via Campesina is the international movement which brings together millions of 
peasants, small and medium-size farmers, landless people, women farmers, 
indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers from around the world. It 
defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote social justice and 
dignity. It strongly opposes corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies 
that are destroying people and nature. 
[Via Campesina 2014:online] 
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It represents 150 local and national organizations in 70 countries and includes 
about 200 million farmers. An international NGO with a pluralist, intercultural base, it 
was born in 1993 and is by now considered a well-respected voice in global discussions 
of food and agriculture. It consults with organizations such as the FAO and the UN 
Human Rights Council, as well as with social movements at the local, national and 
international levels. Via Campesina has most recently called attention to assaults on the 
livelihoods of small farmers and peasants worldwide by celebrating 2014 with the FAO 
as the International Year of Family Farming (IYFF). The IYFF aims to raise the profile of 
family and smallholder farming by focusing on its pivotal role in combating hunger and 
poverty, in facilitating secure and adequate nutrition, in building local economies and 
incomes and in respecting the environment and pursuing sustainable development. It has 
not just engaged in cheerleading but has raised a critical voice as well – not as much to 
the FAO as to national governments that should take the declaration seriously and not 
bend to agribusiness internationally and large landowners nationally.  
Via Campesina works to facilitate more sustainable and equitable agrarian policies. It 
says its goal to promote the central place of small and family farming in the agricultural, 
environmental and social agendas of nation-states and with nongovernmental and 
intergovernmental organizations. The IYFF also wants to enhance the “relocalization” of 
agricultural production – more direct marketing and locally grown with less market 
manipulation – and highlight policies supporting food sovereignty as a way to enhance 
the social, economic and ecological sustainability of peasant agriculture.    
Quantitative lessons about governments in transition. In Pathways to Freedom: 
Political and Economic Lessons From Democratic Transitions (Coleman and Lawson-
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Remer 2013), in an essay on “Statistical Evidence,” Jan Teorell makes these 
observations about democratization based on quantitative analyses:  
 
 A country’s level of economic development is not a driver of democratization, but 
it is a significant safeguard against backsliding into authoritarianism. 
 In the short term, economic growth under autocracy impedes democratization. 
Conversely, economic crises tend to trigger democratic transitions. 
 Nonviolent mass mobilization against autocratic regimes is a strong trigger of 
democratic regime change. Armed rebellion, by contrast, typically does not lead 
to democratization.  
 Authoritarian regimes with partial political openness are the most likely to grow 
more democratic. It is worthwhile to promote elections in autocracies, even if 
flawed and fraudulent, as long as they permit some competition. 
 The fate of new democracies does not appear to hinge on the choice of a 
presidential or parliamentary system. 
 Overall, quantitative studies are fairly successful at predicting long-term changes 
in the level of democracy. Eruptive short-term change is less predictive. 
[Teorell 2013:22] 
 
Holistic lessons about governments in transition. Also in Pathways to Freedom, 
editors Coleman and Lawson-Remer (2013) distill some lessons from a number of case 
studies of civil violence over the last quarter century. They conclude that:  
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 “New governments should move quickly to adopt policies aimed at materially 
improving the lives of the poor and the unemployed.” These need to be context-
specific but address government spending and reduce across-the-board subsidies for 
necessities while offering targeted rebates on such items to the poorest in the 
population.  
 “Rule of law reforms that establish a fair and level playing field and prevent elites 
from bending the rules to serve their interests are crucial.” Two principles matter 
most here: working with local partners to bolster domestic pressure for reforms, and 
taking a bottom-up, capacity-building approach that secures rights for average 
citizens and protects judges, politicians and police so they can enforce the law.  
 “Transitioning countries should decentralize in ways that help deepen and sustain 
democratization efforts.” This should bring public services and state accountability 
closer to the grassroots.  
 “Conducting elections even under authoritarian governments is worthwhile.” 
These can raise expectations and lay the groundwork for greater democracy.  
 “Rather than arming insurgents or sponsoring coups d’etat, governments and 
international organizations interested in nurturing democracy should support civil 
society and independent media under authoritarian regimes through civic exchanges, 
capacity building and bottom-up technology transfer.”  
 “Given the importance of good neighbors, foreign governments and international 
and regional organizations must strive to compensate for bad ones.” This matters in 
particular with regard to the IMF, the World Bank and other bilateral assistance. They 
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should tie their aid to reforms that prevent elites from using the system to mostly 
serve their interests.  
 “Outside states seeking to promote and reinforce democratization should pursue 
economic strategies – including trade, foreign aid, and investment policies – that spur 
the emergence of a middle class, rather than promote economic ties that increase 
overall growth and wealth but concentrate these gains in the hands of elites” 
(Coleman and Lawson-Remer 2013:227–232). 
 
 The UN System Staff College on indigenous peacebuilding. Lastly here, in the report 
from the UN workshop, “Indigenous Peoples and Peacebuilding: A Compilation of Best 
Practices,” sponsored by the UN System Staff College and the Office for the Promotion 
of Peace and Human Rights of the Catalan International Institute for Peace, the authors 
acknowledge that detailed, prescriptive answers for peacebuilding regarding indigenous 
peoples do not exist. They do, however, outline the following lessons learned (emphasis 
added to applications in this study): 
 
o No magic formula nor unique model [exists]; 
o Choice of timing [of negotiations, initiatives and so on] is critical; 
o [Cultivate] knowledge of different phases of the peace process: confidence 
building, dialog, negotiations, agreement, implementation;  
o Address fundamental causes of conflict [such as land reform]; 
o Rely on domestic capacity [across levels]; 
o Improve communication [among disciplines, locales and levels]; 
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o For the international community [the lessons are]: 
 Coherence of message; 
 Avoiding paternalism [patron-client relations, including international ones]; 
 Analysis of situation [analytical fit to context: Burton’s human needs, 
Galtung’s social conflict, Frankfurt School’s critical theory]; 
 In-house capacity for political actions; 
 Early action [as with a professionalization of human-rights work]; 
 Relying on regional organizations [for communication across scales]. 
[UN System Staff College and Catalan International Institute for Peace 
2010:187] 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The professionalization of human-rights work produces social and ethical tensions 
and brings with it social and ethical risks. Western norms for processing personal trauma 
as data, for interpreting narratives of mass violence, need to be examined. They tend to 
individualize and thereby trivialize a collective experience. This then tends to atomize 
perceptions of resources and support, when the trauma needs to be understood 
collectively. Such methods flatten the emotional-intellectual content, its nuance and 
detail, and substitute an incident-driven, non-contextual narrative. This does not 
adequately heal, reconcile or empower local people going forward. A human-needs model 
can help determine how this bureaucratization of human rights limits the full analysis of 
human needs following mass violence and restricts treatment options. 
 222 
 Trauma counseling and conflict-resolution methods need to be administered 
with maximum sensitivity to the social, cultural and political environment. Because they 
see value systems as products of cultures, psychological anthropologists can help build 
an ethic of interculturality here. In addition, belief systems are an integral part of this 
complex of behaviors. They are continuous and contiguous with the mental-health issues. 
They should be interpreted interculturally and supported equally, without bias. As part of 
this, efforts in indigenous theology should be supported and coordinated across traditions.   
 Various models of mass, pluralistic or civil violence are closely related. What the 
phenomenon consists of is critical. The terminology can be worked out later. They all 
tend to target the destruction of civic (legal-governmental) and civil (nonprofit-voluntary) 
institutions. Peacebuilding has to try to restore these. Third-side efforts for peacebuilding, 
generally from civil society, are essential here. National and international leaders need to 
understand this implicitly and develop resources accordingly. Leaders at the top level 
need to be lobbied effectively to ensure this new sector, this peacebuilding support 
system (the professionalization of human-rights, environment and development work), is 
itself supported. Leaders at the middle level often are best positioned to do this. 
Scholarship can assist this effort by focusing on both failure and success stories. In 
addition, if there is an approach to peacebuilding that is characteristic of peasants, 
Indians and the urban poor, what is that and how can civil society assist it? (See parts IV 
and V.) 
 The third stage – the socio-economic phase – of peacebuilding contains virtually 
all of the matters of economic and ecological adaptation. It is just as critical as the first 
two (stability creation and restoration of institutions). We have confronted throughout 
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how human needs, like human rights, are political. To meet areas of basic human 
needs, as well as higher needs that involve autonomy, esteem and belonging (or dignity), 
and to honor the full set of human rights, development needs to be both socially and 
ecologically sustainable. Therefore, we should discuss “sustainable-equitable” 
development whenever the subject comes up. The good news is we have a burgeoning set 
of concepts, methods, models and metrics to help guide us. These activities, from 
indicators and communities of peace to education for peace, to constitutional reform and 
bans on unauthorized development, to land reform and food sovereignty, represent a set 
of emergent properties in human rights.  
 Making development both sustainable and equitable is critical to a more peaceful 
future, but this is much easier said than done. It is a harder sell than sustainability alone. 
However, it can be justified in terms of systems theory, in terms of an imbalance of 
energy and resources, one which, not unlike natural disasters such as floods, tsunamis and 
earthquakes, bring about catastrophic forms of redress in the form of street or organized 
crime, disease, anarchy, rebellions or mass violence.  
 Most critical of all is governmental, intergovernmental, NGO and corporate 
support for such development. Projects aimed at sustainable-equitable development will 
not only help stop the killings but displace many fewer people and do less damage to 
local and regional ecosystems. They also need to include education in a given indigenous 
culture, in particular its preferred way of managing land, wealth and technology. It should 
therefore include an enculturation in the values of the Other, as part of a general 
intercultural education. This has led to good results in education and development in the 
Andes, Central America, the American Southwest and elsewhere.  
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 Groups that have bonded with violence, such as Shining Path and FARC, 
especially as they move deeply into drug trafficking, pose particular problems. Authentic 
citizen-defense groups, as with the rondas in Peru or the Nasa in Colombia, those who 
restrained their violence but still turned the tide of terror, may present a partial solution. 
They need to be well trained and well paid by a responsible military and not seduced into 
working for rogue elements for as much per month as most peasants see in a year (Tasini 
2007). Lasting, deep social, cultural and economic development needs to occur to limit 
the guerillas’ appeal before they again gain broad support.  
 Truth and reconciliation commissions are a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for social healing and peacebuilding. They need to be part of a full complement 
of transitional justice, customary law and reconciliation and peacebuilding. Transitional 
justice has to provide options for the armed actors, or they will return to what they know. 
This is where sustainable-equitable development is indispensable. They not only need 
vocational training and options. They need to be monitored to ensure they do not regroup 
as security firms or join the drug traders. Law enforcement and the military have 
historically had a cozy relationship with the paras, so ways need to be devised to monitor 
their demobilization and ensure it is not a sham. Given the moral and practical 
complications of impunity, along with prosecution of key decision-makers and military 
leaders, reparations might be a way to broker some form of justice. 
 A clarion call for respect for human rights and rule of law would help as well, of 
course. An intensive campaign should be waged in major media. It should seek to 
demythologize both dirty war and armed rebellion. This is a virtually religious thing to 
do. If such campaigns were endorsed by the spiritual communities of Euro-American 
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Christendom and Native Latin America, they would probably carry more weight.  
They should be aimed at the young.  
 Once demilitarization has begun, state and citizen groups need to build support 
for robust small business, for civil society, for decision makers who won’t be bought and 
for stronger, corruption-resistant government in rural areas, especially the judiciary. This 
includes rebuilding the moral fabric of the courts and law enforcement, as well as school, 
health, agricultural and lending systems. Free-trade agreements need to include protection 
for small farmers, workers, small businesses, peasant unions, associations of indigenous 
peoples, the poor, the trades and the environment (Haugaard et al. 2005;
 
Páez 2006; 
Tasini 2007). These would be well represented, or should be, in a comprehensive 
approach to support for all the human rights, for all. 
 A number of civil-society voices have joined human rights, social justice, peace 
and development groups to challenge the historically legalistic (procedural) approach of 
the major human-rights organizations, and this has begun to change. In general, these 
voices have urged that support for procedural rights be tied to greater support for the 
social, economic and cultural (substantive) rights. The CESR approach we are 
highlighting here favors participatory development (Jochnick and Green 1998).  
 In addition, in 2013, a manifesto of sorts was forged among 49 human-rights and 
social-justice groups worldwide. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, Oxfam International and CARE joined CESR in one of the largest joint 
statements on all the human rights, for all, in perhaps half a century, “Human Rights for 
All Post-2015.”  The statement places a great deal of emphasis on the social, economic 
and cultural rights as they provide support for observance of the civil and political rights, 
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those more obviously trampled on during massive social violence (CESR 2013b). 
That statement appears in full in appendix 3.  
 The Joint Statement on Human Rights for All Post-2015 and the CESR web site 
are good places to start when looking for reader-friendly statements on the urgent need to 
integrate the major UN human rights: civil, political, social, economic, cultural and 
environmental. If development can honor all these rights, there may be peace.  
 
Critical directions for future research  
 More detailed work on how indigenous people working in their traditions and 
progressive Christians have begun to promote and build peace, justice and development 
as equals, in ritual and reflection or action. 
 More in-depth investigation of how “theory/theater of mind” relates to our 
understanding of empathy and its role in conflict resolution and third-side activity. 
 More extensive work on how spirituality works, in various forms across cultures 
and subcultures, socially and psychologically, to keep individuals whole and 
communities together under the extreme stress of mass violence and its aftermath, 
especially during peacebuilding.  
 More detailed examinations of the viability and effectiveness of some form of 
trauma counseling for victims of mass violence that is conducted in the victims’ own 
traditions with their own healing specialists. An equivalent look into what form of 
counseling and treatment would be most helpful, even critical, for human-rights workers 
in Latin America. Is there a cultural bias in this process – Western over 
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indigenous/peasant? Or subcultural – reconciliation over liberation? How does it 
affect peacebuilding going forward?  
 
NOTES 
  
1. UN agencies with a stake in various roles along the peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding 
continuum have lined up behind different but related core concepts. Many of the 
programs of the developed nations have also. Out of various roles and missions, they 
have developed different perspectives on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but with a 
consistency that that should be noted. These agencies have the following models and 
definitions. 
  
 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – peacekeeping: activities to help 
countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace, including 
activities to monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in postconflict 
situations and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements.  
 UN Development Programme – conflict prevention and peacebuilding: activities 
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundation of peace and 
provide the tools for building on those foundations, something that is more than 
just the absence of war (along the lines of the Brahimi report). 
 U.S. Department of State – postconflict reconstruction and stabilization: activities 
to help postconflict states lay a foundation for lasting peace, good governance and 
sustainable development.  
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 UN Department of Political Affairs – postconflict peacebuilding: all external 
efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, 
including all activities and programs designed to support and strengthen these 
transitions.  
 U.S. Department of Defense – reconstruction and stabilization: competencies 
identified for reconstruction include humanitarian assistance, public health, 
infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil administration, and 
media, whereas stability operations require sufficient security forces, 
communication skills, humanitarian capabilities and area expertise.  
 U.S. Agency for International Development – postconflict recovery and transition 
assistance: immediate interventions to build momentum in support of the peace 
process, including supporting peace negotiations; building citizen security; 
promoting reconciliation; and expanding democratic political processes.  
[Barnett et al.:38–40] 
 
Regarding other peacebuilding models and definitions in developed nations, the relevant 
agencies in Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom use different terms 
with different emphases, but there is a great deal of common ground among them. For 
example, related to their role and mission, the UK defense department talks about 
stabilization, while NATO uses peacebuilding. In the UK, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development both emphasize 
postconflict reconstruction. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs prefers conflict 
prevention, while the Canadian government generally calls its work for peace and 
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development peacebuilding. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan prefers conflict 
prevention. Its International Cooperation Agency uses peacebuilding and its defense 
department reconstruction assistance (Barnett et al. 2007).  
 
2. If the UN is incapable or unwilling to act when intervention is needed, then the human 
rights, social justice, peace and development communities need to mobilize to pressure 
governments, those implicated and those with diplomatic or financial relations with the 
offending states. Donor nations and intergovernmental organizations (beyond the UN) 
should have the most leverage here and should be targeted (World Bank, IMF, OAS, 
OHCHR and others). This points to another critical reason for an expanded, multi-lateral 
model of genocide: to prevent inaction based on any protracted debate over whether the 
situation constitutes genocide.  
 
3. Consciousness: [1] the condition of being conscious; [2] the normal state of being 
awake and able to understand what is happening around you; a person's mind and 
thoughts; [3] knowledge that is shared by a group of people [the definition relevant here] 
(Merriam-Webster.com 2014b). 
 
4. According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, three types 
of human-rights indicators and their characteristics are:  
(1) Structural indicators help in capturing the acceptance, intent and commitment of 
the State to undertake measures in keeping with its human rights obligations. Some 
common structural indicators are: 
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a) International human rights treaties…ratified by the State; 
b) Time frame and coverage of national policy on vocational and technical 
education; 
c) Date of entry into force and coverage of formal procedure governing the 
inspection of police cells, detention centres and prisons by independent 
inspection entities. 
 
(2) Process indicators help in assessing a State’s efforts, through its implementation 
of policy measures and programmes of action, to transform its human rights 
commitments into the desired results. Some common process indicators are: 
a) Indicators based on budget allocations; 
b) Coverage of targeted population groups under public programmes; 
c) Human rights complaints received and the proportion redressed; 
d) Incentive and awareness measures extended by the duty bearer to address 
specific human rights issues; and 
e) Indicators reflecting functioning of specific institutions (e.g., NHRI [national 
human rights institutions], legal system). 
 
(3) Outcome indicators help in assessing the results of State efforts in furthering 
the enjoyment of human rights. Some common examples are: 
a) Proportion of labour force participating in social security scheme(s); 
b) Reported cases of miscarriage of justice and proportion of victims who 
received compensation within a reasonable time; and 
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c) Educational attainments (e.g., youth and adult literacy rates) by 
targeted population group. 
[UN OHCHR 2012:34,36,38] 
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APPENDIX 1 
Summary of The Third Side: Why We Fight and How We Can Stop 
 
[From: www.thirdside.org] 
 
[William] Ury begins his introduction [to The Third Side] by saying, "No more 
important challenge faces us today than how to deal with our differences." He suggests 
that currently our differences are often resolved by fighting, which he defines as 
“a  e p s  o reso ve conf ic    roug    e use of coercive force ” He goes on to argue that 
  is p eno enon is  arge y   e resu     e wide y  e d be iefs   a  “  ere is no o  er way” 
to resolve differences, or that conflict is human nature. 
T e firs  sec ion responds  o   e assu p ion   a  “  ere is no o  er way” by providing 
an a  erna ive  o vio ence, w ic   e ca  s “  e   ird side ” According  o Ury,   e   ird side 
is "people from the community, using a certain kind of power – the power of peers, from 
a certain perspective – of common ground, supporting a certain process – of dialog and 
nonviolence, and aiming for a certain product – a “ rip e win ” He defines   is “ rip e 
win” as “a reso u ion   a  sa isfies   e  egi i a e needs of   e par ies and a    e sa e  i e 
 ee s   e needs of   e wider co  uni y ” For a ore de ai ed descrip ion of   e “  ird 
side,” see    p:  www beyondin rac abi i y org essay T irdsiders  and www   irdside org  
Having provided an alternative to violence, in the second part of the book, Ury turns 
his attention to the assumed inevitability of violence. While many people believe that 
vio ence is in “ u an na ure,” Ury argues   a    is assu p ion is an “origin y  ” of 
con e porary Wes ern socie y  He poin s  o “si p er socie ies” suc  as   e Bus  en and 
the Semai as examples of societies that do not assume the inevitability of violence and 
goes on to suggest that for 99 percent of human history violent coercion was probably not 
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the norm. Rather, he suggests that it is only in the most recent 1 percent of human history 
that war and violence have been accepted as “ u an na ure ” 
He a  ribu es   is s if   o   e econo ic s if  fro  a resource base   a  is “expandab e” 
in hunter-ga  erer socie ies (wi d foods)  o one   a  is “fixed” in co p ex agricu  ura is  
societies (land and power). As the resource base became “fixed,”   e “basic  ogic of 
conf ic ” is   oug    o  ave s if ed fro  “win-win”  o “win- ose” [zero su ], w ere one 
person's gain is another person's loss. This shift in logic is thought to have encouraged 
violent coercion, but the resource base is again shifting to an expandable resource 
(infor a ion) and   us   e “basic  ogic of conf ic ” can s if  back  o “win-win ” T us, 
Ury views violent coercion not as inevitable, but as a socially constructed norm. 
In the third part of this book, Ury addresses the ques ion of “w a  can be done”  o 
preven  vio en  conf ic  by iden ifying “  ree ajor oppor uni ies  o c anne    e conf ic 's 
vertical momentum, which leads to destructive struggle, into a horizontal impulse, which 
 eads  o cons ruc ive c ange ” T e first of these opportunities is prevention. People can 
prevent conflicts from happening in the first place by addressing latent tensions. The 
second opportunity Ury identifies is resolution. When conflicts do arise, they can be 
resolved before they escalate. The final opportunity is containment. When escalating 
power struggles temporarily escape resolution, they can be contained to prevent violent 
expressions of frustration. 
Wi  in eac  of   ese “oppor uni ies,” Ury iden ifies “prac ica  ro es” individua s can 
embody to help stop violent coercion. Within the prevention opportunity, one can be a 
provider, to help meet frustrated needs, a teacher, to address poor skills, and a bridge 
builder, to strengthen weak relationships. Within the resolution opportunity, one can be a 
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mediator to address conflicting interests, an arbitrator to address disputed rights, an 
“equa izer”  o address unequa  power re a ions ips, and or a  ea er  o nur ure injured 
relationships. Within the containment opportunity, one can be a witness to address a lack 
of attention, a referee to address the lack of limitations or a peacekeeper to address a lack 
of protections. For a more detailed account of these ten practical roles, see 
www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Thirdsiders/ and www.thirdside.org. 
In its three parts, The Third Side addresses common assumptions about violence and 
concludes that there is an alternative to violence, violence is not inevitable and it can be 
s opped  Ury's a  erna ive  o vio en  coercion is   e “  ird side,” in w ich people with a 
common perspective (of common ground) and unified process (of dialog and 
nonvio ence) seek a “ rip e win” (or a reso u ion w ic  sa isfies bo     e par ies and   e 
socie y a   arge)  In order  o ac ieve   is “ rip e win,” individua s can practice ten distinct 
roles in their attempts to prevent, resolve or contain a conflict. Similar to other works 
such as Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Track Diplomacy, Ury's Third Side 
acknowledges that there are many roles to be played to prevent and/or resolve violent 
conflicts. But Ury's book is especially important as it emphasizes the roles that everyone 
– leaders and average people can play to help bring peace and stability to their lives and 
their society. 
[Reeder 2013:online] 
 
* * * 
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Third Siders 
 
Who are the third siders? 
The third side is made up of both insiders, such as friends, family, and even the 
parties themselves, who are in turn actively supported by outsiders, such as neighbors, 
neutrals, and bystanders. 
 
Prevention roles 
The provider. Enabling people to meet their needs. Conflict usually arises in the first 
place from frustrated needs, like love and respect. Frustration leads people to bully 
others, to use violence, and to grab someone else's things. The most basic human needs 
include food (and other necessities for living), safety, identity, and freedom. If we as third 
siders can help people address one or more of these four needs we can avert destructive 
conflict. This is the role of the provider. Share resources, share knowledge; give others a 
sense of security; offer respect; and empower others. 
Although a more thorough description of each of these activities is beyond the scope 
of   is essay… ore de ai  can be found  
The teacher. Giving people skills to handle conflict. Sometimes people fight simply 
because they know no other way to react when a need is frustrated and a serious 
difference arises. By helping people learn new values, perspectives and skills, we as 
teachers can show them a better way to deal with differences. Delegitimize violence; 
teach tolerance; and teach joint problem-solving. 
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The bridge-builder. Forging relationships across lines of conflict. Good relationships 
are key to preventing conflict. Anyone can help build bridging relationships across 
natural divides. A relationship operates like savings in the bank; whenever an issue 
arises, the parties can dip into their account of goodwill to help deal with it. Often not a 
discrete activity, bridge-building takes place all around us, sometimes without us even 
perceiving it – at family meals, on school projects, in business transactions, and at 
neighborhood meetings. Create cross-cutting ties; develop joint projects; and foster 
genuine dialogue. 
The mediator. Reconciling conflicting interests. At the core of conflict are often 
conflicting interests. As mediators, we can help reconcile the parties' interests. The 
mediator does not seek to determine who is right and who is wrong, but rather tries to get 
to the core of the dispute and help the parties resolve it. We may not think of it as 
mediation, but that is what we are doing whenever we listen attentively to people in 
dispute, when we ask them about what they really want, when we suggest possible 
approaches, and when we urge them to think hard about the costs of not reaching 
agreement. Everyone's a mediator; bring the parties to the table; facilitate 
communication; and help people search for a solution. 
The arbiter. Determining disputed rights. Sometimes mediation is not enough to 
resolve a dispute or is not appropriate because basic rights are being violated. Whereas a 
mediator can only suggest a solution, an arbiter can decide what is right. The arbiter is a 
familiar role, embodied in the judge in the courtroom or the arbitrator in a work setting. 
More informally, the arbiter is the teacher deciding a dispute among two quarreling 
students, the parent ruling on a matter involving two children, or the manager 
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determining an issue among two employees. In this sense, we are all potential arbiters. 
Replace destructive conflict; promote justice; and encourage negotiation. 
The equalizer. Democratizing power. Every conflict takes place within the larger 
context of power. Imbalance of power often leads to abuse and injustice. The strong 
refuse to negotiate with the weak or to submit their dispute to mediation or arbitration – 
why should they, the strong think, when they can win? This is where the equalizer has a 
contribution to make. Each of us holds a packet of power, a measure of influence over the 
parties around us. Individually, our influence may be small, but collectively, it can be 
considerable. We are capable of empowering the weak and the unrepresented so that they 
can negotiate a fair and mutually satisfactory resolution. Help bring the powerful to the 
table; build collaborative democracy; and support nonviolent action. 
The healer. Repairing injured relationships. At the core of many conflicts lie emotions 
– anger, fear, humiliation, hatred, insecurity, and grief. The wounds may run deep. Even 
if a conflict appears resolved after a process of mediation, adjudication, or voting, the 
wounds may remain and, with them, the danger that the conflict could recur. A conflict 
cannot be considered fully resolved until the injured relationships have begun to heal. 
The role of the healer is to assist in this process. Create the right climate; listen and 
acknowledge; encourage apology. 
The witness. Paying attention to escalation. Destructive conflict does not just break 
out but escalates through different stages, from tension to overt conflict to violence. By 
watching carefully, the witness can detect warning signals, which, if acted on, can 
prevent escalation of conflict and even save lives. A witness can also speak up to 
persuade the parties to cease fighting and sound the alarm to call the attention of other 
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Third siders who can intervene as mediators, peacekeepers, or other witnesses. Watch out 
for early warning signals; go on patrol; speak out; and get help fast. 
The referee. Setting limits to fighting. Some fighting can be salutary. Fighting can 
serve the function of clearing the air and bringing suppressed problems into sharp focus. 
If and when people do fight, it is important to reduce the harm. That is the role of the 
referee, who sets limits on fighting. Parents know this role well: "Pillows are OK, but 
fists are not." "No blows above the neck or below the belt." As referees, we can change 
the way people fight, replacing destructive weapons and methods with substantially less 
destructive ones. Establish rules for fair fighting; remove offensive arms; strengthen 
defenses – non-offensively. 
The peacekeeper. Providing protection. When the rules are broken and the limits on 
fighting exceeded, the community needs to employ the minimally forceful measures 
necessary to stop harmful conflict in its tracks. The role of peacekeepers need not be 
limited to specialists like the police and U.N. peacekeepers, it is a community function 
that anyone may be called upon to play. When two children fight, adults can step in the 
middle and, if necessary, physically pull the two apart. The best peacekeepers never fight. 
They never fight because they don't need to. They accomplish their ends by intervening 
early and using persuasion. Interpose between parties; enforce the peace; and preempt 
violence before it starts. 
[Ury 2003:online]  
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APPENDIX 2. MODELS OF GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 
 
Author, model and properties (from Chalk and Jonnasohn, 1990, and others after 1990). 
Authors 
 
 
Narrow or 
traditional 
(With stated intent, 
government directly 
murders its own 
citizens, who are a 
racial, ethnic or 
religious group.) 
Broader or 
expanded 
(Mediated – actions 
determine intent; 
perpetrators can be 
other than the state 
and victims other 
than the groups in the 
previous column.) 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence  
 
(Multi-sector, 
multi-lateral, 
involves the state 
and the rest of 
society.) 
Types or other 
properties 
Drost  
(1959) 
Physical annihilation 
only 
Membership in any 
collectivity (not only 
religion, ethnicity or 
nation) 
  
Savon  
(1972) 
Genocide of 
elimination 
Traditional definition 
valid as policy, but 
not useful to social 
science 
Genocides of 
substitution and 
devastation 
Types: 
substitution, 
devastation or 
elimination 
Dadrian 
(1975) 
Successful attempt by 
dominant group with 
authority and/or access 
to resources of power 
to reduce by coercion 
or lethal violence 
minority group 
(emphasis on 
traditional definition) 
Successful attempt 
by dominant group 
with authority and/or 
access to resources 
of power to reduce 
by coercion or lethal 
violence minority 
group  
Cultural and latent 
genocides 
Types: cultural – 
aimed at 
assimilation; latent 
– side effects of war 
or invasion; 
retributive – 
punishment for 
challenging 
majority power; or 
utilitarian –control 
of resources 
Kuper  
(1981) 
Accepts UN definition 
because international 
consensus may make it 
the most viable for 
intervention (not borne 
out in history). 
Still critiques UN 
Convention, including 
the lack of a political 
component he says 
brought it about (see 
below). Calls 
extermination of 
political groups 
related atrocities. 
Since 1900, 
genocides usually 
occur in states that 
are multiethnic or 
pluralistic; these 
are especially 
vulnerable to mass 
violence during  
colonization or 
decolonization. 
Argues for 
genocidal process. 
Types: Genocides 
are designed to 
settle racial, ethnic 
or religious 
differences; to 
terrorize a people 
conquered by a 
colonizing empire 
or nation; or to 
enforce a political 
ideology 
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or 
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Kuper  
revised  
(1985) 
 
Victims can be 
political groups. 
 
Types: against 
indigenous peoples; 
against hostage 
groups; after 
decolonizing a two-
tier empire; in 
struggles by ethnic, 
racial or religious 
groups for power, 
secession, 
autonomy  
Horowitz 
(1984) 
Systematic destruction 
of a people by state 
bureaucratic apparatus 
Admits model 
doesn’  exp ain 
genocide taking place 
across national 
boundaries. Victims 
are any innocent 
people. 
  
Fein  
(1984) 
Murder of a segment 
or all of a group 
defined outside the 
universe of obligation 
of the perpetrator by a 
government (emphasis 
on traditional 
definition) 
Murder of a segment 
or all of a group 
defined outside the 
universe of obligation 
of the perpetrator by 
elite or crowd 
representing the 
perpetrator (emphasis 
on expanded 
definition) 
Political groups 
subject to mass 
killings are called 
ideological 
slaughters. Does 
not explicitly 
exclude soldiers 
killing soldiers or 
civilians residing 
in enemy territory 
during wartime. 
Types: 
developmental – to 
intentionally or 
unintentionally 
destroy peoples in 
the way of 
economic 
exploitation; 
despotic – to 
eliminate real or 
potential 
opposition; 
retributive – to 
destroy a real or 
potential opponent; 
or ideological – 
against groups cast 
as enemies by 
dominant state 
myth 
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or 
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Fein 
revised 
(1990) 
Purposeful actions 
designed to destroy a 
collectivity through 
mass or selective 
murders of group 
members and 
suppressing the 
biological and social 
reproduction of the 
collectivity 
Perpetrator may 
represent the state or 
another collectivity 
(can be states, groups 
or individuals). 
Eliminates one-sided 
killing to include 
victims rebelling 
against unjust govt. or 
situation; allows for 
bilateral genocidal 
killings as in civil 
war. 
 
Re-crafted to include 
social and political 
groups and exclude 
victims of war. 
Bauer  
(1984): 
genocide 
Genocide consists of 
planned destruction of 
an ethnic, racial or 
national group. Includes 
biological decimation 
through kidnap of 
children or prevention of 
family life with the 
same objective as above. 
(Compare to holocaust 
below.) 
Selective mass 
murder of elites or 
other parts of the 
population; the 
elimination of 
national culture and 
religious life (cultural 
genocide); 
enslavement with 
same intent; 
destruction of the 
national economic life 
with same intent 
See previous 
column. 
Includes policies of 
European settlers 
toward many native 
American tribes. 
 
Legters  
(1984)  
Restricted to direct 
attacks on identifiable 
populations such as 
religious, national or 
ethnic groups. Excludes 
political groups and 
non-lethal attempts to 
decimate the group, 
such as deportation or 
cultural genocide 
Includes victims 
based on 
socioeconomic class 
(but not politics). 
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or 
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Melson  
– cited in 
Chalk 
and Jon-
nasohn 
as 1986 
but not 
listed in 
biblio-
graphy; 
see 
Melson, 
1996 
First three types in last 
column (column 5) 
largely conform to the 
traditional definition 
or model  
A process in which 
a settler regime 
confronts a less 
technologically 
advanced people 
 
Types: against a 
communal minority 
tolerated but not at 
all equal; against a 
minority struggling 
for socio-economic 
progress, then 
resented by 
dominant culture; 
against a group 
identified with 
enemies of the state; 
or where majority 
culture undergoes 
economic or military 
disasters. 
Smith 
(1987) 
No definition listed. 
One feature is that all 
his types are based 
largely on intent 
(however, they do 
include key mediated 
genocides).  
Utilitarian and 
developmental (see 
column 5) are 
closely related 
mediated genocides. 
Institutional is also 
a mediated 
genocide.  
 
Types: retributive – 
based on revenge; 
institutional – 
alongside conquest; 
utilitarian – based on 
material gain, 
common in the 
colonial period; 
developmental – has 
most affected 
indigenous peoples; 
or ideological – to 
impose an idea of 
salvation or purity on 
a society. 
Chalk 
and  
Jon-
nasohn 
(1990) 
One-sided mass 
killing in which a state 
or authority intends to 
destroy a group. 
“O  er au  ori y” was 
included to allow for 
occasions where a 
local authority 
becomes the 
perpetrator. 
Group membership is 
defined by the 
perpetrator. Cases 
from broader models 
are instructive. These 
are called genocidal 
massacres and mostly 
combine genocide and 
ethnocide.  
 
Types: eliminate a 
threat [politicide]; to 
spread terror among 
real or potential 
enemies [politicide]; 
to acquire wealth 
[developmental]; or 
to implement a 
theory, belief or 
ideology 
[ideological]. 
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or 
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Scheper-
Hughes 
(2002) 
 
Argues for a 
continuum of 
genocide. Small wars 
and invisible 
genocides deserve 
consideration. Classic 
example of latter is 
street urchins and 
trash scavengers 
disappearing in “socia  
c eansing ”  
See previous 
column.  
Includes in particular 
episodic massacres, 
disappearances, land 
grabs and 
displacement, disease 
or overwork that 
debilitates or kills. 
Bowen 
(2002) 
 
Definition of genocide 
is a social and cultural 
construction. The 
most stable category is 
the relationship of 
powerful to powerless. 
It can involve the 
abuse of economic or 
political power, often 
both. 
Genocide and 
political killings are 
in the same 
category. The more 
reductive the 
category, the more it 
reifies ethnicity and 
ignores its cultural 
construction, and 
the more it suffers 
from a deficient 
political 
explanation.  
Definitions of 
genocide are tied to 
the past but do their 
work in relation to the 
future. They bring 
restrictions binding 
them to events that 
created them. New 
interpretations are 
required to meet the 
challenges of each 
generation. These can 
“s re c ”   e ca egory  
Totten, 
Parsons, 
Hitch-
cock 
(2002) 
UN Convention is 
highlighted but 
authors refer to it as a 
“co pro ise 
defini ion” due to UN 
politics of the time.  
They do explore 
broader models. Also 
note criticism of 
excluding political 
groups and lack of 
distinction of types in 
UN Convention. This 
model seeks common 
ground.  
 
UN Conven ion’s 
mental harm category 
opens door to 
ethnocide. Noteworthy 
is that a dissenting 
member of the UN 
work group felt 
excluding cultural 
genocide would leave 
minorities 
unprotected. 
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or 
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil, 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Barkan 
(2003) 
 
Non-deterministic. 
Diversity of models, 
not parameters that 
exclude possibilities; 
not measured against 
universal yardstick. 
Genocide is a family 
name for a range of 
crimes committed in 
the pursuit of social, 
political, economic or 
ideological 
dominance. 
 
The terms ethnocide 
or ethnic cleansing 
diminish the dignity 
and suffering of the 
victims. UN 
Convention is broad 
enough to include 
these and not dodge 
its international 
duties (to intervene).  
Campbell 
(2009) 
 
Genocide as social 
control based largely 
on social and cultural 
distance. Likelihood 
increases with increase 
in immobility (of 
target peoples); 
cultural distance; 
relational distance; 
functional 
independence (of 
dominant and minority 
groups); and 
inequality. 
 
Types: A social 
deviance that can be 
both predatory 
(exploiting land or 
resources) and 
moralistic 
(retribution for 
alleged grievance or 
failing, often called 
retributive by 
others). Both affect 
peasants and 
indigenous peoples 
disproportionately.  
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MODELS OF GENOCIDE (cont.) 
Author, model and properties 
Authors Narrow or  
traditional 
Broader or 
expanded 
Mass, civil or 
pluralistic 
violence 
Types or other 
properties 
Short  
(2010) 
 
Prevailing notions 
confining genocide to 
direct mass killing are 
not what Lemkin had in 
 ind, don’  recognize 
social and cultural 
“dea   ” Especia  y 
relevant to lethal or 
debilitating persecution 
of peasants or Indians. 
Intent is a consistent 
pattern of action. 
UN Convention is 
inadequate, excludes 
those killed for 
advocacy of social 
justice or self defense. 
Perpetrators can have 
multiple reasons for 
genocidal actions. 
Ci es S aw’s (    ) 
work to show Lemkin 
was at pains to include 
cultural genocide. 
Model excludes 
single massacres and 
includes all 
collectivities.  
Doesn’  depend on 
perpe ra or’s ac ions 
being authorized by 
the state.  
 
Gerlach 
(2010) 
 
A holistic complex that 
is multi-variable and 
multi-sector, one that 
works across ethnicity 
and class, as well as 
social position and 
political affiliation. 
Includes genocide, 
genocidal massacres 
and everything in last 
column (column 5).  
 
Emphasizes process 
over products, 
relationships over 
entities and multiple 
or cybernetic 
causation over linear 
drivers and fixed 
boundaries. Includes 
public participation, 
the state and the rest 
of society.  
 
Includes related 
social disasters 
such as forced 
displacement, 
disappearances, 
rape, famine, 
torture, bonded 
labor and unjust 
imprisonment. 
Ramirez 
(2010) 
 
Multiple armed actors 
function as an 
alternative social order, 
in which militias sublet 
genocidal activities 
from the state. They 
both cooperate and 
compete with the state 
in a pluralistic violence.  
Violent pluralism often 
takes place in an 
authoritarian oligarchy 
that can masquerade as 
a non-authoritarian 
state. It is a genocidal 
pseudo-democracy.  
States of emergency 
seem to affirm state 
dominance but 
actually allow a 
greater role for 
(sublet) death 
squads. Implies that 
Ru  e ’s (1995) 
assertion that 
genocides don’  
occur in 
democracies should 
be amended to 
include this kind of 
violence. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Joint Statement: Human Rights for All Post-2015 
 
 
 A new joint statement, endorsed by 49 leading human rights and development 
organizations, calls for human rights to be placed at the core of the new development 
agenda.  
 
 10 May 2013: Human rights have surged to the forefront of the debate about what 
will succeed the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. As human rights and social 
justice organizations worldwide, we feel compelled to lay out some of the baseline 
implications of embedding human rights into the core of the sustainable development 
agenda this time around. [CESR, 2013b] 
 At its essence, a post-2015 framework anchored in human rights moves from a model 
of charity to one of justice, based on the inherent dignity of people as human rights-
holders, domestic governments as primary duty-bearers, and all development actors 
sharing common but differentiated responsibilities. Accordingly, the post-2015 
framework should be designed as a tool to empower and enable people—individually and 
collectively—to monitor and hold their governments, other governments, businesses, 
international institutions and other development actors to account for their conduct as it 
affec s peop e’s  ives wi  in and beyond borders  A sustainable development framework 
founded in human rights can serve as an instrument for people and countries to help 
unseat the structural obstacles to sustainable, inclusive and just development, and 
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stimulate implementation and enforcement of all human rights—civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights, the right to development and to environmental 
protection.  
 The post-2015 framework must then at the very least respect and reflect pre-existing 
human rights legal norms, standards and political commitments to which governments 
have already voluntarily agreed. International human rights, environmental and 
humanitarian law, the Millennium Declaration, as well as related international consensus 
documents agreed in Rio, Vienna, Cairo, Beijing, Monterrey and Copenhagen and their 
follow-up agreements must form its non-negotiable normative base. 
 If it is going to incentivize progress while also preventing backsliding and violations, 
human rights principles and standards must go beyond the rhetorical, and have real 
operational significance this time around. Amongst other things, anchoring the post-2015 
agenda in human rights for current and future generations implies that the framework. 
 
 1. Upholds all human rights for all. The framework should stimulate improved 
human rights process and outcomes for all people, especially the most vulnerable, in all 
countries global North and global South. Along with economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights, any successor framework must include commitments to protect 
freedom of association, expression, assembly and political participation if it is to ensure 
an enabling environment for an empowered civil society, and protect human rights 
defenders, including women human rights defenders, as central agents translating 
international political commitments into lived realities. 
 261 
 2. Stimulates transparency and genuine participation in decision-making at all levels, 
throughout all policies including budget, financial, and tax policies. Access to 
information and consequential participation is not only a fundamental human right, but 
will also be critical to developing, implementing, and monitoring an effective and 
responsive post-2015 framework  
 3. Integrates meaningful institutions and systems to ensure human rights 
accountability of all development actors. Lofty aspirations for a post-2015 agenda will 
surely fail if proper citizen-led systems of monitoring and human rights accountability are 
not built into the very DNA of the framework, with clear and time-bound commitments 
of all relevant actors. While states must remain the primary duty-holder in development, 
all development actors, including third-party states, the private sector and international 
institutions should be made responsive and accountable for achieving and not 
undermining global goals. Integrating substantive human rights criteria into assessments 
of progress towards development goals and commitments means monitoring both the 
policy and budgetary efforts of governments alongside development outcomes. Any post-
2015 monitoring mechanism would benefit from constructive interaction with the 
existing human rights protection regime, as well as other relevant accountability 
mechanisms. National mechanisms, such as judiciaries, parliaments, national human 
rights institutions, reinforced by regional and international human rights mechanisms 
such as the treaty bodies and the Universal Peer Review mechanism, can help ensure the 
implementation of the post-2015 commitments. Likewise, the post-2015 development 
agenda is well-placed to encourage governments to improve access to justice for people 
living currently in poverty by monitoring measures to eradicate existing barriers.   
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 4. Ensures that the private sector, at the very least, does no harm. The post-2015 
framework must reflect current international consensus that governments have a duty to 
protect human rights through the proper oversight and regulation of private actors, 
especially business and private financial actors to guarantee in practice that they respect 
human rights and the environment, including in their cross-border activities. At the very 
least, no governments should allow their territory to be used for illegal or criminal 
activities elsewhere, such as tax evasion, environmental crimes or involvement in human 
rights violations, no matter the perpetrator.   
 5. Eliminates all forms of discrimination and diminishes inequalities, including 
socioeconomic inequalities as a priority. To start, the timely collection and 
disaggregation of data on the basis of various grounds of compound discrimination is 
essential to identify, make visible and respond to inequalities and violations of human 
rights and to increase accountability. At a national level, data should be collected and 
disaggregated based on country-relevant factors as defined by rights-holders. 
Governments have a particular obligation under human rights law to protect the rights of 
the most marginalized and excluded and to take additional measures to ensure that they 
enjoy their rights on an equal basis with others. Protecting decent work, and diminishing 
wage disparities is also fundamental to reducing socio-economic inequality, as is 
reforming tax policy nationally and globally to unleash the resources necessary to finance 
human rights fulfillment.   
 6. Specifically and comprehensively supports women's rights. Addressing gender-
based violence, guaranteeing sexual and reproductive rights, ensuring wo en’s rig  s  o 
and control over land, property and productive resources and their economic 
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independence, recognizing the care economy and ensuring wo en’s rig  s  o socia  
protection and the equal distribution of paid and unpaid work, and their rights to 
participation in decision-making are critical, not only to realize women's human rights 
and achieve gender equa i y, bu  for enab ing wo en’s fu   and ac ive par icipa ion in 
economic, political and social life.   
 7. Enable the currently disadvantaged and commonly discriminated against and 
excluded groups to be effective agents of their own development by drawing on the 
provisions of human rights standards aimed at eliminating discrimination on grounds 
such as race, disability, migrant or indigenous status, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, etc.   
 8. Upholds the legal obligation to fulfill the minimum essential levels of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, without retrogression, which would imply a focus on “getting 
to zero” through the provision of social protection floors, universal health coverage, food 
security, and other floors below which no one anywhere will be allowed to live.   
 9. Tackles structural drivers of inequality, poverty and ecological devastation at the 
global level. A genuine and balanced global partnership then would enable people and 
institutions to monitor the common but differentiated responsibilities of all actors to 
prohibit rather than perpetuate these global obstacles. To be good-faith partners then, 
governments, business and international institutions must assess the impact of their 
policies (e.g. corporate accountability, environment, trade, aid, tax, migration, 
intellectual property, debt, monetary, financial regulation) on human rights outside of 
their borders. Existing human rights norms can provide a common set of standards and 
useful yardstick to assess policy coherence for sustainable development.   
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 At a time of great uncertainty, multiple crises and increasing insecurity and conflict, 
 e  us no  found   e   s  cen ury sus ainab e deve op en  fra ework on “bracke ed 
rig  s” and broken pro ises, bu  ins ead on a bo d reaffirmation of human rights for all.  
[CESR, 2013b; original boldface converted to italics] 
 
*  *  * 
Signatories so far include: 
 
1.    Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
2.    Amnesty International 
3.    Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) 
4.    Article 19 (Global Campaign for Free Expression) 
5.    Associa ion for Wo en’s Rig  s in Deve op en  (AWID) 
6.    Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
7.    Cen er for Wo en’s G oba  Leaders ip a  Ru gers Universi y (CWGL) 
8.    Center of Concern 
9.    Centre for Research and Advocacy, India  
10.  Centre For 21st Century Issues (C21st), Nigeria 
11.  Climate Change & Development NGO Alliance 
12.  Defensores PROCDN 
13.  Ecological Society of the Philippines  
14.  Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) 
15.  Equilibres & Populations (EquiPop), France 
16.  European NGOs for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, Population and 
Development  (EuroNGOs) 
17.  FemLINKPACIFIC 
18.  FIAN International 
19.  Finnish NGDO Platform to The EU Kehys 
20.  Forum for Women and Development (FOKU.S.), Norway 
21.  Gender at Work (G@W) 
22.  Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
23.  Hope for the Needy 
24.  Human Rights Watch 
25.  International Centre of Comparative Environmental Law (CIDCE) 
26.  International Presentation Association of the Sisters of the Presentation 
27.  International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
28.  International Women's Health Coalition (IWHC) 
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29.  Ipas 
30.  Kenya Debt Relief Network (KENDREN) 
31.  Kepa, Finland 
32.  KULU-Women and Development, Denmark 
33.  Latin-American Campaign for the Right to Education (CLADE) 
34.  National Fisheries Solidarity Movement, Nepal 
35.  National Indigenous Women Federation (NIWF), Nepal 
36.  Oxfam 
37.  Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo 
(PIDHDD) 
38.  Population Matters 
39.  Realizing Sexual and Reproductive Justice (RESURJ) 
40.  Red Latinoamericana de Católicas por el Derecho a Decidir  
41.  Sedane Labour Resource Center (LIPS), Indonesia  
42.  Slow Food Tanganyika 
43.  Social Watch 
44.  Soroptimist International 
45.  Southern Africa Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGON), Tanzania Chapter 
46.  Terre des hommes Germany (tdh) 
47.  WASH United, Germany 
48.  WITNESS 
49.  Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF/FeDDAF-WASRO/BSRAO) 
      [CESR, 2013b; U.S. Human Rights Network, 2013] 
  
 
 
